




Safety Leadership and Command Climate Guide



December 2002

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


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SAFETY LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND CLIMATE GUIDE

Introduction

CNO reminds us, "Navy leaders must communicate and shape accurate expectations. Our people promise to serve, leaders in return commit themselves to mission accomplishment, to the good of the institution, and the growth and well being of their shipmates. That involves clarifying expectations for subordinates." Naval aviation expects Commanding Officers to provide comprehensive leadership. Some of this expectation is clearly communicated, measured and institutionally supported especially in the area of operational effectiveness. Exact expectations however, dim in non-operational areas. One of these expectations is to set and constantly reinforce the command climate and culture. However, there are no specific programs or metrics to guide or evaluate this expectation.

Climate is the feeling you get as you walk around, talk to people and see how they interact, the cleanliness of the command, and the military bearing of the people and professionalism displayed in carrying out evolutions and performing maintenance. Culture is the evolution of climate and the influence of leadership over time. It is measured through communication, trust and integrity. As it relates to mishap prevention, culture is our non-physical operating environment and supports a wide range of rules and attitudes that profoundly affect how we work and train. Leadership styles, formal and informal, both past and present, exert great influence on those attitudes and operating rules that form a specific culture. Formal and informal leaders communicate acceptance of these specific attitudes and rules either through direct and visible actions or support (right or wrong) or through sustained tolerance. You as a leader bear the ultimate responsibility of placing your personnel in harms way.

There is no one right way to create or sustain a positive command climate and robust culture. The following areas are provided to help you foster the right safety climate and culture, one that emphasizes trust, integrity, communication and leadership, and deeply root it into the very fabric and operations of your unit. It is requested that you constantly update this guide based on lessons learned and new ideas and pass it on at a minimum during command inspections.

Preparation

A Commanding Officer should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination where required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and keep a cool head in applying it. He needs to seek optimum, not adequate performance. Not easy, but like landing at the ship a good start means everything when you are preparing for Command. There is no one right way to lead. Individuals come from various personal and professional backgrounds and have different personalities, leadership styles, goals and perspectives. Proper preparation will allow you to understand how these aspects interrelate and what it takes to be the best, begin developing the mindset and framework for your desired Command climate, and ultimately help you on day one to improve command

performance of which a safe and accident free environment is a bi-product. The following will help with that preparation:

- Command Leadership Course

Mandatory, even for previous CO's. A chance to reinforce fundamental tenets of Naval leadership and improve decision-making foundations. Also an opportunity to begin assessing the vision and values of your new command and developing ideas for change. A CD of course material is provided in enclosure (1), appendix A. The website for the Command Leadership School is listed in suggested reading, appendix B.

- Aviation Safety Command Course

Mandatory if not attended in last 3 years. Designed to indoctrinate and reinforce CO's in the current policies, philosophy and techniques of an effective Command safety program. The Navy Postgraduate School Aviation Safety website is listed in suggested reading.

- Command Climate / Culture Assessment

You have the ability to informally assess command climate in a very short amount of time using the human side of organizational life: leadership, motivation, communications, decision-making, goals, and controls. During turnover you may want to consider using the framework outlined in enclosure (2), appendix A, to gain an insight on the existing command climate / culture and define areas where you may want to concentrate your early efforts to either build on the current climate or begin its transformation. Also, if the command has not done a formal Safety Center Culture Workshop or the NPGS web based cultural survey in the last 6 months that is also highly recommended. Read the suggested items in appendix B for more information on these and other important aspects of command climate.

- CTP/XO Mentoring (by CO)

Remember Skipper; you were once a CTP/XO looking forward to assuming command and trying to learn as much as possible. Frequently communicate with your CTP/XO, seek opinions, solicit inputs, delegate to the maximum extent possible, and understand that you two are a team and the command needs to see you that way. Also remember you are training your relief, so that when you depart the command the new leadership will not miss a beat. In superior commands CTP'S/XO's are active in planning, key to unit staffing, display professional knowledge, ensure that the standards are met and enforced, and get out and about to accomplish this. An article on mentoring is provided in enclosure (3), appendix A.

- CO Mentoring (by the Wing Commander or Reporting Senior)

Starts with the Wing Commander or Reporting Senior sharing his views on leadership and being explicit on how he expects a particular command to operate. . Col Fraser's July/Aug 02 Wing Safety Gram, enclosure (4), appendix A, is a good example of communicating policy expectations relative to safety and operational risk management. There will be other

expectations promulgated formally and informally but CO's also need frequent constructive feedback over time on those specific personal characteristics and behaviors that distinguish the CO's of superior commands. They are:

- Targets key issues
- Gets personnel to support Command philosophy
- Develops/involves CTP/XO
- Gets out and about
- Builds team and Espirt de Corps
- Keeps his cool regardless of stress level
- Knows his / her people, and their capabilities
- Develops strong Wardroom Camaraderie
- Develops military / civilian partnership
- Values and seeks Senior Enlisted and Government Service Personnel advice
- Ensures training is meaningful and effective
- Builds positive effective relationships
- Influences successfully
- Leads by example
- Engenders loyalty

- Suggested Reading/Browsing:

- Command Leadership School Website (www.nt.cnet.navy.mil/cls)
- CNAF Rosetta Stone Website (<https://extra.cnaf.navy.mil>)
- Naval Safety Center Website (www.safetycenter.navy.mil)
- Naval Postgraduate School Aviation Safety Website (www.nps.navy.mil/avsafety)
- CNAF Operational Risk Management Website (www2.cnad.navy.mil)
- Ultimate Guide to Aviation Safety, CD Rom, enclosure (1), appendix B
- Culture Shock, enclosure (2), appendix B
- Thoughts on the Culture Workshop and Other Things, enclosure (3), appendix B
- Culture Workshop Seminar Overview, enclosure (4), appendix B
- Culture Workshop Lessons Learned / Best Practices, enclosure (5), appendix B
- MCAS Sample Survey, enclosure (6), appendix B
- CSA Sample Survey, enclosure (7), appendix B
- CNAP Apr 01 msg on Leadership and Retention, enclosure (8), appendix B
- CNAP Nov 01 msg on Fly, Flight, Lead, enclosure (9), appendix B
- Command Excellence: What it takes to be the Best, enclosure (10), appendix B
- Leadership is Flesh and Blood, enclosure (11), appendix B
- Nobody Asked Me but....Fish Rot from the Head, enclosure (12), appendix B
- Redefining Airmanship by Tony Kern
- Command at Sea by VADM W.P. Mack
- Command Excellence in the Wardroom by Robert Greenly and George Fehr
- The Transformational Leader by N. M. Tichy and M. A. Devanna
- United States Navy Policy Book
- Navy Regulations
- UCMJ

- OPNAVINST 3750.6
- OPNAVINST 3710
- OPNAVINST 4790
- OPNAVINST 3500.39
- OPNAVINST 5354.1D

Establishing Policy/Standards/Expectations

Ideally before, but no later than soon after you assume command you should not only recognize the importance of, but articulate your Command philosophy and personal policy statement regarding your fundamental beliefs on how you want the Command to operate and why. You also need to understand the importance of communicating it to all personnel and obtaining their support and buy-in. A successful, well articulated philosophy and policy results in high morale and the desired culture based on commitment, trust and integrity. The following are some suggested ideas for setting and promulgating your policy, standards and expectations:

- **Command Philosophy/Policy Statement**

Needs to be explicit, realistic and is most effective when formally promulgated in writing. Samples are provided in enclosure (1), appendix C. Personnel know what the standards are by being told and by observing the behavior of those whose job it is to enforce them. Remember, your actions and example most powerfully communicate your philosophy. It is through your day-to-day behavior that personnel learn operationally what is important and how you really expect it to be done. Ideas for conveying important attitudes and walking the walk and talking the talk are presented later in maintaining standards.

- **New Arrival Check-in Briefings**

All command personnel need to hear from you personally as soon as possible after the Change of Command, and all new arrivals as part of their check-in process. To ensure quality and consistency regardless of what else may be going on, you need formal briefs and checklists. Sample information from squadron in-briefs, command presentations, ready room briefs and individual aircrew/project officer briefs are provided in enclosure (2), appendix C. Additionally enclosure (3), appendix C, provides RADM Johnston's, COMNAWCWD, all hands safety and risk brief.

- **Directives and Instructions**

Read, review, and understand them. Make sure your philosophy, policy, directives and instructions are aligned. Every effort should be made to avoid misunderstandings regardless of reason or message mismatch, but should one occur, personnel need to know your decision on what takes precedence.

- Standard Operating Procedures/Squadron Organizational Manual

Both need to be clearly written, understood and again aligned with other governing instructions. Equally important, they need to reflect how you "really" do business. Don't get into the habit of waiving directives specified within your SOP. Numerous waivers have the effect of lowering the standard and encouraging less than optimum performance. In situations where a waiver may be appropriate have that decision tree/process articulated in the SOP.

- Training Sessions/Seminars

You all understand "train like you fight," no different here. Get together with your key leadership groups, utilize scenarios or literature that reflect your ideas, solicit inputs, and discuss how they apply to safety and risk management. Establish a process that encourages decisions made at the most appropriate level within your organization. Look at the lowest level that a decision should be made and then determine what you must do to place the decision making process at that level.

- Special Saying or Motto:

Like "If you're not having fun you are not doing it right" or "Safety is my #1 priority". All too often, these statements can have negative results within your organization. Sound bites like this can be a powerful tool, but don't get caught short when it comes to practicing what you preach or realizing the intended results.

Maintaining and Reinforcing Policy, Standards and Expectations

In superior units there is no mystery about what the standards are and the consequences of not meeting them. However, you can't just tell people what is expected and then assume things will be done right. You need to constantly monitor how well things are going and be on guard for problems that may arise. This can range from informal conversations to formal programs and actions. The following tools or actions will help you monitor and reinforce policy, standards, and expectations:

- Constantly review and update standards and operational and safety procedures
- Ensure Strong communication, evidenced by
 - Communication occurs frequently
 - People listen to each other
 - Explanations are given often
 - Communication flows up, down and across the chain of command
 - Supervisors get out and about
 - Personal issues are discussed
 - Routine all-hands, all aircrew, all officer, Captains Call forums
 - Monthly safety gram, example provided in enclosure (1), appendix D

- POD notes, general safety examples are provided in enclosure (2), appendix D, other areas contained on safety center web page
 - Operations / ORM / Safety meetings
 - Maintenance meetings
 - Platform coordinator meeting
 - Safety Council meetings and minutes
 - Routine safety awards and awareness venues
 - Safety read board or share folder, example provided in enclosure (3), appendix D
 - Routine safety posture reports, example provided in enclosure (4), appendix D
- Utilize available tools and processes
 - CO suggestion box
 - Anymouse Program
 - Operational Pause
 - Safety Stand down
 - Wing IG/Command Inspection Program
 - AMMT Visits
 - Model Manager Visits
 - Safety Survey
 - Safety Center Culture Workshop, information provided enclosure (3-5), appendix B
 - NPGS Cultural Web Survey, information provided enclosure (6-7), see appendix B
 - Human Factors Council
 - Human Factors Board
 - Temporary Groundings
 - FNAEB
 - Sponsor or mentor program
 - Internal audits and hazard reporting and follow-up system
 - Ready room lessons learned log
 - ORM, incorporated in all planning and decision making
 - General military, NATOPS/ACT and maintenance training
 - ORM practical exercises at safety stand down or training
 - Safety Center Preventive Maintenance Program
 - Convey Important Attitudes and "Walk the Talk"
 - Personal morale and motivation always high
 - Good safety self talk
 - Safety department has a prominent location
 - Safety jobs and assignments viewed as desired and value added
 - Supervisors key to reinforcing safety command climate
 - Safety department is proactive vice reactive
 - Flight surgeon active involvement
 - Lead by example, on the ground and in the air
 - Make time to fly and manage the flight schedule

- Command presence during flight operations
- Strong what and why mentality
- Absolute support of the "no vote" concept
- Tie rewards to appropriate goals vice those that could lead to shortcuts or violations
- Have the moral courage to always do the right thing
- All actions must support trust and integrity
- Sensitive to and avoid unintentional persuasive culture
- Attend and participate in training
- Develop a "ready room atmosphere"
- Stress importance of informal network to surface violations, hazards and behaviors, etc.
- No perception of negative reaction should someone report a violation or hazard
- Encourage peer influence to discourage violations or negative behaviors
- Temporary groundings for life stressors are not bad
- NATOPS, crew rest, ACT, etc. applies to you too.

Summary

You are responsible and accountable for every aspect of your command. Mission accomplishment and asset preservation will always be a top priority. A leader must understand that he should not focus on managing statistics, instead focus on leading and caring for his sailors. It is unacceptable to lose a single sailor as a result of a hazard that we failed to see or anticipate. This guide is an attempt to help you lead your command more effectively in the areas of risk management and safety. Although sound leadership and command climate principles apply to all aspects of command, successful examples of administering these attitudes may differ. As you evaluate the suggested actions to accomplish a certain objective always consider whether there is another way to safely accomplish the same objective. Fleet Admiral Nimitz once remarked, "The time for taking all measures for a ship's safety is while still able to do so." The strong risk management and safety climate you develop is a key first step.



**COMMAND LEADERSHIP COURSE
TRAINING MATERIALS**

(CD ROM)

INFORMATION SHEET 6-1-1

A. Introduction:

This Information Sheet provides thoughts on a method to informally assess a command's climate.

B. References:

Malone, Dandridge M. *The Integration of Internal Operating systems: An Application of Systems Leadership, Strategic Leadership, A Multi organizational-Level*, edited by Robert L. Phillips and James G. Hunt.

What is command climate? One explanation is that it is the "feel" you get as you walk around, talk to people and see how they interact, the cleanliness of the command and military bearing of the people, and the professionalism displayed in carrying out evolutions and performing maintenance. As a commanding officer, you have the *ability* to informally assess a command's climate in a very short amount of time; one hour or less. Likert, in *The Human Organization* (1967), described climate as a systemic phenomenon resulting from the interactive effects of all the major components of the human side of organizational life: leadership, motivation, communications, decision making, goals, and control. Using these components, you can quickly assess the climate of any command. During your turnover you may want to consider using the following framework to gain an insight on the existing command climate and define areas where you may want to concentrate your early efforts at transforming the climate to meet your expectations.

- Leadership:
 - How much confidence is shown in subordinates?
 - How free do they feel to talk to superiors about their job?
 - Are subordinates' ideas sought and used, if worthy?
- Motivation:
 - Is predominant use made of fear or fear of involvement?
 - Where is responsibility felt for achieving the organization's goals?
- Communications:
 - What is the direction of information flow?
 - How is downward communication accepted?
 - How accurate is upward communication?
 - How well do superiors know problems faced by subordinates?
- Decision making:
 - At what level are most decision made?
 - Are subordinates involved in decision related to their work?
 - How much does the decision making process contribute to motivation?

- Goals:
 - How are organizational goals established?
 - How much resistance to goals is presented?
- Control:
 - How concentrated are control and review functions?
 - Is there an informal organization resisting the formal one?

You can certainly add several of your own questions to each component to obtain the assessment you are looking for to better make decisions regarding the current climate of the command. An organization's climate is all of the answers to all of these questions by all of its people, over a period of time-a vast array of perspectives, all mixed and blended together into how an organization "feels" when you are inside it. The climate of the command evolves slowly over time and becomes its culture. Is that why some commands have consistently good reputations over time and some do not? This informal approach, coupled with a formal assessment of the command can provide a wealth of information for you to either build on the climate or begin its transformation.

"What Is This Mentor Stuff?"

Both Officer Candidates School and The Basic School have implemented mentor programs that are designed to assist a struggling candidate or second lieutenant. Here one author offers a perspective on such programs.

by Capt Brian K. Buckles

Before the Greek King Odysseus left for the war, he tasked his servant, Mentor, to take responsibility for the education and parental responsibilities of his son Telemachus. Mentor was tasked with teaching Telemachus not only book knowledge but also 'the wiles of the world.'

Today the Random House Dictionary defines mentor as a wise and trusted counselor.

Ancient warriors and present-day military leaders have relied on the mentor concept as a way to counsel juniors about their duties and responsibilities in the profession of arms. Recently, however, this age-old concept has raised its head in various corners of the Marine Corps as a program to assist those officers or potential officers having trouble assimilating into the Marine Corps lifestyle. The methods in which these mentor programs have been implemented have created doubt and apprehension on the part of those involved, and in some instances have led to a negative aura surrounding the entire mentor concept.

Though mentoring is not a panacea, it does have valuable benefits. Failing to examine the origins, purposes, and potential pitfalls of these mentor programs may cause the Marine Corps to miss an opportunity that would benefit all officers.

The use of mentors has gained prominence in the civilian business sector because of the need to pass on the experiences of upper-level management to junior executives who are being groomed for increased responsibility. The experienced mentor acts as a role model and provides guidance that aids the junior in overcoming phases of anxiety, stress, and inflated expectations about his or her new work environment.

The developing relationships between a mentor and a junior, according to D.S. Libbey in an unpublished paper titled "Mentoring in Manage-

ment," "are rarely officially sanctioned relationships, but develop naturally in an unofficial manner in most cases." This naturally developing relationship represents a combination of friend, parent, teacher, and guidance counselor. The mentor is obligated to find the right balance and must avoid becoming focused on one aspect of that relationship. Too much friendship can lead to the perception of favoritism by the junior's peers. Too much counseling can be seen as excessive criticism by the junior, which leads to apprehension about the mentor. A balanced relationship between the mentor and his/her charge can produce a life-long association that benefits both people.

A drawback to strictly natural development of mentor relationships in an organization is that female and minority employees find themselves lacking guidance, and thus failing to socialize rapidly. According to Professor Wayne F. Cascio's book *Managing Human Resources: Productivity, Quality of Work Life, Profits*, he states that:

Unfortunately, women and blacks often find themselves excluded from mentoring relationships. Part of the difficulty is that mentoring is frequently based on friendship, admiration, and nurturing developed outside a 9-to-5 schedule. Moreover, some men hesitate to take on female protégés because of the sexual innuendoes that often accompany such relationships.

Therefore, civilian businesses are beginning to intervene directly with sanctioned mentor programs developed by their human resource management departments. By intervening directly, businesses are hoping to correct this disparity and provide equal opportunities for all employees.

The civilian business sector has promoted mentoring because it has found that early and rapid socialization (learning organizational policies, norms, traditions, and values) reduces em-



employee turnover rates, retains corporate knowledge, and increases employee morale. An added and unexpected bonus to sanctioned mentor programs in the business place has been that middle-level and upper-level managers designated as mentors began to show morale improvements and increased productivity. These newly designated mentors began to realize how significant a role they could play, and they felt honored that the company trusted them in this significant role.

Just as the civilian business sector found it necessary to intervene with sanctioned mentor programs, so did certain Marine Corps organizations. One of the first organizations in the Marine Corps to intervene directly with a sanctioned mentor program was The Basic School (TBS). Increased female and minority recycle rates and attrition rates led to the commanding officer's (CO's) initiation of a mentor program. TBS Policy Letter #11, "The Mentor Program," published in April 1992 states:

The purpose of this program is to facilitate contact between staff and students that goes beyond the chain-of-command. It will hopefully provide an additional avenue for advice, counsel, and support for those students who choose to avail themselves of it. I believe that it will assist in the increased professional development of our officer students by fostering the concept of teacher-scholar and making the new officer feel more like a fellow officer in the profession of arms instead of 'just' a student.

Basically, the program serves as a tool to assist

those student lieutenants who are having difficulty assimilating to the Marine officer lifestyle. For example, a lieutenant whose test grade average falls below 75 percent will be assigned a mentor.

The mentors at TBS are staff members not in the lieutenant's chain-of-command. The purpose of this is to allow the student an opportunity to discuss problems without the pressures of evaluation and to provide the student a fresh viewpoint on his or her performance from someone he or she feels comfortable with. Policy Letter #11 further states:

SPCs [staff platoon commanders] can use the mentors as a resource for students, either suggesting or arranging for students to visit with a mentor who shares some experience or background which could be of assistance to the students.

Views of the success of the mentor program at TBS vary widely. Some staff members see the process of sending students to the mentor as an additional burden that disrupts the intent of the chain-of-command. Some staff members view the mentor as someone who can verify a student's deficiencies and, therefore, can assist in the student's disenrollment process. A few staff members have grown to appreciate the mentor program as they have witnessed its success with students requiring assistance. Regardless of the variety of views, the intent of the mentor program at TBS is to assist in student socialization, reduce student disenrollment and associated costs with disenrollment, and increase student morale.

The next organization in the Marine Corps to implement a mentor program was Officer Candidates School (OCS). Faced with allegations of bias and injustice by formerly disenrolled candidates, a quality management board (QMB) was stood up by the commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Development Command in the Fall of 1992 to investigate OCS' operating procedures and high attrition rate. Following the debriefing of the QMB's results to the executive steering committee in May of 1993, the CO of OCS was directed to implement a mentor program as a way to assist minority officer candidates. This program would



be only one element of a larger-scale program to reduce officer and officer candidate attrition rates.

The CO tasked the leadership section of OCS' academic department with developing a mentor program. Debates raged over the conflicting philosophies of OCS' mission and a mentor program's purpose. Some felt that a mentor program implied that OCS would now assist candidates in overcoming their leadership deficiencies. This was viewed as contrary to the evaluation and screening philosophy of objectively and subjectively evaluating a candidate's ability to overcome leadership deficiencies on his or her own accord.

Following much discussion, the final outcome resulted in the publication in June 1993 of *OCS Order 1530.3, Implementation of the Mentor Program*. The following excerpts from *OCS Order 1530.3* highlight its purpose and intent:

- The purpose of the mentor program at Officer Candidates School is to afford officer candidates an opportunity to seek leadership assistance from staff officers outside the evaluation process.
- My intent is not to bypass the traditional use of the chain-of-command, but to provide a support network of guidance and assistance for those candidates who desire such support.
- Officer Candidates School provides an environment which affords every candidate the greatest opportunity for success.

In order to prevent the conflict of opposing philosophies as described above, the CO of OCS determined that the mentors should come from the academics department; therefore they would not play a part in that candidate's evaluation process. The information discussed between a mentor and a candidate is to remain in relative confidence, except in the extreme case where information involved allegations against another staff member or proved to be potential disenrollment material.

Many other concerns about a mentor program at OCS were discussed prior to implementation. Those concerns included quantifying the success of the program; preventing the perception that bypassing the chain-of-command is acceptable; and receiving feedback on the program that would allow the candidate company staff and the officer selection officers (OSOs) to anticipate and address candidate's problems in the future.

Presently, the mentor program at OCS is performing its role as initially envisioned. End-of-course critiques and exit questionnaires have revealed that the candidates believe the program is a valuable aid. Though many candidates never use the program, they have indicated that they have a comfortable feeling knowing there is somewhere to turn in case they have troubles. Trends of topics discussed with mentors have been identified and generally fall into four categories:

- First, the candidates question their ability, their desires, and their original goals for OCS attendance. Candidates often become so focused on completing one task at a time, one day at a time, that they become discouraged and forget why

they originally came to OCS. In this case, the mentor acts like a football coach who pats the quarterback on the shoulder and then sends him back into the game.

- Second, candidates seek advice on upcoming events and billets and seek clarification of the billet assignment process. Candidates sometimes have difficulty understanding the billet duties and responsibilities that we as Marines take for granted (and assume they comprehend). Mentors merely recap the billet's inherent responsibilities as outlined in their Candidate Regulations.

- Third, candidates use the mentor as a way of relieving built-up stress that the program of instruction induces.

- Finally, candidates express that their expectations of OCS differ significantly from the realities of OCS. Usually these candidates are the ones who have failed to prepare mentally and, therefore, are unable to relieve encountered stress.

Specific comments by minority and female candidates on the end-of-course critiques have indicated their appreciation for the mentor program, especially when given the opportunity to meet with a minority or female mentor. They felt it assisted their adaptation to the Marine Corps' beliefs and values (i.e., socialization), and it allowed them to establish contact with potential role models.

Quantifying success of the mentor program at OCS is difficult. Although the CO appeared at the time to have some initial reservations upon implementation, the positive responses reflected by the candidate critiques have most likely dispelled those concerns. Similar to TBS' program and civilian programs, OCS' mentor program assists in socializing candidates, improving morale, and reducing unnecessary attrition and associated attrition costs.

The benefits to sanctioned mentor programs at OCS and TBS were viewed as a potential solution to the overall minority officer candidate and officer attrition problems that have been facing the Marine Corps. Therefore, a second QMB, tasked with analyzing minority officer attrition, established a process action team (PAT) to review the feasibility of enhancing the mentor concept to benefit those who face higher rates of attrition.

The PAT, chaired by LtCol Alphonse G. Davis, determined there to be four significant "chokepoints" of attrition prior to any officer's graduation from TBS:

- The first chokepoint occurred with the initial contracting of potential candidates by the OSO. The OSOs faced varying degrees of difficulty in filling assigned gender and ethnic quotas.
- The second and third chokepoints were attrition

In order to prevent the conflict of opposing philosophies . . . , the CO of OCS determined that the mentors should come from the academics department; therefore they would not play a part in that candidate's evaluation process.



rates with the Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) Junior, PLC Senior, and PLC Combined programs. OCS was experiencing difficulties in graduating acceptable proportional levels of female and minority candidates.

- The final chokepoint was the actual number of successful candidates who accepted commissions—OCS graduation does not obligate a candidate to accept a commission.

Analysis by the PAT concurred with a *Navy Times* report that determined the second, third, and fourth chokepoints, in essence OCS attrition, were being addressed successfully by OCS. The PAT originally focused on precandidate mentor

programs that could address specific minority- and female-related issues such as perceived racism, bias, and obstacles to promotion.

The team also focused on ways that a mentor program could address the first chokepoint—officer applicant contracting. The team then determined that an experienced officer, one who shared a common background with a potential candidate, could assist the OSO in making initial contact, discussing personal experiences, and giving guidance on the challenges

of becoming a Marine officer. Because these assisting officers did not meet the true spirit of a mentor, the PAT titled them OSO support officers.

The proposed OSO support officer program would draw volunteer officers, active duty and reserve, from the geographic region nearest the prospective candidate. In theory, the OSO support officer would provide the guidance necessary

to “level the playing field” for all candidates prior to their arrival at OCS.

The PAT’s final recommendations with regard to sanctioned mentor programs in the Marine Corps included establishment of an OSO support officer program; continuation of OCS and TH mentor programs; and an emphasis by the Commandant of the Marine Corps on returning to the basics of counseling and mentoring. The final recommendation, in the form of a White Letter, would include guidance on the commander’s role as a mentor, and would reference *NAVMC 2795, USMC User’s Guide to Counseling*. Some PAT members felt that negligent counseling and mentoring practices on behalf of commanders have directly contributed to an increase in the perception of institutional racism and bias.

As one who participated in the mentor program implementation at OCS, I was able to view firsthand certain pitfalls that can adversely impact the program. A failure to recognize these pitfalls can, and will, lead to poorly managed mentor programs.

The first potential pitfall is the misleading perception of a mentor’s role. Yes, the mentor can act as a friend, parent, teacher, role model, and guidance counselor. The mentor can provide proposed solutions, critique performances, and boost morale. The mentor and the protégé cannot, however, become such good acquaintances that objectivity on the mentor’s part is lost. The protégé cannot be allowed to rely solely on the mentor for guidance, and the mentor cannot be allowed to solve the protégé’s problems. If any of these errors occur, then the mentor-protégé relationship has been compromised and professional development declines rapidly. The old saying “familiarity breeds contempt” must be kept in mind.

A second potential pitfall is the loyalty conflict a protégé may experience between a mentor and a commander. Sanctioned mentor programs seek shared, common backgrounds as a technique to pair a mentor with a protégé. Shared, common backgrounds may include having been members of the same fraternity, having competed in the same college sport, having a similar hobby, or simply having the same gender or ethnic identity. This shared, common background serves as an icebreaker, or springboard, to further bonding. Because sanctioned mentor programs use mentors from outside the chain-of-command, a well developed mentor-protégé relationship can conflict with existing commander-subordinate relationships inside the chain-of-command. This conflict of loyalty can be easily prevented by the mentor if the first pitfall is avoided. The subordinate, however, is responsible for realizing that the mentor only provides guidance, while it is the commander who writes fitness reports. The subordinate should also realize that the commander has a role in his or her professional development, and the commander, too, can act as a second mentor.

When a protégé seeks guidance from a mentor, the protégé assumes that what is discussed is said

The mentor and the protégé cannot, however, become such good acquaintances that objectivity on the mentor’s part is lost. The protégé cannot be allowed to rely solely on the mentor for guidance, and the mentor cannot be allowed to solve the protégé’s problems.

in confidence. This assumed level of confidentiality is the third potential pitfall to sanctioned mentor programs. Unfortunately, strict confidentiality seldom exists in the military where the Uniformed Code of Military Justice carries the ultimate authority.

Though no need exists to openly discuss guidance sessions with others, information presented of significant importance must be reported to the protégé's chain-of-command. The mentor must simply advise the protégé that he (the mentor) is obligated to do so, and that the protégé is also obligated to inform his chain-of-command. Determining what information constitutes "significant importance" is the responsibility of the mentor. The mentor may make occasional contact with the protégé's commander in order to assess that protégé's progress in professional development. This contact will aid in preventing mistrust between a commander and his subordinate's mentor, and it will aid in preventing the second pitfall of conflicting loyalties.

As sanctioned mentor programs expand, personnel designated as mentors may not have the necessary training to provide sound professional guidance. Therefore, lack of appropriate training and preparation of designated mentors can become a pitfall. Personnel designated as mentors must receive training in their role and purpose in the mentor program. The designated mentor must have a clear understanding of the intent of the person establishing the program. Failure to understand that intent defeats the purpose of implementing a sanctioned mentor program.

Establishing a sanctioned mentor program creates administrative paperwork, appointment letters, training seminars, and counseling forms that lead directly to the final pitfall—time consuming paperwork. Every effort must be made to keep the level of bureaucracy to a minimum in order to prevent a lack of interest in the program. Marine officers already overwhelmed with additional duties will not see the mentor program as building professionalism—but instead see the program as a burden.

Civilian businesses, OCS, and TBS have been successful in implementing sanctioned mentor programs. They have improved mentor and pro-

tégé morale, they have decreased turnover and attrition rates, they have reduced associated costs involved with turnover and attrition rates, and they have instilled programs that enhance the overall professionalism of their respective organizations. We cannot overlook the fact that all four Total Quality Leadership organizations (including the PAT) recommended implementation of mentor programs as a way to address specific officer candidate and officer female and minority attrition problems. All four organizations also came to the same conclusion that these programs, if executed correctly, could benefit all members of an organization requiring assistance and would not be successful if aimed solely at the original target audience.

Regardless if mentor programs are adopted or if commanders choose to enhance their own role as a mentor, examining the origins, purposes, and potential pitfalls of sanctioned mentor programs will allow all Marine officers to glean the benefits of professional development. As Roger H. Nye states in his book, *The Challenge of Command*:

It is the commander-as-trainer who attempts to prepare his people for missions they might embark on tomorrow morning. As mentor, however, the commander looks more towards the horizon, to the protégés' potential in years to come. . . . the mentor's role is to make protégés better leaders, better decisionmakers, and more courageous soldiers . . .


The subordinate should also realize that the commander has a role in his or her professional development, and the commander, too, can act as a second mentor.

US  MC



>Following graduation from AWS, Capt Buckles was assigned as the S-3 officer and CO, Headquarters Company at Camp Fuji, Japan. Prior to attending AWS, he was assigned to OCS where he served in a variety of billets.






July/August 2002

Naval Test Wing Atlantic

Safety Gram



"GATOR SENDS:"

To all Teammates: I have elected to retire from the Marine Corps and this will be my last Safety Gram. The Safety Gram has been a way for me to share my thoughts on safety and Operational Risk Management with everyone in the Wing. My philosophy has been straightforward. If you set and maintain high standards, if you have effective and caring leadership, if you pay attention to what you are doing, if you are accountable for your actions, and lastly if you believe in and use the Risk Management process—you will have done what is required to have a safe and professional organization.

The message that I have sent is simple; ACCIDENTS AS A COST OF DOING BUSINESS ARE UNACCEPTABLE. I am not willing to accept any accident as a cost of doing business. We have had accidents and fatalities in the Wing. The toll of these accidents cannot be measured only in terms of life lost. These accidental losses drain already scarce resources and seriously impact our ability to accomplish our mission. Eliminating accidental losses demands planning, assessment during execution and a commitment to integrate Operational Risk Management into all activities, on and off-duty. This will enable you to make informed decisions in controlling hazards and ensure that risk is accepted at the appropriate level. The key is that all in a position to make a decision have the correct information on which to base that decision.

I have listened to all those that say ORM is another "check-the-block system" that creates paperwork and is a roadblock to accomplishing the mission.

IF YOU ARE ONE OF THEM – YOU DON'T GET IT AND YOU ARE WRONG. FUTURE DECISIONS WILL BE INFORMED DECISIONS – THE FUTURE IS NOW.

The best leader in the Navy cannot eliminate all risk, but what he can do is enforce the standards and demand that everyone demonstrate the utmost in professionalism. My challenge to you remains the same as when I arrived here--on a daily basis demonstrate the professionalism, competency, compassion, and a desire to accomplish the mission in a safe and responsible manner. Do these things and you will be part of a professional organization.

I am extremely proud of the progress and sacrifices that have been made by each and every member of this team. I know that you will continue to promote a safe work environment in the future.

It has been a great pleasure to be part of this TEAM.

"Standing By For Signals"

Colonel Gene Fraser, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander, Naval Test Wing Atlantic

Comments or Questions: Contact Tom Roberts at 342-3425 or robertste@navair.navy.mil or LCDR Bill Patton pattonwr@navair.navy.mil 342-1145.



**ULTIMATE GUIDE
TO AVIATION SAFETY**

(CD ROM)

CULTURE SHOCK

Lt Pat DeConcini
ANGRC/SE
Andrews AFB, MD

The Combat Edge (Jan 95)

In The Beginning

In October of 1992 Major General Shepperd, Director of the Air National Guard, called his Director of Safety, Col Nielsen, and asked him to attend a briefing given by Lt Col Groben, a maintenance officer who had served on four Class A mishap investigation boards. A group of senior officers listened as Groben explained a unique theory he had developed about mishap prevention. Col Nielsen recalls, "For many at the briefing this was a completely different approach that was outside the normal acceptable boundaries of mishap investigation." Nielsen and the others listened cautiously as Groben explained that many recent mishaps occurred not because an individual forgot to perform a required inspection or a pilot violated a regulation or procedure. Instead, he argued, there were dysfunctional unit cultures that allowed the errors to happen, and these cultures were the root causes of the mishaps. Nielsen remembers: "I was a little skeptical at first, but I kept listening; and the more I heard, the more it made sense to me. After the briefing we decided that if we really have a true quality environment, we should at least examine the idea and see what our customers in the field think."

It was agreed that the ANG safety office would take on the project to evaluate its potential. Nielsen sent Groben to two volunteer units to evaluate their cultures. Nielsen explains: "We then surveyed these

units and found out that the program was very well received. Gen. Shepperd agreed that the program had merit, so we decided to continue." It is now two years later and the program has been taken to almost 50 Air National Guard units and one Army National Guard unit. After each visit, a survey is given to the unit commander with the results mailed to the ANG safety office. Col Nielsen says: "Most of the surveys contain comments such as: 'best program yet for the units,' 'every unit needs this program,' 'thanks for a program that is for us.' The units realize that this program is for them to assess their unit culture. The results are confidential and are not given to anyone outside the unit including the ANG safety office which sponsors the program." Nielsen attributes much of the success to the non-retributational nature of the program and gives great credit to Gen. Shepperd for his long-term vision and ability to see beyond the present paradigm. Nielsen explains: "A program like this exemplifies the quality principles that tell us to step outside of our normal boundaries and imagine new ways of doing business. We know that if we take chances on a program of this type it could fail, but if we are unwilling to accept that failure is possible, we will limit our growth and learning. Sometimes risk and uncertainty are necessary to provide for a continually improving organization."

What's In A Name?

In the early stages of the mishap prevention workshop, many commanders provided feedback indicating that the name, Accident Prevention Paradigm Workshop, was inadequate and misstated the scope and impact of the process. As a result of this feedback, Lt Col Groben adopted a new name and the following foundation statement: "An effective safety program must exist on a foundation of Integrity, Trust and Leadership created and sustained by effective communication. The name of the program is: The Leadership Culture Workshop. Groben says, "While integrity is the bedrock of a sound safety program, communication is the medium through which integrity is created." the workshop examines the existence of trust, integrity, leadership and effective communication in an organization. The workshop results are the culmination of a deep inquiry into the workings of the unit far beyond the scope of traditional safety oriented examinations. Traditional avenues of review are essentially compliance based. That is, does a unit do what they're supposed to do, and do they refrain from doing what they're not supposed to do? The workshop process does not focus on these compliance issues. Rather, it examines the foundation of compliance which is integrity. Groben explains: "The issue then shifts from what was done wrong, to why did it really happen? That is, what systemic or attitudinal deficiencies exist that allowed the anomaly to occur, and could those deficiencies rear their ugly head again if not properly resolved?" It only takes one breach of integrity when "no one's watching" to overshadow hundreds of successful Stan/Eval and QA performances. There are several recent examples where the root cause of the mishap was that the crew did not fly what they said they would fly, constituting a breach in integrity. Groben claims that

current Safety Investigation Board (SIB) guidelines and procedures do not address this fundamental issue - leaving the door open for repeats. The current name, The Leadership Culture Workshop, is descriptive of the processes and results which are creating a shift from the traditional compliance view of safety to one with culture as a root issue.

Pitfalls

The lights are on, but no one's home. The existing system makes the commander responsible for safety, with a Chief of Safety to implement and manage the program. Groben describes: "The right person for this job is someone who demonstrates integrity. The effect of filling this position with the wrong person is important from a cultural aspect. Because of the high visibility of this position, unit personnel are aware of the actual performance of the Chief of Safety. Unit members, both enlisted and officer, see what's happening and make judgments about what the commander perceives as a priority and what he/she does not. These judgments essentially run along the lines of "If it's not important enough to place a competent, capable person as chief of safety, safety is not very important." As Groben explains: "The failure of commanders to install an accountable and capable individual as chief of safety constitutes a breach of integrity readily visible to all unit personnel. That breach spreads and becomes the standard for the unit. If problems channeled through the safety office are not handled properly, the culture of safety in the unit will deteriorate. Safety as an effective culture in the unit will be diluted because the commander did not create a culture that places emphasis on it. Saying safety is important will not produce the foundation

for an effective safety program. Actions that mirror those words will."

Leadership Style And Transition

Establishing the right culture many times means altering the existing culture, and change of any kind is often resisted. The culture of a unit may have developed over many years and its roots may be very deep. On the other hand, some unit cultures are newly developing, undefined, or just not entrenched as deeply as others. If cultural transition is necessary, it will probably be much easier in the non-entrenched situation.

Another important factor which may effect cultural change is the style of leadership which created the existing culture. As with cultures, there are many different leadership styles and different types of leaders. One leadership style that creates particularly difficult problems for cultural change is the fear and intimidation method. This style is normally associated with micro-management, arbitrary and capricious actions and a "do as I say, don't ask why, and like it" attitude. From the commander's point of view, this style may appear to be effective. However, as Lt Col Groben explains, this is not always true: "The reflection of this approach eventually begins to manifest itself in negative ways. People stop making independent decisions and seek approval before acting because they are unable to distinguish between situations when approval is needed, and when it is not. Honest opinions are not shared because they are not well received. Lateral communication and coordination begin to suffer because people are too busy protecting themselves." The fear and intimidation approach permeates the organization and becomes institutionalized at all levels. When a leader attempts to

transition to a more empowering style, or a new leader takes the reins, the inheritance of the old style may remain in place for a long period of time in spite of substantial effort to the contrary. Communicating honestly and creating trust where there was none is difficult and risky for the people. Since the path of least effort is to continue with the existing behavior patterns, it can be extremely difficult to dislodge institutionalized behavior patterns.

In order to change the culture, the unit members and commander must first identify what the culture is and what type of leadership styles exist. This is where the Leadership Culture Workshop comes into play. Lt Col Groben's system identifies the unit culture and leadership styles and provides a forum for honest and frank discussion in connection with mishap prevention.

Lt Col Groben believes: "As a commander, the best thing you can do for your unit is to create the right culture, one that emphasizes trust, integrity and leadership, and deeply root it into the very fabric and operation of the unit. Then you will know that as time goes by and the torch is passed, your legacy of professionalism and safety will live on."

Essential Elements

INTEGRITY. What does this mean to Air Force pilots? Integrity is the most important element because it encompasses the core values that the other elements revolve around. Webster's dictionary describes integrity as "firm adherence to a code of...values." According to Groben, "If a pilot has the opportunity to violate a rule with little or no apparent chance of being caught, but decides not to because there's a rule prohibiting it, that's integrity." In this

example, the reason why the pilot doesn't break the rule is not because he/she is afraid of repercussions, but because the pilot understands integrity and believes in following the rules. What exactly is the application of integrity? Why should we follow some training rule that in a situation really isn't important or doesn't apply? Because, although the rule might not apply, the value of following rules does. Groben uses a hypothetical example and explanation to make his point.

Squadron pilots regularly violate the borders of a particular MOA. ATC doesn't usually complain because airline and civilian traffic is rarely in the vicinity of the border excursions. As a result, when a pilot violates the MOA border, there is little or no peer accountability and no consequence back at the squadron. In fact, there is no mention about it in the post-flight debrief because, in practice, there is no potential for harm. As the months and years go by, pilots in this squadron become accustomed to, and unafraid of, frequently violating MOA borders. Then, while deployed to a relatively unfamiliar training sight, Capt. O, as part of a large package, shows up late to the mass brief. He feels bad about being late, but after all, "some guys are late to every brief back home and nothing happens to them." Where our nocturnal pilot arrives at the brief, he squeezes into the back of the room and tries to spot his flight leader. The local briefer is just finishing a discussion on local procedure and airspace restrictions as our pilot finds his flight leader and gets all his paper work. Part of the local brief the pilot missed was a discussion about the importance of not violating the western boundary of the MOA because airline traffic uses it as a transition route into the local commercial airport frequently flying very close to the western boundary of the MOA.

The mission proceeds as planned and our pilot is involved in several multi-bogey engagements. As he pulls off from a guns track and prepares to return to his cap point, he realizes that a right turn will be much shorter than a turn to the left. However, he thinks that if he turns to the right (the short way) he might go out of the MOA, but he's not sure. This is where the subconscious part of his brain says "don't worry, we fly out of MOAs all the time and no one even notices." So, as he turns right and looks over his shoulder for other bandits, he crashes into a small commuter airliner killing all 18 aboard. The pilot ejects and receives a broken ankle on landing and gets to tell the story for the rest of his life. Investigators and commanders completely miss the point and prompt a new FCIF and training focus on maintaining area boundaries.

But, as Groben explains: "Area boundaries are not the real issue. The real issue is that the culture in the squadron allows its pilots to become accustomed to violating rules. A philosophy that allows rules to be broken when it's 'OK' leads to an opportunity to break a rule at each decision point. The system created that rule for a good reason and based it on reliable data and real life eventualities. When you understand this idea and you follow a rule not because you're afraid of getting caught, but because you understand the 'big picture,' congratulations. You have INTEGRITY."

Groben believes integrity by only a few is inadequate, which is why peer accountability is necessary to ensure all members of a squadron have the same philosophy. Does this mean we all have to become policemen of each other? Absolutely not! What it means is that when

you violate a rule, or you see one violated, it is recognized as such and some sort of corrective action is taken. This action might only be a short mention in the debrief: "Hey, you went a little below your minimum release altitude; watch out for that." Or self recognition: "I should have called 'blind' immediately instead of waiting." These small actions by themselves might not prevent a mishap, but the cumulative effect of demanding the best out of yourself and your peers definitely will.

TRUST. What does this mean to Air Force pilots? Again, Webster's dictionary defines trust as "assured reliance on the character, ability, strength or truth of someone or something." As pilots we trust and rely on each other to carry out certain tasks. Without mutual trust we cannot do our job; it's that simple. Time cannot be wasted worrying about whether other flight members are following the rules. The less time wasted on such concerns leaves more time available to do our main job. In simple terms, the more we trust each other, the better and safer we fly. Pilots must trust that other pilots will attempt to protect them from harm, give honest and constructive criticism, accept criticism and act like professionals. We need to be able to trust our training, instructors, commanders and, most importantly, ourselves. Lack of trust can create a nagging feeling of uneasiness which could prove disastrous in the demanding environment of military flying. As Groben states, "Trust comes from

proven, consistent, reliable behavior and the knowledge that everyone is singing off the same sheet of music; and most importantly, the knowledge that everyone has integrity."

LEADERSHIP. What does this mean for Air Force Pilots? For integrity and trust to exist in a unit the commanders must support and actively promote the right philosophy. If the commander doesn't demonstrate that he/she has integrity, the unit is destined to have problems. Groben thinks: "Commanders need to personally address and speak with all pilots to explain what integrity means, why it's important, and what is expected from each pilot. They must specifically address situations where known violations of training rules happen frequently and encourage senior pilots to be publicly self-critiquing as an example to the new and less experienced flyers." This will probably be somewhat difficult for many commanders and senior pilots because of the "touchy, feely" nature of it all. Actually, many squadrons have this exact environment; however, it may not be recognized as such and talked about enough to keep the integrity and trust alive into the distant future. Groben asks: "What's the culture in your squadron, and what are you as a commander doing to change and improve it? Have you accepted that your unit has a culture? If not, look critically at how people operate and you will find a prevailing attitude that explains most of your unit's failures and/or successes." Fly Safe!



THOUGHTS ON THE CULTURE WORKSHOP AND OTHER THINGS

I just finished a Culture Workshop for what I would call a "little better than fleet average" squadron. I say that with a great deal of respect, because I believe that a "little better than fleet average" squadron is a very effective organization. In my book, a "little better than fleet average" represents a unit that on a daily basis confronts and overcomes challenges that most of the planet does not even know exist. "Fleet average" squadrons are probably the biggest reason I am still in the Navy, because in my heart I believe from the most junior sailor to the C.O. they represent all that is best in the Navy as well as the human experience. I have probably seen better squadrons, and I know I have seen worse, but most importantly I know that I would be proud to be counted as a member of this or any other "fleet average squadron." I am saying this up front as a disclaimer, because it is important that any inferences or examples I draw upon that may appear unflattering be taken in the appropriate context.

I believe the workshop was very effective, but as I was leaving the squadron I had mixed emotions. As always I felt like I had done a good job and "earned my pay." The seminars were well attended and very engaged. I am very confident that through the workshop process the squadron had gained some valuable insights, and been provided with a tremendous window of opportunity to make significant improvements in their operation. I was also perplexed by the nagging question, would they?

This was the second workshop this squadron had done in a relatively short period of time, and as luck would have it, I was the facilitator for both. Many of the key players had been on board for both events, so I had a chance to gather some firsthand insight on how this particular unit had progressed in the interim. The squadron had acted on many of the issues that had surfaced in the previous workshop, and had made some significant improvements at what I will call the tactical level. Both individually and as a group they were very positive about their previous experience, and said it had made a difference. They had instituted an ORM program, and across the board they were the best squadron I have observed at being able to at least list the five steps of the ORM process. They had a little difficulty with the principles, however, and implementation was generally limited to an adjunct exercise in matrix interpretation.

They were well into their IDTC, and the operational pace was significantly higher than during the last visit.

As the workshop progressed, it was very apparent that the cost of doing business was high, and that at the root many of the same core issues that had confronted the squadron during the previous visit remained. Although I found this a little disappointing, it was not unexpected, and is probably very close to the norm. The human factors that define the performance of an organization, both good and bad are perishable. Unfortunately, as much as we may wish otherwise, the reality is there is no "endgame," because the contest never ends. The value of the Culture Workshop, much like a NATOPS test, is not in the score, but in the study and reflection that goes into the preparation and execution both

before and after the event. I am absolutely convinced that in the end, any long-term gains will be won by facilitating the development of our talent. As Culture Workshop facilitators, if we can help our customers to hit singles by throwing enough batting practice, "grand slams" are inevitable. If I did not believe this I would have moved on a long time ago.

The institutional challenges faced by the Navy and on a larger stage by our society as a whole, have been created and nurtured over generations. They are not new, and at their core are part of our common human heritage. The particulars might vary, but Naval Officers across the ages would easily recognize the fundamental issues.

Although it is intellectually convenient to talk about doing "the right thing," walking the walk is a whole lot tougher. Taking care of our individual needs is a pretty significant driver in our daily existence. Who among us does not desire to make their personal situation better? That very drive is what has propelled humanity throughout time. Channeled correctly, the desire to succeed is and will continue to be the source of our finest accomplishments. The great challenge comes in the paths we choose to achieve our goals.

On the surface we learn very early that results matter. They are measurable. They can be quantified. Most importantly they lend themselves nicely to data analysis. The only problem is that once in a while "figures lie and liars figure." Furthermore, even the best data is subject to the broad brush of interpretation, and the natural course of action is generally to try and make the brush cast the best possible light on the particular canvas being painted.

Having said that, we all recognize that a child learns very early that personal rewards are tied directly to results. Presented with the choice of being given the answers to a test, or studying many hours to demonstrate the same final product presents a pretty significant and basic choice. Do I take the easy road, or the one "less traveled by?" I think we can all agree that the natural inclination is often the path of least resistance, despite the long-term negative consequences to the individuals underlying educational and moral foundation. The fact of the matter is that most rational societies invest significant effort in teaching and challenging their heirs to take the more difficult path. Fundamentally, they recognize that at the end of the day a solid moral foundation is the key to overcoming adversity and provides the highest probability of triumph. They also understand, however, that a moral compass is not necessarily issued as original equipment. As a point of emphasis, consider all the effort the United States Naval Academy is now placing on character development and ethics.

Those types of choices do not go away, or get any easier as we get older. For most of us they just become a little more subtle and subject to a healthy dose of rationalization.

Throw in a little career pressure, some object lessons in economic reality, and then tie that to a seniority based promotion system, tempered by the promise of performance, and you may discover an organization that on occasion is subject to some institutional deceit. In times of plenty, some of these challenges can be masked by an overabundance of resources. If there is room for everybody at the table and then some, waste and inefficiency can be overlooked, and the motivation to improve can easily be relegated to an intellectual exercise. Deficiencies can be ignored without immediate impact because many problems can be overcome by throwing enough resources at them.

In times of scarcity, however, the opposite is true. The realization that there won't be room for everybody, and that some passengers will have to get off the boat, increases the temptation to insure your ox is not the one being gored. If individual success remains the key element to personal advancement, pressure on individual integrity that once may have been subtle can become intense. If there will only be ten chiefs advanced where once there would have been a hundred, the significance of an individual's ranking amongst his peers is substantially increased.

While overtasking, underfunding, and a lack of both parts and people do impose significant challenges and should not be minimized, under these circumstances they can easily become justifications for individual failures which are smaller, more fundamental, and not specifically related to a lack of resources. By way of example, consider the all too common complaint of Leading Petty Officers that routinely contend they are acting as wrench turners. On the surface the complaint is typically tied to a lack of people. On further reflection, however, those same LPOs readily admit that they are choosing to bypass many opportunities to develop their subordinates. At the end of the day they understand that if the work is not done their personal standing will be diminished so they feel compelled to make sure production comes first. By failing to embrace their role as leaders and trainers, however, they are at best sustaining the effort while the underlying problem continues to fester. At the next level, the same cultural disconnects are often reflected between the LPOs and the Chiefs, and again between the Chiefs and the Division Officers. As a direct result junior people are underutilized and frustrated by a lack of job accomplishment, while senior people feel overworked and compelled to sometimes compromise their personal integrity to get the work done. Throw in a well-intentioned impediment like NALCOMIS II, and you have a recipe for disaster, particularly for our CDI and CDQARs. Clearly there are both external and internal problems in this scenario. Unfortunately the external problem often becomes the focus and then the justification for shortcomings with origins that are closer to home.

From a cultural perspective, a common denominator between "fleet average squadrons" that find themselves stuck in a "peaks and valleys" existence is the failure to effectively utilize the tools they already have to improve the status quo. Conversely, in the most successful organizations these time-tested tools, as well as such simple things as the C.O.'s Suggestion Box and the "Anymouse" are alive and well. Because the stronger organizations have developed and utilized these tools in both good times and bad, and have nurtured a self-reliant culture they are able to moderate the sign wave. Accordingly, the pressures to deviate based on time and personnel shortages do not become

organizational drivers.

Unfortunately, improvement of the underlying culture often requires additional effort, as well as an ability to recognize and confront personal limitations and shortcomings. In a culture where public scrutiny of any shortcomings is likely to result in a truncated career, the desire for honest self-reflection can easily be clouded by the fray of day to day survival. What's the saying about confession being good for the soul, but bad for the reputation?

There are cultures where significant self-critiquing is the norm. Finnish aviators undergo a rigorous five-year training program before they are designated. The airspace and environment they live in, routinely presents formidable obstacles to a safe and effective operation. They are routinely required to fly aerobatics in all types of weather down to 900 meters. Their flight time is very resource limited, and they often do proficiency flying in high performance turbo props instead of their tactical assets. Despite these challenging circumstances their Class A mishap rate is zero. As a routine part of debriefing, aviators are expected to self-report publicly on any deviations or violations that they commit during the course of their flight evolutions. A little closer to home, our own Blue Angels have a similar practice. Both organizations have cultivated a culture of professionalism that requires the individual to put the interest of the group ahead of his own. As a direct result they are able to sustain operations at the most challenging level without compromise or shortcuts. They strive to follow rules, not because they are afraid of accountability or personal consequence, but because they understand that "following the rules," is the measure of their own professionalism and commitment to the organization. They understand that commitment to excellence is more than football slogan, and starts with the individual. Contrast these cultures with some units where post flight debriefs are cursory at best, or even worse do not happen at all. Although we would like to believe and often advertise that excellence is our touchstone, the truth is that sometimes the perception does not match the reality.

So tell me something I don't know, what can be done to improve the situation, and how does this all relate to Culture Workshop, MCAS, CSA, and ORM?

As I reflect back on the history of the Human Factors QMB, it seems to me that while the previous mentioned initiatives have been good ones, the original question was not properly framed. As is often the case, a lot of time and effort went into analyzing data in hopes of finding intervention strategies to reduce the mishap rate. While this has served us well in understanding where we have been, it does not necessarily portend where we need to go. As the class "A" mishap rate continues to decline, finding effective and coherent strategies becomes ever more difficult. Furthermore, while it is clear that human factors have some common elements, intentional violations and supervisory error for example, the difference in individual mishap circumstances makes it difficult to design a system or write a rule that effectively attacks the root causes in each particular circumstance. How do you make people use what often times comes down to good "headwork?" What's more, while looking over the shoulder may result in not repeating the mistakes of the past, it might also prevent a turn or change in direction that could very

well provide a much greater return on investment. Human foibles and motivations being what they are, preparing to fight the last battle does not always prepare us for the next one. That is why Admiral Nathman's question "to what can we attribute any apparent reduction in the mishap rate, and how can those improvements be institutionalized?" is difficult to answer.

During the course of the Culture Workshop initiative, it has become abundantly clear that the Navy's most effective organizations do not avoid having mishaps just because they have better intervention strategies. Rather, their success is largely do to their approach to business. They are organizations that routinely facilitate mission accomplishment, while cultivating organizational effectiveness and operational excellence. As a direct result, their mishap trend line is influenced downward. These units have elevated professionalism to a *raison d'être*. They solicit "bad news" with the same enthusiasm they seek "good news." They understand that challenges cannot be overcome, and contingencies planned for, if they cannot be honestly identified. They know that if bad news routinely results in punishment, they will eventually lose access to information that is likely critical to their ultimate success. They realize at every level, the fundamental difference between bad news and bad conduct. Their leadership understands how the "can do" attitude of a subordinate can be subtly corrupted into a reluctance to question a particular course of action, or even worse a well intentioned willingness break a rule or deviate from standard operating procedures. Accordingly they place the onus and responsibility for saying no on their most senior members. They embrace mentoring as the key to their continued success. They understand the power of example and body language and use both to their advantage. They live in a culture that maximizes their success, and minimizes the stress and duration of unplanned adversity. In short, they succeed irrespective of the challenge, because their culture allows them to effectively utilize all of the formidable tools at their disposal.

Clearly then, the challenge for the Navy is to develop a strategy which attacks the mishap rate on two fronts. Certainly there is a need to continue the development of intervention strategies aimed at specific cause factors. TCAS and GPWS are clear examples of effective strategies that are or can be adapted to improve the "safety" bottom line. On the human factors front, however, to have a long term positive and sustained impact on the mishap curve, the Navy must chart a course that is focused on and committed to developing a force wide culture of excellence. To do everything in its institutional prerogative to make sure the rhetoric matches the reality.

The Culture Workshop, MCAS, CSA, and ORM were originally conceived as mishap intervention strategies. Have they been effective in that role? Probably so, but because it is difficult to prove a negative, to what degree is problematic. During the four years these initiatives have been available the mishap rate has been reduced significantly. Though it may be anecdotal, most if not all of the facilitators would agree that using some or all of these tools, they have helped units identify and deal with circumstances that could have easily resulted in tragedy without their intervention. It is also fair to ask the question what

might have been, had these tools been effectively utilized in the case of the V-22, Aviano, or perhaps the Greenville. Conjecture either way, however, is an intellectual exercise and raises questions that will never be answered. The fact of the matter is that even an incremental positive impact would justify the “decimal dust” expenditure of resources on these initiatives to date. Measuring their individual effectiveness solely against the mishap trend line, however, may cause their true long-term value to be overlooked or misunderstood. Taken as a complete package they work hand and glove to provide the Navy with a powerful tool to promote organizational effectiveness and operational excellence. Commanding Officers have been overwhelming supportive of these programs not because of tangible results, but because it has given them valuable tools to use in the mentoring and development of their people.

Fundamentally ORM is not a safety tool as much as it is a business model. If we change the word “risk” to “outcome,” and then evaluate that “outcome” in terms of reward and probability the rest of the steps fall out exactly the same. Viewed in that context, ORM stops being a “safety” tool incorporated into a briefing guide, and becomes an approach to business designed to insure a desirable outcome. It is applicable to any evolution from the most benign to the most complex, and provides a systematic way to accomplish the most difficult tasking.

Unfortunately, although the Navy has made a significant effort to train and implement ORM, its application has been uneven. As it stands now, most of our sailors can’t even recall the steps to an ORM analysis, let alone the underlying principles that are arguably more important. Difficult to use it, if you don’t know it. Furthermore, there is very little or no accountability for the use of ORM once a “program” has been put in place. The focus would be significantly increased if every time a junior briefed a senior on a challenge (hazard) at any level, it followed an ORM format. If the brief started with an identification of the event and possible impediments, contained a cognizant analysis of the possible outcomes, recommended a course of action, and had a list of controls to ensure the end game “mission accomplishment,” the last step would naturally fall into place. (Supervision has always been a Navy strong point.) As a side benefit time management and accountability would be built in, and it is not unreasonable to expect that in short order anyone faced with the prospect of briefing someone senior to him or her would start to see the world through ORM colored glasses. Over time, ORM would cease to be a separate process to be specifically considered and start to be a way of life.

Culturally, the Navy could add significant firepower to this approach by reinventing the “Safety Department.” If it became the “ORM” Department, and was tasked with maximizing “mission accomplishment” to include return on investment and preservation of capital, similar to what might be expected from a Chief Financial Officer, it would be cast in an entirely different light. If an aspiring young C.O. understood that in order to screen for command, a record would have to reflect successful tours as Ops or Maintenance as well as the ORM Department Head, chances are his enthusiasm and motivation for the challenge would be significantly enhanced. If the Flag that flew over the “ORM (Safety) Center” had three stars, and was known to be a viable path to a fourth, the Navy’s commitment to a more effective way of doing business would truly be

institutionalized. The “talk” and the “walk” would finally be joined, and a large institutional disconnect between what is said and what is rewarded would be rendered moot. Over time, the compounding of “interest” paid up front would yield tremendous dividends at little cost. The benefit to the Navy’s underlying cultural fabric and future success would likely be tremendous.

The Culture Workshop, MCAS, and CSA, support ORM by providing effective proactive forums to identify human factor disconnects that cause an organization to struggle and sometimes fail. More importantly, they require the organization to take a hard look, both collectively and individually, at its ownership of both problems and solutions. During the course of a workshop individual participants must reflect on their own role and whether they are engaged to fix or engaged to observe. Because all of these tools are voluntary, a C.O.s decision to participate demonstrates his personal commitment to making the organization better in both word and deed. Not because he stands to gain personally, but because it is the right thing to do. At the institutional level, the ability of the Unit Commander to utilize these tools without fear of negative career consequences, is a clear signal of the Navy’s desire to enhance organizational effectiveness and operational excellence, as well as its continued faith in those that it selects to command.

At the end of each workshop seminar, the focal point of the whole exercise becomes integrity. During the course of the discussions about integrity, the examples that seem to be the most powerful are directly tied to the circumstances which are the direst. The Vietnam POW experience is riveting not because anyone would like to live it, but because it poignantly illustrates how strong the human can be under the most trying circumstances. The most important part of the story is not that the POWs lived up to the Code of Conduct in every situation, not that they received a 4.0 on the ultimate exam, because in many instances that was impossible to do. They will be the first to tell you that. The important part of the story is that everyday, often times after enduring intense physical and emotional pain and confronted with serious challenges to their very survival, they recommitted themselves individually and collectively to doing the best they could to live up to the Code. That at the end of each day, despite the pressure of intense physical coercion and with everything to lose and very little to gain, they held themselves personally accountable to a higher standard. Their magnificent struggle and ultimate triumph, like all fundamental struggles, is so compelling because they provide a glimpse of what we would all like to find in ourselves faced with the similar circumstances.

It may be presumptuous, but I believe the POW’s would tell most of us that that is exactly what we would find confronted with similar circumstances. That we too, would discover the key is not the result of each particular event, but rather the personal accountability and commitment of each and every individual. In the end, integrity is not something that you have or don’t have. Rather integrity is something you are committed to. The most important question then becomes not whether or not an individual’s integrity has ever been compromised, because honest reflection would almost certainly demonstrate a 100% probability that that is the case, but rather how the individual responds to that very compromise? Does it result in defeat, further compromise and failure, or ultimately triumph through first honest recognition and then personal

recommitment?

Framed in that context, the answer to permanently reducing “intentional violations” as a mishap cause factor is the same as it has always been. Technology has not changed it, just made it a little more difficult to see. Time, tide, and formation still wait for no man, and the sea is still unforgiving. The answer to Admiral Nathman’s question is simply that we must all do all we can to cultivate a culture that expects and fosters a commitment to integrity as the price of admission. A culture that understands that while perfection is and should be the goal, it is rarely the reality, and advertising such should be reserved for the Almighty. A culture that recognizes that exposing what is and trying to make it better, is far superior to polishing the brass while painting over the corrosion. This is not “rocket science,” and it is certainly not a revelation. It does require a serious commitment, a willingness to check personal egos at the door, and a serious look in the mirror from the CNO to our newest recruit.

Better than 25 years ago I stepped off the bus in Annapolis, and began an incredible voyage, which has been the central theme of my adult life. When I stepped off that bus I was a surfer kid from San Diego, who knew little or nothing about the Navy, an organization I now know represents all that is best in this great Republic. I do not remember much about that day other than I was in absolute awe of the United States Naval Academy. As Plebe summer dragged on, I was struck by the less than complimentary commentary expressed by those charged with my development, about the institution we all were bonded to. Regrettably, four years later I too was responsible for some of the same unflattering commentary. That begs the question, are we the result or the cause of the circumstances that challenge us, and more importantly do we choose to be part of the problem or part of the solution?

SEMINAR OVERVIEW

This Workshop is being conducted at the request of your Skipper. This is not a mandatory program nor is it being jammed down someone's throat. We are here because your Commanding Officer wanted us here. Why? Because he is proactive in safety measures and he knows that this is a freebie... a mulligan if you will. What I mean by that is the results of this Workshop and these seminars don't go outside of the squadron. No written reports to my boss, AIRLANT Safety, your skipper's boss the wing Como....no one. This is your family and what goes on here stays here. Results of this two day workshop are briefed to your CO and XO only. Think of this as a Captain's Call without your CO. This is an opportunity for you to be able to tell it like it really is. No names, ranks are discussed at any other level.

The Navy's newly implemented Safety Culture Workshop was modeled after a program that Colonel Alan Groben instituted within the ANG in the early 90's. After years of unprecedented and rising accident rates, the ANG accepted a program that provided a completely different approach to accident prevention; one that was considered at the time to be completely outside the normal acceptable boundaries of mishap investigations and prevention. Colonel Groben's premise is that unit culture (command culture) is the root of most aircraft mishaps. I will discuss Command Culture and its definition in a few moments. The ANG has quantitative data that indicate this program has attributed to a downward trend in their accident rates

since it's implementation. The ANG accidents have been reduced from a 10 year average of 2.87 for 1985-1994 to 1.25 and 1.31 respectively for 1995 and 1996. This is a sudden reduction of over 50%, a significant result.

So what is Command Culture? In simple terms, culture is basically how a unit or command operates. I'm talking about culture in the cockpit, on the hangar deck, the work spaces...everywhere within the command. The culture in a squadron usually is something that takes years and years to build and years to change. A good culture can survive a weak skipper. And a strong skipper can't change a bad culture in his tour. Culture is a climate permeated over a long period of time. Let me give you some examples that exemplify culture.

In the past, investigative teams have been notorious for concentrating on **individuals** who were responsible for aircraft accidents. For instance, the maintainer who left the bolt out of an engine during an engine repair. Now we look at the culture of the unit that would allow a bolt to be left out.

Examples of Command Culture:

- *Daily or Turnaround
- *CDI armchairing
- *Admin gundecking instructions or paperwork for inspections
- *Sustained tolerance of work/practices that are less than the Navy standard

So what constitutes a good safety culture in a squadron?

Cultureit's a family way of life. And sometimes, you, the command members, are too close and too familiar to realize that a culture problem exists. And more frequently, members individually and collectively, who realize or think that there's a culture problem, are afraid to tell anyone. And that where the Safety Culture Workshop comes into play.

So what constitutes a good safety program or safety culture within a squadron? **An effective safety culture is based on the foundation of three elements**
....INTEGRITY...TRUST...and LEADERSHIP created and sustained over a period of time. (Repeat)

COST OF DOING BUSINESS Someone is asking you (or there is a perception of someone asking you) to compromise one or more of these three elements in order to accomplish the job (Perceived pressure).

COMMUNICATION

(Webster) The act of imparting or transmitting information.

POD, FLT Schedule, Passdown, Capt's Calls, Capt's Mast, CO Suggestion Box, Chits, Verbal, HandSignals, Evals, Quarters, Duty Sections, Meetings.

TRUST

(Webster) Assured reliance on some person or thing; a confident dependence on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone.

There are certain key behaviors that contribute to whether or not others perceive us as trustworthy. And although trust may be forged in moments of great trauma, it is more likely to be formed by small, moment-to-moment, encounters. It is gained little by little.

Is a person's behavior predictable or erratic?

Some degree of predictability or consistency is required in order for people to believe in you. Consistency means that the same personal values and organizational aims will influence what you say and do. "You can count on it!"

Does a person communicate clearly or carelessly?

Sometimes we make statements about our intentions, even if tentative in our own minds, without realizing that to others these are viewed as promises. Someone that frequently makes statements or commitments and fails to execute these, may be perceived unreliable over time.

*Note: It is important to realize that someone who is clearly competent, dynamic and inspirational, but yet lacks the quality of trust, will find it difficult to lead other people, or to become a team leader.

*Note: Increased trust requires greater communication with your fellow workers. This means listening everywhere and to everyone. It means regularly "walking the dog", listening to the troops. Listening can't be achieved from a distance, by reading reports, or by hearing something second-hand. People want to know who we are,

how we feel, and whether we really care. Most supervisors must go to their people to achieve this.

INTEGRITY

(Webster) An uncompromising adherence to a code of moral values; utter sincerity, honest, and candor.


(The most important characteristic of the 3)

Truthfulness, trustworthy, character, have convictions, code of values.

"Doing the job right because it is the right thing to do whether someone is watching you or not, and regardless of the personnel consequences



*Lyn,
These ones are being
updated as well. Neeraj*



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Lessons Learned

Directorates
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[Media/Magazines](#)
[Public Affairs](#)
[Statistics](#)
[ORM](#)


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1. Supply system: Continues to be the number one problem in Naval Aviation. It has an extremely detrimental effect on how our people are conducting business. Current manpower levels do not allow for the increased maintenance efforts that a high cannibalization rate requires. This results in extreme wear and tear on our sailors and greatly reduced morale, with the final result being a decreased safety margin.
2. Training - Rate training and GMT are poorly implemented throughout the fleet. Pop-up operational requirements often result in rate training being conducted as OJT. This deficiency leads to decreased morale and directly impacts both professional development and enlisted advancements. Squadrons need to set aside dedicated time to meet personnel training requirements and abide by them. Squadrons conducting one to two dedicated training days per month are more likely to execute tech training as planned. Squadrons planning weekly tech training days are more likely to skip training in hopes of picking it up on the next training day.
3. Management By Walking Around Leadership - The most respected Commanding Officers are those that get out of their offices and into the workcenters. The good news is that many Commanding Officers are doing this. The bad news is that this effort is not being emulated by the junior officers. Junior Officer mission and tactical training requirements have caused them to lose focus on the people that they are leading. Sailors are saying that they seldom see members of the wardroom in the workcenter and Commanding Officers are shifting the branch and division officer responsibilities to the CPO's, which further exacerbates the situation. A new system is being created which negatively affects the morale of the junior enlisted personnel. Additionally, the information technology environment substantially reduced the amount of human interaction at all levels. This environment could be creating a cadre of future leadership which is much more people oriented.
4. Morning Maintenance meeting - This meeting drives many events and the strong squadrons not only hold the meetings but make sure that word is disseminated throughout the squadron. There are many squadrons that have no in-house quality check in place to make sure that word put out at the morning maintenance meeting does get down to the workcenters efficiently. A simple process of having each workcenter representative be required to write down in a notebook the highlights of the meeting has created great dividends for many squadrons.
5. Plan of the Week - This document has become an unwanted burden to many squadrons and no effort is being put into it to make it a communication tool for those that need it most, the junior enlisted. Strong squadrons take the time to make this a quality document signed by the Commanding Officer himself.
6. Maintenance Manuals (particularly weapons manuals): The innovation of changing maintenance manuals to compact discs has created strains in carrying out proper maintenance procedures. It is now more difficult to implement changes and often times nearly impossible to create a hard-copy of the procedure to carry out to the maintenance evolution.

- the procedure to carry out to the maintenance evolution.
7. Squadron Operating Procedures - SOP's need to be documents that the squadrons live by. If the squadron is not following any part of the SOP, the remainder of the document becomes ineffective. Some squadrons are assigned real-world tasking commitments that require SOPs to be routinely violated. This creates the perception amongst aircrew that SOPs are only followed until they "get in the way". SOP's need to be a living document that all members of the squadron adhere to in meeting all mission requirements.
 8. Maintenance Goals: When a squadron ties time off or other rewards to maintenance goals, often times the sailors will cut corners to meet these when they are tied to time critical requirements. Sailors often comment that they are not given adequate time to meet proper maintenance procedures because of operational commitments.

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Best Business Practices

The following is a listing of the best business practices as viewed from the eyes of the culture workshop facilitators:

Directorates
[Afloat](#)
[Ashore](#)
[Aviation](#)
[Media/Magazines](#)
[Public Affairs](#)
[Statistics](#)
[ORM](#)

Services
[Checklists](#)
[Discrepancies](#)
[DoD Menu \(.mil\)](#)
[Downloads](#)
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1. Many sailors feel lost when being assigned TAD for numerous months in assignments away from their squadron to support ship or shore-based manning requirements. One solution to this was for the squadron to develop a TAD division. The TAD division officer would be responsible for all TAD personnel and would make the TAD sailors feel more attached to the squadron.
2. Healthy squadron sponsor and mentor programs need to have the highest priority of the Commanding Officers. Initial impressions create lasting effects.
3. Traffic Safety: Squadrons that create a strong hands-on vehicle safety program also create enhanced morale through the process. Some squadrons require that a sailor pass an in-house vehicle safety inspection performed by a voluntary group of auto-enthusiast shipmates before an extended leave is signed. Dial-a-ride programs with a no retribution policy have also been effective. One squadron had a member pack up his or her sea bag prior to going on leave so that "it would be ready to send to your family member in case you become a driving statistic." Another squadron kept a constant written listing in the POW of all members of the command under the age of 21 so that the member knew that he or she was in the "spotlight" not to drink and drive.
4. ORM: One Safety Officer would hand out a green dot to each member of the command to put on their wrist watch so that they would be reminded of each time they looked at their watch. This would remind them to never be in a hurry to perform any maintenance or personal endeavor without thinking of the risks involved.
5. Lessons Learned Log: Squadrons find it beneficial to keep a "lessons learned" log in the ready room so that any officer can write down any operational problem that may affect other members of the squadron.

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PART I. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The following survey is a **SAMPLE**. No actual responses will be recorded. For the actual survey, no individual's demographic data will be made available to any CO.

Your rank:

Total years aviation maintenance experience:

Your work center:

Your primary shift:

Your current model aircraft:

Your status:

Your service:

Your parent command:

Your unit's location:

PART II. TAKE SURVEY

The following survey is a **SAMPLE**. No actual responses will be recorded.

1. The command adequately reviews and updates safety procedures.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

2. The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a program that targets training deficiencies.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

3. The command uses safety and medical staff to identify/manage personnel at risk.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

4. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

5. Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely monitored.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

6. Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

7. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know

Disagree				Agree	Know
8. Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other procedure violations and encourage reporting safety concerns.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
9. Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other violations and individuals feel free to report them.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
10. Procedural violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are not common in this command.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
11. The command recognizes individual safety achievement through rewards and incentives.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
12. Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems/illness.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
13. Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
14. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the command.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
15. The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and set standards to maintain quality control.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
16. QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential to mission accomplishment.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
17. QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete and are not pressured by supervisors to sign-off.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
18. Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as that at home station.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
19. Required publications/tools/equipment are available, current/serviceable, and used.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> Don't Know
20. QARs are helpful, and QA is not 'feared' in my unit.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
21. Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect maintenance.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
22. Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training/support is provided as needed.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
23. Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards associated with maintenance and the flight-line.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
24. I am provided adequate resources, time, personnel to accomplish my job.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
25. Personnel turnover does not currently impact the command's ability to operate safely.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
26. Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance than the flight schedule, and do not permit cutting corners.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
27. Day/Night Check have equal workloads and staffing is sufficient on each shift.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
28. Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and are aware of individual workload.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
29. Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is not over-committed.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
30. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having problems.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
31. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work center supervisor decisions are respected.					

31. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work center supervisor decisions are respected.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

32. Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are actively engaged in the safety program.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

33. Supervisors set the example for following maintenance standards and ensure compliance.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

34. In my command safety is a key part of all maintenance operations and all are responsible/accountable for safety.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

35. Safety education and training are comprehensive and effective.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

36. All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, supervised and staffed by qualified personnel.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

37. Maintenance Control is effective in managing all maintenance activities.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

38. Effective communication exists up/down the chain of command.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

39. I get all the information I need to do my job safely.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

40. Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with other work centers and Maintenance.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

41. My command has effective pass-down between shifts.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

42. Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes before flight.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

43. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated with maintenance activities.

☐
Strongly
Disagree

☐
Disagree

☐
Neutral

☐
Agree

☐
Strongly
Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't
Know

Submit

Reset



SAMPLE SURVEY

PART I. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The following survey is a **SAMPLE**. No actual responses will be recorded. For the actual survey, no individual's demographic data will be made available to any CO.

Your rank:

Your designation:

Your current model aircraft:

Your total flight hours:

Your total hours in model:

Are you currently a department head?:

Your status:

Your service:

Your parent command:

Your unit's location:

PART II. TAKE SURVEY

The following survey is a **SAMPLE**. No actual responses will be recorded.

1. My command conducts adequate reviews and updates of safety standards and operating procedures.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A Don't Know

2. My command uses an internal audit and hazard reporting system to catch any problems that may lead to a mishap.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A Don't Know

3. My command has a defined process to set training goals and to review performance.

T&R

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A Don't Know

4. My command closely monitors proficiency and currency standards to ensure aircrew are qualified to fly.

SOP

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A Don't Know

5. Command leadership is actively involved in the safety program and management of safety matters.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A Don't Know

6. My command has a defined process to effectively manage the high-risk aviator.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A Don't Know

7. Human Factors Councils have been successful in identifying aircrew members who pose a risk to safety.

<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
8. Human Factors Boards have been successful reducing chances of an aircraft mishap due to high-risk aviator.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
9. My command makes effective use of the flight surgeon to help identify and manage high risk personnel.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
10. Command leadership encourages reporting safety discrepancies without the fear of negative repercussions.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
11. Individuals in my command are willing to report safety violations, unsafe behaviors or hazardous conditions.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
12. In my command, peer influence is effective at discouraging violations of standard operating procedures, or safety rules.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
13. In my command, we believe safety is an integral part of all flight operations.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
14. In my command, anyone who intentionally violates standard procedures, or safety rules, is swiftly corrected.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
15. In my command, violations of operating procedures, flying regulations, or general flight discipline are rare.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
16. Leaders in my command encourage everyone to be safety conscious and to follow the rules.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
17. In this command, an aviator who persistently violates flight standards and rules will seriously jeopardize his/her career.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know

18. I am not comfortable reporting a safety violation, because people in my command would react negatively toward me.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

19. My command has a reputation for high-quality performance.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

20. My command sets high quality standards and strives to maintain quality control.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

21. My command closely monitors quality and corrects any deviations from established quality standards.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

22. Quality standards in my command are clearly stated in formal publications and procedural guides.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

23. Command leaders permit cutting corners to get a job done.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

24. Lack of experienced personnel has adversely affected my command's ability to operate safely.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

25. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels, by the most qualified people in my command.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

26. Command leaders consider safety issues during the formation and execution of operational and training plans.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

27. Command leadership has a clear picture of the risks associated with its flight operations.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

28. My command takes the time to identify and assess risks associated with its flight operations.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

29. My command does a good job managing risks associated with its flight operations.

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
30. My command has increased the chances of a mishap due to inadequate or incorrect risk assessment.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
31. I am provided adequate resources (time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to accomplish my job.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
32. My command provides the right number of flight hours per month for me to fly safely.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
33. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my flights.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
34. Based upon my command's personnel and other assets, the command is over-committed.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
35. My command has incorporated Operational Risk Management processes in decision-making at all levels.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
36. My supervisor can be relied on to keep his/her word.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
37. Our command leaders and supervisors can be trusted.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
38. My command's Safety Officer is highly regarded.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
39. Our Safety Officer is influential in promoting safety.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
40. My command is genuinely concerned about safety.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
41. Command leadership is successful in communicating its safety goals to unit personnel.					
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> N/A

<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
42. My command provides a positive command climate that promotes safe flight operations.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
43. Command leadership is actively involved in the safety program and management of safety matters.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
44. Command leadership sets the example for compliance with flight standards.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
45. My command ensures that all unit members are responsible and accountable for safe flight operations.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
46. Command leadership willingly assists in providing advice concerning safety matters.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
47. Command leadership reacts well to unexpected changes to its plans.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
48. My command does not hesitate to temporarily restrict from flying individuals who are under high personal stress.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
49. I am adequately trained to safely conduct all of my flights.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
50. Morale and motivation in my command are high.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
51. My command ensures the uniform enforcement of all operating standards among unit members.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
52. Crew rest standards are enforced in my command.					
<input type="radio"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Disagree	<input type="radio"/> Neutral	<input type="radio"/> Agree	<input type="radio"/> Strongly Agree	<input type="radio"/> N/A <input type="radio"/> Don't Know
53. In my command, NATOPS tests and check rides are conducted as intended, to candidly assess aircrew					

53. In my command, NATOPS tests and check rides are conducted as intended, to candidly assess aircrew qualifications.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

54. My command provides adequate safety backups to catch possible human errors during high-risk missions.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

55. Within my command, good communications flow exists up and down the chain of command.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

56. My command has good two-way communication with external commands.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

57. Safety education and training are adequate in my command.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

58. The Safety Department is a well-respected element of my command.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

59. The Aviation Safety Officer position is a sought after billet in my command.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

60. My command's Safety Department keeps me well informed regarding important safety information.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

61. My command's Aircrew Coordination Training program is helping to improve mission performance and safety.

☐ Strongly Disagree

☐ Disagree

☐ Neutral

☐ Agree

☐ Strongly Agree

☐ N/A
☐ Don't Know

Submit

Reset

Whitmer, Lyn

From: CNAP, EA [cnapea@cnap.navy.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 19:53
To: CNAP, EA
Subject: CNAP 181500Z APR 01 LEADERSHIP AND RETENTION//



AuditTr.TXT

ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE

ROUTINE

R 181500Z APR 01 ZYB PSN 171415Q19

FM COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N00//

TO ALNAVAIRPAC
NAVAIRLANT

INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N09/N7/N78//
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N09/N7/N78//
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD

THIS IS A 3 SECTIONED MSG COLLATED BY MDS
UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR ALL AVIATION LEADERS INFO ADMIRALS CLARK,
ELLIS AND FALLON FROM NATHMAN//N00000//
ALNAVAIRPAC 003/01

MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVAIRPAC//

SUBJ/LEADERSHIP AND RETENTION//

RMKS/1. AVIATION LEADERS MET IN MILLINGTON 3-4 APRIL TO DISCUSS LEADERSHIP AND RETENTION ISSUES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFERENCE STRATEGY AND DELIVERABLES WAS BASED UPON TWO STATEMENTS FROM CNO (UNCLAS PERSONAL 082130 AUG 00) WHEN HE SAID QUOTE NAVY LEADERS MUST COMMUNICATE AND SHAPE ACCURATE EXPECTATIONS...OUR PEOPLE PROMISE TO SERVE. LEADERS IN RETURN COMMIT THEMSELVES TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, TO THE GOOD OF THE INSTITUTION, AND THE GROWTH AND WELL-BEING OF THEIR SHIPMATES. THAT INVOLVES CLARIFYING EXPECTATIONS FOR SUBORDINATES...END QUOTE. THEREFORE, CONFERENCE DISCUSSION CENTERED UPON THE IDENTIFICATION OF NAVAL AVIATION EXPECTATIONS VERSUS REALITY AND SOLUTIONS TO ALIGN THE MISMATCH. THIS CONFERENCE IS A FIRST IN A SERIES OF NAVAL AVIATION LEADERSHIP MEETINGS - MORE ON THIS IN A FOLLOW ON MESSAGE. MAJOR POINTS FOLLOW:

A. EXPECTATION.

NAVAL AVIATION EXPECTS SQUADRON COMMANDERS TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE LEADERSHIP. SOME OF THIS EXPECTATION IS CLEARLY COMMUNICATED, MEASURED AND INSTITUTIONALLY SUPPORTED. FOR INSTANCE, SKIPPER'S ARE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP OPERATIONALLY COMPETENT SQUADRONS AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS THAT INCLUDE EVERYTHING FROM GROOVE INTERVAL TO SORTIE GENERATION RATES TO FIRST PASS BOMB HIT ASSESSMENT. THE ENTIRE IDTC, NSAWC AND THE ACTC EXIST TO SUPPORT THIS COMBAT PROFICIENCY. EXACT EXPECTATIONS DIM IN NON-OPERATIONAL AREAS. FOR INSTANCE, ONE OF THE PRIMARY EXPECTATIONS OF SQUADRON CO'S IS TO PROFESSIONALLY DEVELOP THEIR

JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC PROGRAMS OR METRICS TO GUIDE OR EVALUATE THIS EXPECTATION.

REALITY.

NAVAL AVIATION LEADERSHIP DEMONSTRATES CLEAR APPRECIATION FOR OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL PROWESS AND IT BECOMES EASY TO ASSUME THAT GOOD METRICS IN THOSE AREAS INDICATES THEIR UNDERPINNING IS ALSO GOOD. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT CLEARLY EXPRESS OUR TOTAL EXPECTATIONS OF A COMMANDING OFFICER. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE ARE NO ESTABLISHED SQUADRON TRAINING PROGRAMS OR ACCEPTED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR NON OPERATIONAL COMPETENCIES.

SOLUTION.

NAVAL AVIATION MUST MORE CLEARLY DEFINE EXPECTATIONS OF COMMANDERS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE REGARDING COMMAND CLIMATE, OFFICER AND ENLISTED RETENTION DATA, ATTRITION INITIATIVES AND JUNIOR OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT. THESE EXPECTATIONS MUST BE COMMUNICATED AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS DESIGNED. THESE EXPECTATIONS WERE BASELINED, TOOLS DEVELOPED AND ACCOUNTABILITY EXPLAINED AT CNAP'S FEB 01 RETENTION/ATTRITION CONFERENCE. THESE WILL BE THE AVIATION FORCE STANDARD. LEAD TYCOM WILL COORDINATE WITH CNAL FOR DISSEMINATION.

B. EXPECTATION.

LEADERSHIP EXPECTS COMMANDERS TO UNDERSTAND GUIDANCE FROM SENIORS AND TO EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE THE NAVAL AVIATION STORY.

REALITY.

ALTHOUGH MUCH MUST STILL BE DONE, NAVY HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS DEVELOPING PROGRAMS AND POLICIES TO SUPPORT ITS PEOPLE. HOWEVER, COMMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS VOICED BY CONFERENCE ATTENDEES INDICATE SOME ARE NOT ONLY UNAWARE OF MANY FACTS, BUT ALSO PASSIONATELY BELIEVE THINGS THAT ARE UNTRUE. WE HAVE BECOME PROFICIENT AT IDENTIFYING BARRIERS TO SUCCESS BUT LESS ADEPT AT FINDING SOLUTIONS TO BREAK DOWN THESE BARRIERS. FOR INSTANCE, SOME COMMANDERS BELIEVE OUR BONUS PROGRAM IS NOT AS GOOD AS THE ONE FOR THE USAF, COMPLETELY DISCOUNTING THE FACT THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT PAY NFO'S A CENT AND THEIR MOST GENEROUS BONUS HAS A TAKE RATE LOWER THAN OURS. ANOTHER COMMONLY HELD MYTH IS THAT SINCE THE RESERVES FLY ADVERSARY, THEY HAVE TAKEN ALL THE FUN FLYING JOBS. THIS BELIEF COMPLETELY DISREGARDS THE MULTITUDE OF GREAT FLYING BILLETS AVAILABLE IN THE TRAINING COMMAND, FRS'S, VX 5/9, AND IN ADVERSARY SQUADRONS. WE HAVE MORE SUPERB FLYING BILLETS THAN WE HAVE AVIATORS TO FILL. IT ALSO POINTS AN UNFAIR FINGER AT THE RESERVES BY DISCOUNTING THE MANY TRAINING COMMAND BILLETS THEY FILL AS WELL AS OTHER NON-FLYING BILLETS. MANY COMMANDERS ARE NOT CREATING A POSITIVE, COHERENT NAVAL AVIATION STORY. NAVAL AVIATION HAS ALWAYS PRIZED TRUTHFULNESS AND MANY LEADERS TAKE PRIDE IN "TELLING IT LIKE IT IS" AS A METHOD OF RAISING ISSUES.

UNFORTUNATELY, WHAT WE ARE TELLING AS COMMANDING OFFICERS IS NOT ALWAYS FACTUAL OR IN PERSPECTIVE. THIS ACCELERATES FRUSTRATION AND RESENTMENT. SOLUTION. COMMANDERS MUST PULL FROM EXISTING INFORMATION SOURCES AND CONTINUOUSLY ARM THEMSELVES WITH FACTS TO FIGHT THE LIGHTENING SPEED OF NEGATIVITY. THEY MUST UNDERSTAND AND DEVELOP THE NAVAL AVIATION STORY. THE LEAD TYCOM, IN CONCERT WITH CNATRA, NSAWC, PERS 43 AND N78 WILL FACILITATE THIS DEVELOPMENT. SPECIFICALLY, WE MUST PROVIDE UPDATED PERSONNEL AND PROGRAM INFORMATION AND PUSH IT TO COMMANDERS IN USEABLE FORM. UPDATES MUST BE REGULARLY INCORPORATED AND WEB BASED. TO FACILITATE THIS, THE LEAD TYCOM WILL COORDINATE SEMI-ANNUAL INFORMATION UPDATES OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, PROGRAMS AND FORCE POSTURE TO COMMANDING OFFICERS. THIS PUSH CAN ONLY GO SO FAR-IT IS A PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION OF COMMANDERS TO COMPREHEND AND EXPLAIN THE SOMETIMES COMPLEX TENETS OF OUR PROFESSION. COMMANDING OFFICERS MUST BE PROACTIVE IN REACHING OUT FOR FACT BASED INFORMATION, WHETHER IT BE FROM AVIATION PLACEMENT, THE REQUIREMENTS OFFICER, PROGRAM MANAGER, TYPE WING OR TYPE COMMANDER STAFF (I.E. PICK UP THE PHONE).

C. EXPECTATION.

COMMANDERS ARE EXPECTED TO BE FULLY PROFICIENT IN ALL COMMAND AREAS.

REALITY.

SINCE EXPECTATIONS FOR COMMANDERS ARE NOT CLEARLY EXPRESSED, CURRENT TRAINING TRACKS DO NOT EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS WHAT IS REQUIRED OF THEM.

SOLUTION.

AIR TYCOMS MUST WORK WITH PERS 43 AND FLEET COMMANDERS TO ENSURE EXPECTATIONS OF COMMANDERS ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND TRAINING SUPPORT IS IDENTIFIED AND PROVIDED.

D. EXPECTATION.

LEADERSHIP EXPECTS COMMANDERS TO STAY ON ACTIVE DUTY UNTIL MAKING CAPTAIN.

REALITY.

THE NUMBER OF COMMANDERS LEAVING PRIOR TO MAKING CAPTAIN HAS INCREASED FROM APPROXIMATELY 5% TO OVER 20% IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. THIS IS CRITICAL BECAUSE SELECTION FOR COMMAND IS NOT A REWARD BUT A NECESSARY GROWTH EXPERIENCE FOR FUTURE NAVAL AVIATION LEADERSHIP. ALTHOUGH THE NAVY HAS ENOUGH CAPTAINS IN THE AGGREGATE, NAVAL AVIATION STRUGGLES TO MEET SPECIFIC CAPTAIN EXPERTISE REQUIREMENTS. A RELATED CONFERENCE DISCUSSION CENTERED UPON COMMANDERS WHO HAD TENDERED LETTERS OF RESIGNATION WHILE STILL IN COMMAND AND WHAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. SKIPPERS ARE THE CHIEF RETENTION OFFICERS IN THE NAVY AND THEIR CAREER DECISIONS DO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THEIR JUNIORS. HOWEVER, CONFEREES FELT THAT IF SKIPPERS SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, WE SHOULD HONOR THEIR DECISION TO RESIGN BUT ONLY AFTER AN ISIC LEAD REVIEW TO SUPPORT THESE OFFICERS FOR POTENTIAL FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS WITH PERS 43.

SOLUTION.

DISSATISFIERS FOR SENIOR COMMANDERS AND CAPTAINS NEED TO BE UNDERSTOOD AND ANALYZED AND SENIOR OFFICER RETENTION NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN CONTEXT TO JUNIOR OFFICER CAREER DECISION MAKING. CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS STUDIES INDICATE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENIOR AND JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION AND CERTAIN ACTIONS FOR SENIORS WILL RESULT IN RETENTION INCREASES IN THE JUNIOR RANKS. PERS 43 HAS COLLECTED INFORMATION ON THIS ISSUE AND WILL FORWARD WITH PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO N1 AND THE LEAD TYCOM FOR REVIEW AND DECISION.

E. EXPECTATION.

COMMANDERS EXPECT JUNIOR OFFICERS TO EXERCISE COMPREHENSIVE LEADERSHIP SKILLS.

REALITY.

JUNIOR OFFICERS RECEIVE LITTLE LEADERSHIP TRAINING DURING THE TRAINING COMMAND. THEY ARE REQUIRED TO GO TO BASIC OFFICER LEADERSHIP TRAINING COURSE (BOLTC) FOLLOWING WINGS AND PRIOR TO THE FRS. THEY DO NOT LEAD SAILORS UNTIL REACHING THEIR FIRST OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND IN THE CASE OF HORNET SQUADRONS, THE ADDITION OF LDO GROUND OFFICERS HAS HAD THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF RELIEVING MANY OF THEM OF EVEN THESE OPPORTUNITIES. IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A DEPARTMENT HEAD TO HAVE NEVER LEAD A SAILOR AS A JUNIOR OFFICER. OTHER COMMUNITIES MAY HAVE DIFFERENT LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES BUT NO SYSTEMATIC, SQUADRON BASED PROGRAM AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS EXIST.

SOLUTION.

A TYCOM SANCTIONED TEAM WILL BE CHARTERED TO LOOK AT THE LEADERSHIP CONTINUUM FROM THE INITIAL BOLTC COURSE THROUGH INTERMEDIATE TO TRAINING AT THE COMMAND LEVEL AND VIEW IT IN RELATION TO NAVAL AVIATION NEEDS. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROGRAM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SQUADRON BASED SUPPLEMENTS SHOULD BE AMONG THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED TO THE LEAD TYCOM.

F. EXPECTATION.

POST COMMAND COMMANDERS WITH EP FITREPS EXPECT TO BE ASSIGNED TO SHORE DUTY.

REALITY.

SEA DUTY ASSIGNMENTS FOR POST COMMAND COMMANDERS ARE VERY CRITICAL AND CANNOT BE GAPPED. IT IS BOTH THE AVAILABILITY OF AN OFFICER AND HIS FITREP PERFORMANCE THAT DICTATES ASSIGNMENTS.

SOLUTION.

DETAILERS MUST WORK WITH OFFICERS TO PLAN POST COMMAND SEA DUTY ASSIGNMENTS TO ENSURE JOINT, EDUCATION AND OTHER CREDENTIALS CAN BE CAPTURED. ISIC'S SHOULD WORK WITH THE COMMANDER PLACEMENT OFFICERS TO SUPPORT THESE PLANS.

G. EXPECTATION.

JUNIOR OFFICERS EXPECT TO BE RESOURCED TO BE AS GOOD AS THEY CAN BE. REALITY.

WE HAVE CREATED PERFORMANCE AND EXPECTATION BARS THAT ARE UNNECESSARILY HIGH AND NOT NECESSARILY RELATED TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. NAVAL AVIATION HAS AMASSED REQUIREMENTS TO ADDRESS THE WORST POSSIBLE SCENARIO AND STRUGGLES TO TRAIN TO THAT SCENARIO, REGARDLESS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE. IN MANY CASES WE ARE NOT RESOURCED TO SUPPORT THIS LEVEL OF TRAINING AND WHEN WE FALL SHORT, JUNIOR OFFICER EXPECTATIONS ARE NOT MET AND FRUSTRATION BUILDS.

SOLUTION.

CURRENT WORK ON ALIGNING THE TRAINING AND READINESS MATRIX RELATIVE TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IS ONGOING. COMMANDERS MUST WORK WITH THEIR ISIC AND TYCOM TO CRITICALLY ANALYZE WHAT TRAINING IS REQUIRED VERSUS WHAT IS WANTED. COMMANDERS MUST PUT EXPECTATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE AND FIGHT THE PERCEPTION THAT WHEN ANY ONE OF THEM IS NOT COMPLETELY MET, IT IS A NAVAL AVIATION FAILURE.

H. THE AMOUNT OF ENERGY AND COMMITMENT FROM THE 58 ATTENDEES WAS UPLIFTING AND THEIR DESIRE TO LEAD US OUT OF THIS SITUATION GAVE GREAT PROMISE. I AM CONFIDENT THE WAY AHEAD IS IN THE MINDS AND SKILLS OF OUR CAPTAINS AND COMMANDERS IN COMMAND. HOWEVER, THE CONFERENCE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT OUR CURRENT INABILITY TO ALIGN EXPECTATIONS WITH REALITY BREEDS FRUSTRATION ACROSS THE FORCE. OUR SELF TALK IN NAVAL AVIATION IS OFTEN SELF DESTRUCTIVE. WE ARE DOING OURSELVES MORE HARM THAN ANY POTENTIAL ENEMY COULD EVER DO. IRONICALLY, MANY WELL-INTENTIONED AND HIGHLY RESPECTED COMMANDING OFFICERS ARM THEMSELVES WITH ANECDOTES (THAT ARE NOT FACT BASED) AND OFTEN EAGERLY SHARE THEM WITH ALL THAT WILL LISTEN. WE OFTEN CREATE LISTS OF EXPECTATIONS AND THINGS THAT ARE OWED. IN THIS INSIDIOUS MANNER, MANY OF US HAVE BECOME LEADERS OF THE ENTITLED.

I. WHO WE ARE. NAVAL AVIATION'S CORE COMPETENCY IS PROJECTING EFFECTIVE COMBAT POWER IN AN EXPEDITIONARY CONTEXT WHETHER FROM A FLIGHT DECK OR FORWARD BASE. FLYING EXPERIENCE IS CRITICAL TO THE NAVAL AVIATION FORCE TO KEEP THAT FORCE SAFE AND COMPETENT-WE KNOW THIS FUNDAMENTALLY. FLIGHT HOURS ARE IMPORTANT BUT AREN'T NECESSARILY WHO WE ARE. WE ARE THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE NAVAL AVIATION FORCE, MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE ALL WORKED HARD TO EARN AND POLISH WINGS OF GOLD OR PEWTER. WE WEAR THESE INSIGNIA WITH THE GREAT PRIDE IT DESERVES. WE INFLUENCE EVENTS IN THIS UNSETTLED WORLD BY ENGAGING FORWARD WITH OUR PRESENCE AND COMBAT POWER. OUR SERVICE PUTS US IN HARMS WAY FAR FROM OUR FAMILIES, OFTEN FOR SIGNIFICANTLY LONG INTERVALS. WHAT WE DO IS HARD AND OFTEN TIMES DANGEROUS BUT IT IS BIGGER THAN ALL OF US SO WE DO IT AS A TEAM. HARDSHIPS ARE SHARED. SOME LEAD, BUT ALL OF US ARE PART OF A COMPETENT, PROFESSIONAL NAVAL AIR FORCE WHICH HAS NO EQUAL IN AVIATION COMBAT SKILLS. WHAT DRIVES EACH OF US HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH MAKING MONEY, BUT RATHER A RICHNESS OF LIFE AND EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE FOUND NO WHERE ELSE. WE SERVE OUR COUNTRY. OUR DUTY IS MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. WE LEAD OUR MEN AND WOMEN WITH COMPASSION. WE EXCEL IN THE AIR. ONE MUST STAY TO SERVE, LEAD AND MAKE A DIFFERENCE. WARMEST REGARDS, VADM NATHMAN//

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PERS FOR 1



The background of the entire page is a white grid. Overlaid on the grid are several grey, cut-out style illustrations of military equipment. At the top left, there's a large, angular shape resembling a missile or a large aircraft. Below it, on the left side, is a smaller aircraft. In the center, a large fighter jet is shown in profile, facing left. To the right of the center, another aircraft is partially visible. At the bottom, there's a large, detailed illustration of a naval ship, possibly a destroyer or cruiser, with a prominent radar mast. The text 'COMMAND EXCELLENCE:' is printed in a large, bold, sans-serif font, slanted upwards from left to right. Below it, the phrase 'What it takes to be the best!' is written in a smaller, italicized sans-serif font, also slanted upwards.

COMMAND EXCELLENCE:

What it takes to be the best!

COMMAND EXCELLENCE:
WHAT IT TAKES TO BE THE BEST!

December 1985

Leadership Division
Naval Military Personnel Command
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20370

Second Printing October 1986

Third Printing October 1987



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have contributed to the preparation of Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! Special credit and thanks go to Captain Richard F. Shea, USN; Commander Thomas D. Williams, USN; Commander Marlene L. Durazo, USN; Lieutenant Commander Christopher A. Douglas, USN; Lieutenant Joanne Yates, USN; and Master Chief Arthur Boyd, USN. The report was written by David E. Whiteside, Ph.D., with assistance from the editorial staff at McBer and Company. A special thanks goes to Robert G. Greenly.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States does not wish ever to go to war, it must be prepared to do so if necessary. Maintaining our combat readiness is a critical national priority. To be combat ready requires naval commands of the highest caliber, and this demands unsurpassed leadership. Mediocrity is unthinkable and unacceptable. However, the question of how to lead effectively and achieve superior command performance is not an easy one to answer. There are many theories, and even the opinions of outstanding leaders do not always accurately reflect what they practice.

To understand what it takes to be an outstanding command, the Leadership and Management Education and Training division of the Navy compared 21 operational units (12 superior and 9 average) from the three warfare communities (air, surface, submarine) in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The Command Excellence research teams, made up of Navy and civilian consultants, spent four to five days observing daily operations in each command. They conducted individual and group interviews with commanding officers, executive officers, department heads, division officers, chief petty officers, and junior enlisted. Wing and squadron staff for each command were also interviewed. In total, more than 750 individuals were interviewed.

In addition, the research teams administered surveys on how effectively different groups worked together and how each command rated itself on key activities (planning, standards, morale, communication, and training and development). Team members also examined such command documents as PODs, retention statistics, and NJP logs.

Only after the research teams finished collecting data were they told which commands were considered by the Navy to be superior and which were considered average. Once they knew the rating of each command, the research teams began isolating those factors, or characteristics, that distinguish superior from average commands.

The resulting data was organized by using a systems view of organizations. There are two key ideas in a systems model: (1) the whole is made up of parts that are interrelated--as one part changes, the other changes, and (2) the system, or command, exists within a larger environment that affects the functioning of the command, while, in turn, the command's actions affect the outside environment. Connectedness is the key to a systems view--change in one area affects other areas.

Figure 1 shows the organizational framework used to understand the commands studied and to develop a model of command excellence. As Figure 1 indicates, the research teams examined the organizations and people in the external environment that impact a unit's performance, the inputs that flow into the system, and intermediate and final outputs. Intermediate outputs are characteristics of individuals or groups that contribute to the final outputs. The final outputs are primarily the criteria used to distinguish superior from average commands. The characteristics of people, relationships, and key activities that distinguish superior from average commands were also isolated. Figure 2 shows all of these characteristics as a model of command excellence.

This text is for those who have leadership positions in the United States Navy--specifically, current and prospective commanding officers (COs) and executive officers (XOs). Its aim is to help these officers lead their commands to superior performance.

Assuming that you are, or will be, a commanding officer or executive officer, Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! can help you in several ways. First, it can help you diagnose the cause of problems in your command and then figure out what to do about them. For example, if there seems to be a lot of crisis management in your command, then the ideas in the Planning section can be useful. One might use them, for example, as a checklist to identify why crisis management is occurring. Is planning a regular, frequent activity that has command priority? If so, has this been made explicit? What are the command's long-range plans, and are they based on sound data? Have you gotten input from the right people? Are plans specific in terms of objectives, action dates, and who is responsible for what?

The model of command excellence that is presented can also help you be more effective by saving you time and energy. Using the model to identify the specific cause(s) of a problem, you will be better able to target your efforts. Continuing the above example, you may discover that people engage in a lot of planning, but that the breakdown is in the communication of plans. It would be a mistake, then, to have more planning meetings. Rather, a bigger payoff would come from using a wider variety of means to publicize plans.

In addition, Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! can be used to anticipate obstacles or benefits that might occur in implementing an action plan. One of the main points of the study is that the three integral parts of a command--People, Relationships, and Activities--are interrelated. A change in one will have an impact on the others. An action might be compared to a pebble being thrown into a pond: the

effects ripple out, reaching further than the initial point of contact. For example, out of a concern for maintaining high standards, you might form "tiger teams" composed of people from different divisions, to tackle a job that urgently needs to be done. A secondary result of this activity might be that it brings together people who rarely see each other, thereby improving communication. It might also help promote morale and unity in the command by having several divisions do a job ordinarily done by only one. On the other hand, unless there is good coordination among the divisions, other scheduled work might not get done on time. So an action designed to promote standards has effects on planning, coordination, esprit de corps, and communication. Acquiring a sense of how the various elements of command excellence are interconnected will aid in predicting the unintended as well as the intended effects of an action. Armed with this awareness, you can act more strategically to accomplish command goals.

Appendix B contains a sampling of flag officers' views of what distinguishes a superior from an average command. Their outlooks on command excellence are in basic agreement with the findings of our study. Having passed this "litmus test" of the experts' experience increases the credibility of our study. Because these officers make decisions that affect command operations and base their performance evaluations partially on their concept of what a superior command should look like, knowledge of how they judge superior performance will help you accomplish both your goals and theirs.

Since the main purpose of Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! is to help you improve your command's performance, we suggest you read the text with one overall question in mind: "How can this help me lead my command more effectively?" When you read the examples of what officers and enlisted do in superior commands, ask yourself whether or not you, or your unit, has done something similar. If not, would there be a worthwhile payoff if you did? When you come across an example of an action taken to achieve a certain objective, we encourage you to think about whether there is another way to achieve the same objective.

We recommend that you read the entire text first. Then, with an understanding of how all the parts fit together, you can go back and study any section of special interest. As you read, we suggest you think about ways in which you can apply the command effectiveness study's findings to your own command. In the Conclusion, we offer some specific ideas of how you might do so.

It is important to keep in mind that we are not suggesting there is only one "right" way to lead a command. To do so would be to ignore the fact that people have different person-

alities, leadership styles, goals, and perspectives. The command excellence model is not a recipe or blueprint for success--rather, it is a guide. Though the facts indicate that superior commands need to do all of the things presented in the command excellence model, there are different paths to these goals. For example, monitoring morale is necessary for command effectiveness. But you do not necessarily have to get out and about every day to accomplish this, as some COs in superior commands do. One could accomplish this in other ways.

Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! contains numerous striking examples of how superior commands function. It is our hope that these vignettes will be inspirational and suggestive of possible courses of action for your command.

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE




FIGURE 1

PEOPLE

CO Characteristics

- Targets Key Issues
- Gets Crew to Support Command Philosophy
- Develops XO
- Staffs to Optimize Performance
- Gets Out and About
- Builds Esprit de Corps
- Keeps His Cool
- Develops Strong Wardroom
- Values Chiefs Quarters
- Links Training to Combat Readiness
- Builds Positive External Relationships
- Influences Successfully

XO Characteristics

- Drives Administrative System
- Is Active in Planning
- Is Key to Unit Staffing
- Gets Out and About
- Ensures Standards are Enforced

Wardroom Characteristics

- Is Cohesive
- Matches CO-XO Leadership
- Raises Concerns with CO and XO
- Takes Initiative
- Does Detailed Planning
- Takes Responsibility for Work-Group Performance

Chiefs Quarters Characteristics

- Acts for Command-Wide Effectiveness
- Leads Divisions Actively
- Enforces Standards
- Supports and Develops Division Officers
- Is Cohesive
- Has a Strong Leader

Crew Characteristics

- Committed to Command Goals
- Lives Up to Standards
- Respects the Chain of Command
- Takes Ownership for Their Work Areas
- Is Motivated
- Works as a Team

RELATIONSHIPS

CO-XO Relationship

- CO Is in Charge
- XO Stands Behind CO's Philosophy and Policies
- CO and XO Have Well-Defined and Complementary Roles
- CO and XO Communicate Frequently
- CO and XO Respect Each Others' Abilities

Chain of Command

- The Chain of Command is Respected, But Flexible
- Information Flows Both Up and Down the Chain of Command
- Responsibility is Delegated

External Relationships

- Command Builds Networks with Outsiders
- Command Advocates for Its Interests with Outsiders
- Command Promotes a Positive Image

COMMAND EXCELLENCE CHARACTERISTICS

FIGURE 2

ACTIVITIES

Planning

- Planning is a Regularly Scheduled Activity
- Planning Occurs at All Levels
- Planning is Long-Range
- Plans are Specific
- Plans are Publicized
- Systems are Put in Place to Implement Plans
- Command Makes Every Effort to Stick to the Plan

Maintaining Standards

- Standards are Clear and Consistent
- Standards are Realistic and High
- Standards are Continuously Monitored
- Positive and Negative Feedback is Frequently Given
- Performance Problems are Handled Quickly and Appropriately
- All Levels Participate in Enforcing Standards

Communicating

- Communication Occurs Frequently
- People Listen to Each Other
- Explanations are Given Often
- Communication Flows Up, Down, and Across the Chain of Command
- Officers and Chiefs Get Out and About
- Personal Issues are Discussed

Building Esprit de Corps

- Positive Regard and Expectations Occur at All Levels
- Teamwork is Promoted
- Morale is Monitored
- Rewards and Recognition are Given Frequently
- Command Integrates Incoming Crew Quickly
- Command Focuses on Successes
- Command Encourages Social Activities and Having Fun
- Symbolic Activities Used to Promote Esprit

Training and Development

- Value of Training is Recognized
- Training is Kept Realistic and Practical
- Training Programs are Monitored and Evaluated
- All Levels Participate in Training and Development
- Command Emphasizes Professional Development and Career Planning

PEOPLE



PEOPLE

The people in a command are the most important determinant of success. Our study looked at the contribution that each level in a command makes in achieving top-flight performance. Not surprisingly, the CO and the relationship between the CO and the XO have the greatest impact on the character of a command and its destiny. However, each level has a special and critical role to play, and it is up to the CO and the XO to orchestrate the entire command to produce superior performance. Here's how each level functions in a superior command.




THE COMMANDING OFFICER

"A commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination where required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and to keep a cool head in applying it."

-- B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



CO Characteristics

- Targets Key Issues
- Gets Crew to Support Command Philosophy
- Develops XO
- Staffs to Optimize Performance
- Gets Out and About
- Builds Esprit de Corps
- Keeps His Cool
- Develops Strong Wardroom
- Values Chiefs Quarters
- Links Training to Combat Readiness
- Builds Positive External Relationships
- Influences Successfully

THE COMMANDING OFFICER

In analyzing the transcripts of the COs interviewed, we found 12 "themes," either personal characteristics or behaviors, that distinguished the COs of superior commands from those of average commands. That is not to say that the COs in the average units did not do any of these things. Indeed, on occasion, they seemed to exhibit all 12 characteristics. The difference is in completeness and consistency. COs of superior units did all of these things consistently on a day-to-day basis. The average ones did some of them usually but all of them rarely.

The superior commanding officer:

- Targets Key Issues
- Gets Crew to Support Command Philosophy
- Develops XO
- Staffs to Optimize Performance
- Gets Out and About
- Builds Esprit de Corps
- Keeps His Cool
- Develops Strong Wardroom
- Values Chiefs Quarters
- Ensures Training Is Effective
- Builds Positive External Relationships
- Influences Successfully

Targets Key Issues

Like a venerable Chinese sage, COs of superior units do more by doing less. They simplify things by focusing on the big picture and by identifying and prioritizing a few key issues. The CO of an outstanding HS squadron explained: "It's very hard in the Navy now to do everything that everyone wants you to do. You have to pick those things that you think are the most important. Nobody can do them all."

Aside from practical necessity, however, these COs realize that it is not wise for them to try to do everything because it's not the best use of their own or their men's talents. Instead they concentrate on what they consider the most important areas.

What they choose to pursue is determined, first, by their assessment of the most critical needs facing their command at a given time. As the situation changes, they emphasize different areas to work on. For example, when one CO took over the leadership of an aviation squadron, the command had a reputation for not meeting its flight commitments and of always getting beaten by its sister squadron. The CO identified one goal as paramount: "The number-one goal was to fly those airplanes and to establish a winning attitude--to prove to the men that they were not losers." To achieve this, he recruited top performers and pushed his men very hard. Once they became successful, his goals shifted to consolidating and maintaining the progress they had made.

The second determinant of what the CO emphasizes seems to be the CO's personal beliefs about the best way to achieve superior command performance. Each CO injects his personality into his leadership by having pet areas that he is particularly concerned about. For example, the CO of a frigate says that one reason he has captain's call with all paygrades divided into four groups is:

I can reinforce any points that I want to reinforce. I always talk about combat readiness. I always talk about safety. I always talk about sanitation and cleanliness. Those are the constant themes, and any time anybody asks me a question about what's this and what's that, I say, "What's my number-one priority?" And they always tell me, "Safety is your number one priority."

However, always overriding these special concerns are those critical issues that he knows the unit needs to take care of to accomplish its mission. So there is a balance between paying attention to ongoing and long-range issues and more immediate and short-range needs.

So, these COs concern themselves with the big picture. They focus on such general areas as setting policy and prescribing procedure, interfacing with wing/squadron staff and Washington, and developing long-range plans. The crew of one outstanding SSBN approvingly attributed much of their success to the CO's "not sweating the small stuff." This also means that these COs do not micromanage. They leave the detailed, day-to-day running of the command to others. Unlike some COs of the average units studied, they are not constantly looking over their men's shoulders to see if they're making mistakes.

Gets Crew to Support Command Philosophy

Not all of the COs in the outstanding units had taken the time to write out their command philosophy or their personal statement of fundamental beliefs on how they wanted their command to operate and why. Nevertheless, it was clear they had such a philosophy, that they were successful at communicating it to the crew, and that they got the crew to buy into it. This resulted in high morale, commitment, and trust. We were surprised at how often we heard the crews of these commands commend their CO with what they considered the ultimate in praise: "I'd go to war with him."

How do these COs generate such support? For most, it's through being explicit. They simply tell their men how they want their command to operate and share with them their views on leadership. For example, one CO has what he calls "management seminars" with the wardroom and selected chiefs. At these he passes out readings that express his own ideas, solicits input, and discusses how they apply to running the unit. Others have special sayings that they repeatedly mention. On one submarine, all levels of the command interviewed emphasized that they operate according to the motto the CO had posted on the wall of his stateroom: "If you're not having fun, you're not doing it right!"

But for all of these COs it is their actions and personal example that most powerfully communicate their philosophy. It's through the COs' day-to-day behavior that their men learn operationally what is important to the skipper and how he wants things done. Here, actions speak louder than words.

Develops XO

COs of superior units do not forget that they were once XOs looking forward to their own command and trying to learn as much as possible. This causes them to pay attention not just to how the XO carries out his duties, but also to helping their XO prepare to become a CO.

To do this, they frequently communicate with the XO. Much of this communication consists of the CO asking the XO's opinion on some question or problem and then discussing the best course of action. One CO said, "When I roll out of here, my XO is not going to miss a beat; he's going to be right in step. I don't make any major decisions here unless I've talked it over with him."

Another way used to develop the XO is for the CO to delegate as much as possible--to allow the XO room to do things his way. If the XO makes a mistake, the CO helps him learn from it.

And then there is the more direct way of giving the XO feedback. Another CO describes his efforts to help his XO:

When I took over, the XO was mean and tough, and I tried to tone him down. I told him: "Hey, you know you're not going to be able to do that as CO. You're not going to be able to walk into the control room and pick out somebody that has screwed up and just dump on him--because you'll wind up destroying him." I tried to get him to start thinking about a year or two from now when he would be a CO and how he would have to start handling himself more professionally and with more class. If he didn't, I told him, he was going to turn everyone off.

Staffs to Optimize Performance

"The right person in the right job at the right time" summarizes the way COs of superior commands staff their units. There are several important things they do to accomplish this. First is selection--getting the right person to do the job you want done. Second is assessing people's skills and experience to make the best use of their talents and then monitoring their performance. Finally, there's the CO's response when a person does well or poorly. When the job is done well, the person is rewarded and praised. When not done well, constructive feedback and counseling are given, or an attempt is made to put the person in another job. If all else fails, the person is reassigned.

We briefly referred to the air squadron where the CO turned his command around from being a poor performer to a Battle E winner. Much of this was due to the fact that the CO carried out an aggressive recruiting program to get the best maintenance people he could find. First the command checked around to get recommendations on who the top performers were in the ratings needed. Then they persuaded these men to come to their command. The CO himself was involved in talking with these men, especially in negotiating with a highly touted, water-walking maintenance chief. His strategy was to tell them how bad things were, how much he wanted their help to make the squadron a winner, and what they could expect to get out of it. There were few who got away.

Once they have the right men on board, these COs continue to assess the strengths and weaknesses of key players and to put people in those slots where they can contribute most. This means putting the good of the unit before the personal desires of any particular member of the command. It requires having a good sense of what the unit needs at any particular time and knowing the abilities of key personnel. For example, this same

CO knew that one of the strengths of his XO was his knowledge about maintenance, whereas the CO felt his own main strength was in operations. So, in those rare instances when he had to advise his maintenance officer, the CO would first consult with his XO. His philosophy was: "You can't know everything; you've just got to know the people who do. You have to put the right person in the right job."

Gets Out and About

The COs of these superior units are not "stateroom COs." They are in close touch with what is happening--or not happening--in their commands. A principal way of accomplishing this is by walking about the unit and talking to the men. Most of the talk is informal. In particular, it's not done in the spirit of looking over people's shoulders or trying to discover their mistakes. One CO explains what he does:

I've got a personal goal of seeing three people a day and just getting out around the crew, walking around and saying, "Hey, guy! How's it going?" There are several questions I invariably ask. If he's married, I ask, "How's your family?" If he's not married, it's "How's your car?"--or motorcycle--or something like that. One of the things I always ask is, "What is the status of your advancement courses?"

Getting out and about, then, accomplishes several things. It allows the CO to monitor and build up morale. It provides an opportunity to answer questions, give feedback, and explain things. And it allows the CO to monitor the progress and quality of work. All of this adds up to higher morale and commitment, improved job performance by the crew, and more effective decision making.

Builds Esprit de Corps

COs of superior commands are vitally interested in the esprit de corps of their command because they know that it is directly correlated with performance. The elements of esprit de corps that they work at are high morale, pride, and teamwork. There are a variety of mechanisms used to create and maintain them.

All of these COs let their men know they value them and are concerned about their personal well-being. As we just saw in the previous section, one way this is done is by getting out and about. Another important ingredient is projecting a "can do" attitude and instilling pride--the conviction that this command is "second to none." These COs frequently tell their

munications or not responding fast enough. During the exercise, I would go to the various spaces and watch, having positioned myself in a particularly eventful area where I could see how my shipmates were doing. Our intent was to drill everybody in any contingency that could come up. I said something at every critique. I focused on the positive things and tried to say something good about all the team members involved.

An important part of ensuring that training is effective is linking it to a specific aspect of combat readiness and making it realistic. One CO insisted his men find some way to make the doors of the ship's compartments hot in order to simulate a fire there during a damage control drill. His men responded by rigging heat lamps to make the doors hot to touch. In order to focus their training for an upcoming inspection, another CO arranged to have one of his officers be part of the inspection team for another command. This officer was later able to brief his unit on exactly what they should train for.

Builds Positive External Relationships

One of the strongest distinguishing characteristics of COs of superior commands is their relationship with the external environment, which includes squadron or wing staff, tenders, shipyards, private contractors, other commands, detailers, and Washington staff. One aspect of this relationship is like public relations or advertising--promoting a good image of the command to important outsiders. One CO describes his command in terms of a product and talks about how important it is to sell his product to the staff and to convince them it's superior to other products, or commands. He feels this will make it easier for his command to accomplish its mission, but it also enhances the career of everyone on board because they will be coming off a command with a good reputation.

All of these COs, then, not only wanted to be superior: they also wanted to be seen as superior. Some believe that having such a reputation will make it easier for them to get what they want from squadron or wing staff. The desire to be seen as an outstanding command is the reason why many of these COs make sure that all communications leaving their command, whether written or by radio, are accurate, adhere to proper military form, and are free of grammar and spelling mistakes. They believe that others will form opinions of their operational performance based on the quality of these messages.

Another aspect of the CO's relationship with the external environment is his advocacy of command interests. This might mean talking to detailers to get superior performers, persuading the staff to give his command a better schedule, getting

help from squadron or wing staff to prepare for inspections, arranging to get material resources, or getting needed services performed at a preferred time. In addition, these COs develop a wide network of positive relationships with important outsiders. This network provides them with valuable data that other commands might not have, and the personal relationships established facilitate getting what they want.

Another CO describes what he did to get the shipyard workers who were repairing his ship to clean up at the end of the day:

The shipyard guys are supposed to stop working at 3:30, pack up their tools, and clean up their mess. But usually what happens is they pick up their tools and leave the mess. So, I had the supply officer go out and buy 400 fox tails and 400 dust pans, although I only had about 120 guys on the ship. Every day when that 3:30 whistle blew, everything stopped and everybody had to help clean the ship. Every guy went down into his space with two fox tails and two dust pans and would hand the shipyard guy one and tell him, "Here, let me help you clean up." So here's the shipyard guy standing there with his fox tail and the shipforce's guy is cleaning up. I told my men not to force them to help clean but if the guy refused, to get his badge number and let me know, and then I'd go talk to his foreman. Well, after a week, there wasn't a problem. Our ship stayed clean. Now, the shipyard people like to come work on our ship because we help them clean up.

In contrast to the characteristic of building positive external relationships shown by the COs of superior commands, the COs of average commands often see the squadron staff as an obstacle to getting the job done. Some do not have the skills to cultivate positive relationships, and others have little desire for frequent contact with the squadron staff, feeling that the squadron only makes life more difficult for them.

Influences Successfully

"A leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don't want to do, and like it." So said Harry S. Truman. And our collection of COs of superior commands certainly fits this description. Much of leadership and management is influence, and these men are masters of influence. They are very successful at getting people to do what they want them to do and, as Truman said, to like it. In addition, they have a repertoire of influence strategies that they use, depending upon the situation and personalities of the men involved. At one time, they may use reason and facts; at another, a judicious display of strong emotion and a loud voice.

In particular, these COs seem to know how to push the right buttons to get their men to make sacrifices and to work exceptionally hard. Again, how they do this seems to be determined by the situation, the personalities of the men involved, and the values and leadership style of the CO.

These COs realize that they often have to play the role of salesman to their sailors. One technique commonly used is re-framing, getting the men to see an onerous task in a positive light--or, as the saying goes, "making lemonade out of lemons." For example, when the CO of one submarine learned that his boat, manned by the Gold crew, was going to have an unusually long patrol cycle, he was able to convince them that this was really a good thing for them. He told them, "The Blue crew really ought to worry because they are going to get rusty with all this time back in the off-crew office." The CO of a helicopter squadron was able to get his men to fly 101 out of 102 days at sea with gung-ho enthusiasm by emphasizing to them the importance of their job and how no one else could do it as well as they could.

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER

"Executive ability is deciding quickly and getting somebody else to do the work."

-- John Garland Pollard, 1871-1937

is posted outside the Ready Room, and they use cards on which are written the results of regularly scheduled retention interviews. He explains:

The first interview is done by either the CO or XO eight months prior to the individual's exit. Basically, every month somebody sits down and talks to him and writes down the results of that conversation. It is far and away the best retention program I've ever seen because it forces people to talk to him. Yesterday morning I went down, and I did all the Daycheck people. I have something in the neighborhood of 15 of them that I've done in two days. That's more than a lot of people do in three months.

Gets Out and About

Like their COs, the XOs of superior commands frequently and regularly walk about. Again, they don't do this to micromanage or look over people's shoulders. In describing his daily routine, one XO explains: "I try to get out every day and look at what is going on in the control room. I might check and see what the missile program watch is for today, stop and look at a set of logs, or watch a guy do his hourly cleaning. I find it very useful. It lets the crew know that the command is interested. They like to know that we are not just growing mushrooms on them."

Ensures Standards Are Enforced

Enforcing standards involves, first, letting people know what the standards are that they must live up to. After standards have been set, they must be monitored. As one XO put it, "You get what you inspect, not what you expect." If they're not met, corrective action is taken. The consequences of failing to measure up to standards may merely be feedback or EMI. But in more serious cases they may range from extra duty, to restriction of leave, to fines, up to administrative discharge or even a dishonorable discharge. Finally, when disciplinary action is called for, it needs to be fair and consistent.

On one of the helicopter squadrons visited, the men were preparing the aircraft for a fly-off the next day. One of the maintenance crew engaged the rotor with the blades folded and damaged the rotorhead. Although the XO was careful not to "get in somebody's face" and tell him how to do his job, he wanted to "make sure they were tracking in the right direction." The men were considering replacing the damaged rotorhead with a used one, but the XO thought this was too risky. He explains how he was able to maintain the squadron's commitment to safety:

I tried to steer them away from that by just asking questions like: "Do you think there is a possibility of damage over in this area?" "Can you absolutely rule out that this didn't happen?" "How hard would it be to get the tools to change the spindle?"

To promote high standards, the XO on one frigate reports that he makes available to his men a book called Success Through A Positive Mental Attitude. As one walks through this ship, one sees signs stating how many "success points" were earned in an evolution that was inspected. The XO explains: "We stress success. Our minimum acceptable standard for any type of evaluation is a 90. If you don't make the 90, then you look at what happened during that event, and we reschedule it and retrain to ensure that the next time we do get a 90."

One way these high standards are maintained is by the XO paying attention to details. For example, not wanting their command to be seen in a poor light, several of these XOs report scrutinizing messages for spelling and grammatical errors before they leave the ship. As another example, here's the XO on the frigate referred to above, describing how he inspects the living spaces:

When I go into the berthing spaces, I see that each man adheres to the rules and regulations, even as far as making sure that each man's books are stowed properly in his cubicle, that his safety strap is up, so in case of heavy seas he won't roll out, that the bunks are made properly, that the blanket is folded properly. I take a lot of personal pride in going through a space where you have 45 people living and there are no discrepancies. Now, I will not say that happens every day but probably three out of five days a week the berthing spaces have a flawless record. On the other two days, there might be one blanket that isn't folded properly. I nitpick that much. I go into that much detail because they know what the standards are.



THE WARDROOM

"It ain't hard to be an officer, but it's damn hard to be a good officer."

-- Remark by a Chief Petty Officer, USN

also often spend time socializing among themselves and with their families. This provides time for relaxation, but it also facilitates working together as a close-knit unit and further cements the bonds that hold them together.

The operations-navigation officer on a submarine described how his wardroom worked together to deal effectively with a previous XO who "hollered and screamed" at people. They talked among themselves about how to support him, using a lot of humor to defuse their feelings of frustration. Although they were aware of his shortcomings, they also could acknowledge his strengths, such as having many creative ideas. They made an effort to pick up the pieces in the wake of his explosions at people. Sometimes this involved alerting him to the consequences of his behavior or talking to the men he had unloaded on. The whole wardroom would help in "defusing crises and re-establishing egos to get people back on the center line so they could do their job."

Because of the special position of the division officers, the department heads of superior commands make a special effort to work with them and make them feel they are a part of the team. Here's one department head describing how he works closely with the division officers to help them plan:

I try to sit down and help them prioritize, plan, monitor their progress, and I try to keep them informed so they know the big picture. It takes continual counseling. You sit down with them and say, "O.K., let's review the projects you're working on. Where are you with each one of these projects?" Then, you may need to tell them, "I think you need to change your priorities on this one. We've got to get that other one done first. I understand that you want this one very badly, but it's not going to produce the results." You have to explain to them what's going to be visible and what's not.

If I see there's something they're not going to be able to do, I usually grab them and say, "Let's go talk to the XO and tell him what the problems are." Then we follow the guidance that we get from the front office.

Average commands are characterized by more competitive behavior and less mutual support. There is less coordination and communication. People who should be talking to each other to plan and carry out evolutions don't. Division officers are more often left to their own devices. And there seems to be less of an attempt to help or work around other "problem" officers.

Matches CO-XO Leadership

We found that in superior commands there is more congruence between the wardroom and the CO-XO on command philosophy and leadership style than in average commands. Put simply, everyone is headed in the same direction. They identify with the goals set by the CO and XO and with how the CO and XO wish to accomplish them. In average commands, there are more people who are just standing around watching or even pushing in the opposite direction.

This theme was strongly indicated in our survey data and was evident in our group interviews with the officers. In superior commands, people were more aware of what the command's goals and philosophy were and were more enthusiastic about supporting them. In average commands, sometimes people did not know the goals or philosophy, or were cynical about them or even openly critical. In addition, there was a matching of how things were done in superior commands. This was also evident in the fact that in superior commands the officers reinforced the command philosophy with subordinates. They left little doubt in their men's minds that they were aligned with the view from the top.

Raises Concerns with the CO and XO

Officers of superior commands also readily ask the CO or XO for guidance or information if they believe these are necessary to accomplish their jobs or to advance their own professional development. This involves raising issues with the CO or XO before they turn into serious problems. They act according to the adage, "There are no dumb questions." Besides getting inputs from above, they also report both good news and bad news. However, when they raise concerns, they do not go in without a well-thought-out course of action to propose.

Takes Initiative

Officers of superior commands take initiative in three ways. First, when they see that something needs to be done they do it without waiting to be told. Second, they try to find new and better ways to get the job done. And third, they are willing to do extra things to enhance mission accomplishment, even if they are not technically part of their job description.]

One officer suggested and implemented the idea of developing slides to use in his boat's briefs. Another officer instituted a matrix planning form to catch up on overdue evals and to make sure evals were done on time in the future. An

operations officer in an air squadron persisted in his attempts to get some ASW practice time with a real sub. After his request was turned down by the squadron staff, he went to the flag staff, who referred him back to the squadron ASW officer. They eventually did get some sub time but, in his words, "It was a matter of liaisioning with the staff, repeatedly pressuring and harassing them until they finally broke down and did it." All of these individuals undertook these actions without waiting to be told to do them.

In average commands, there is a tendency for officers to wait to be told what to do and to accept the status quo. New ideas are resisted, and people are likely to play it safe.

Does Detailed Planning

The wardroom plays a major role in developing and implementing short- and long-range plans to achieve the command's goals. After learning the command's goals from the CO and XO, the officers develop plans for their departments and divisions by getting input from their chiefs and other relevant sources. They pay special attention to coordinating their department's activities with other work going on. For example, the engineer does not test ship service generators when the electronic technicians are calibrating electronic equipment. They make sure that plans are specific in terms of who is to do what, when, and how. These commands usually write down weekly goals that need to be accomplished to prepare for a major evolution, such as an OPPE. Plans are then publicized so that everyone knows what to expect. They then delegate tasks and monitor how well the plan is being carried out.

Takes Responsibility for Work-Group Performance

One of the greatest strengths of wardrooms of superior commands is their sense of responsibility for the performance of the people in their department. This leads them to try to anticipate problems before they occur, to take responsibility when a problem occurs that they should have prevented, and to hold their men accountable for meeting the command's standards. It is a sense of personal ownership--something like a garden that one diligently cultivates, or a house in whose appearance one takes pride. These men have the same sense of pride and attachment to their turf, their department. When there are weeds, they take it as a personal affront and act decisively to get things in order.

As an example, shortly after his arrival, the personnel officer in an aviation squadron was asked by his CO about the status of back pay for men who would be leaving soon. When the

personnel officer asked the yeoman who was responsible, he was told that the claims had all been submitted. He reported this to the CO and said they were just waiting for the money to arrive. A few days later, however, he noticed several claims on the yeoman's desk that were several months old: they had been returned because they had not been filled out properly. Further investigation revealed that there were numerous outstanding travel claims, and this was why men had not been paid for the previous four detachments.

After going over some of the returned claims with the yeoman, the personnel officer concluded that the yeoman did not understand how to do the paperwork properly and had just stuffed it in his drawer and ignored it as long as no one bugged him about it. The next thing the officer did was to confront the first-class petty officer responsible for supervising the yeoman to find out why he had not caught the problem. He then arranged for the problem to be fixed. He reports:

As soon as I found out that things were as bad as they were, I marched right back down to the skipper's office and said, "I'm sorry but I didn't give you the straight word. This is what happened, and this is what I'm doing to take care of it." I felt I was obligated to go back to him and tell him what was going on--not only that we did it wrong but that it was three months overdue. Although I wasn't there when it happened, by being the guy that's in charge, it's still my responsibility. I was embarrassed that it had gotten out of hand.


Officers in superior commands "take the heat" for problems in their departments or divisions. Because of the command environment, officers readily accept this responsibility and enjoy the leadership challenges they are given. They do not need to blame others for their mistakes; they are willing to share the credit for their departments' or divisions' successes.

THE CHIEFS QUARTERS

"The Chiefs run the ship."

-- Traditional Navy saying

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Chiefs Quarters Characteristics

- Acts for Command-Wide Effectiveness
- Leads Divisions Actively
- Enforces Standards
- Supports and Develops Division Officers
- Is Cohesive
- Has a Strong Leader

THE CHIEFS QUARTERS

"We've got some damn good chiefs, and 98% of the job is chief petty officers. They make the Navy run. They make my job so much easier. I'm really tickled by them."

-- Executive Officer (Air)

"The backbone of the Navy." This old adage well sums up the role of the chiefs in the superior commands we studied. In these commands, the special role and contribution of the chief petty officers was readily acknowledged. It is true, though, that the chiefs in any command play a unique role just because of the position they occupy in the organizational structure and the qualifications for becoming a chief petty officer. They are the senior management for the enlisted personnel; they are the interface or linchpin between officers and enlisted; they have many years' experience in the Navy; and they are the hands-on technical experts. Although they share these characteristics with chiefs in average commands, those in superior commands act in a distinct fashion to contribute to their command's superior effectiveness.

Examples to illustrate exactly what the chiefs do in each area of command excellence are given in the Relationships and Activities sections. Here, we present an overview of what the chiefs quarters is like in superior commands. The chiefs quarters in superior commands:

- Acts for Command-Wide Excellence
- Leads Divisions Actively
- Enforces Standards
- Supports and Develops Division Officers
- Is Cohesive
- Has a Strong Leader

Acts for Command-Wide Excellence

Chiefs in superior commands act to promote the success of the command as a whole. Although they have a strong sense of ownership and take responsibility for their division, they are able to look beyond their own immediate job to help the entire

ing out to make sure that the effectiveness of the command does not suffer. They may even recommend that he be reassigned to another area of responsibility that he can more easily handle. They also take the time to listen and help each other with personal problems. They do not ridicule each other or engage in backbiting. The chiefs quarters in these commands is relaxed, amiable, and a popular hangout. The cohesiveness of the chiefs quarters is also reflected in the fact that they often socialize together.

Has a Strong Leader


In superior commands the cohesiveness and high morale of the chiefs quarters is in part due to the presence of a strong leader. The leader may be a formal leader, like the chief with the highest rank, but he can just as well be an informal leader, one who leads through charisma or superior know-how. This chief usually plays the role of standard-bearer for the command, being enthusiastic about it, encouraging and giving support to people, and driving them to excel. It is also usually someone whom the rest of the chiefs perceive as fair, as standing up for their interests and those of the crew, as willing to listen with an open mind, and as highly competent. This person is often sought out by the CO or XO to sample the tone of the chiefs quarters or crew or to get his advice on matters concerning enlisted personnel. In superior commands there is a consensus as to who this person is. In average commands, there is no such consensus and, frequently, no such leader.

THE CREW

"The task of leadership is not to put greatness into humanity, but to elicit it, for the greatness is already there."

-- John Buchen, 1875-1940

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Crew Characteristics

- Committed to Command Goals
- Lives Up to Standards
- Respects the Chain of Command
- Takes Ownership for Their Work Areas
- Is Motivated
- Works as a Team

THE CREW

Up till now, we have focused on the roles and significance of senior and middle management, so to speak, in producing command excellence. Clearly, however, there is another group that plays a key role in achieving command excellence, and that is the crew. It is the crew, constituting the bulk of the command, that the officers and chiefs must lead and manage to accomplish the command's mission. This relationship is suggested by the old Navy saying of "What is a captain without a ship, and what is a ship without a crew?" This dependence is also reflected in the adage that the crew is where "the keel meets the water."

By being in the command a process of transformation takes place that affects a crew member's behavior, motivation, values, knowledge and skills, team orientation, and personality. The different manner of leading and managing officers and chiefs in superior commands results in differences between the crew in superior commands versus the crew in average commands. Without going into much detail, here are the characteristics of crews in superior commands:

- Committed to Command Goals
- Lives Up to Standards
- Respects the Chain of Command
- Takes Ownership for Their Work Areas
- Is Motivated
- Works as a Team

Committed to Command Goals

Due to the success of the CO at communicating and influencing, the crew of superior commands is able to articulate the command's philosophy and is committed to it. This is accomplished also by the officers and chiefs making sure that explanations and information get to the crew in an accurate and timely manner. They have a clear understanding of what must be done and how the command expects it to be done. They feel like they are an integral part of a team or family and speak with pride, for example, of "my squadron (boat, ship)." In average commands, we found more disagreement about what the command's philosophy was and more questioning of its correctness.

Lives Up to Standards

In superior commands the officers and chiefs make sure that standards are clear, and that they are monitored and enforced. Because of this, their identification with the command, and their high motivation, the crew also accepts and tries to live up to the command's high standards. They also monitor their own performance and that of their co-workers and give feedback where it is appropriate. They are committed to doing things right the first time.

Respects the Chain of Command

The crew of superior commands follows the chain of command. If they want something done, they go to their immediate superior first. They understand how the chain of command is supposed to work and the value of adhering to it. Aside from going to the appropriate person to get things done, respecting the chain of command also means respecting people higher in rank. In our group interviews with crew members in average commands, there was much more criticism and ridicule of their superiors. In superior commands, there was very little of this.

Takes Ownership for Their Work Areas

Crews of superior commands take responsibility for their own individual performance and the performance for their division. This is fostered by their pride in the command, the clarity of standards, the amount of authority they are given, and the fact that they are held accountable by their supervisors and chiefs. They also know that if they do the job well, they will be recognized and rewarded.

Is Motivated

One of the most striking aspects of our interviews with the crews of superior and average commands was their enthusiasm, pride, and positive attitude. Morale in superior commands was much higher than in the average ones. This resulted in jobs being done on time, done well, and people taking the initiative to propose better ways of doing things.

Works as a Team

Crew members of superior commands realize that they are all in the same boat together and that they are dependent on each other. They must work together as a team to accomplish their individual jobs, the tasks of their division, and the mission of

the command as a whole. They communicate with each other frequently through sharing information, soliciting input, giving feedback, discussing job-related problems, and talking about personal issues. They cooperate, coordinate, and share resources. Each person is clear about his role, is committed to a common goal, and works hard to achieve it. And they support each other. They realize that to be a team, there can be no prima donnas and that each person must pull his fair share of the weight.





RELATIONSHIPS



RELATIONSHIPS

A command is not just a collection of people. Rather, people interact in patterns, some informal and some formal. In each command, people come to relate to each other in recurring and distinctive ways. The quality of these relationships impacts command excellence.


Our study found that there are three key relationships that influence a command's success: the CO-XO relationship, the chain of command, and how the command, particularly the CO, manages the external environment. How well the CO and XO work together as a team affects all aspects of the command's performance. How well a command follows and uses the chain of command and delegates responsibility also determines how successful it will be. And since every command is dependent on outside individuals, groups, and organizations for its success, how a command manages this dependence also contributes to its success or failure. All of these relationships are different in superior commands from relationships in average commands.

THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP

"Nothing in war is as important as an undivided command."

-- Napoleon I: Maxims of War, 1831

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



CO-XO Relationship

- CO is in Charge
- XO Stands Behind CO's Philosophy and Policies
- CO and XO Have Well-Defined and Complementary Roles
- CO and XO Communicate Frequently
- CO and XO Respect Each Others' Abilities

THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP

How well the CO and the XO work together vitally affects the command. In superior commands the CO and XO work together as a team. We found several characteristics of the CO-XO relationship that enable this teamwork to occur and that distinguish superior from average commands:

- CO Is in Charge
- XO Stands behind CO's Philosophy and Policies
- CO and XO Have Well-defined and Complementary Roles
- CO and XO Communicate Frequently
- CO and XO Respect Each Other's Abilities

CO Is in Charge

Superior commands live up to Napoleon's dictum that "Nothing in war is as important as an undivided command." In these commands, there is no doubt who is calling the shots. Although the CO and XO work together as the dominant coalition in the command, it is the CO who leads and the XO who follows. In some of the average commands, the crew felt that it was the XO who was really in charge, with the CO spending a lot of time in his stateroom.

XO Stands behind CO's Philosophy and Policies

"The CO and I discuss a lot of things together. I understand basically where he is coming from and it is my job to try and support him. I don't always agree, and I tell him I don't agree. But when he explains that that's how I am going to do it, that's the way we do it. And we do it as well as we can."

-- Executive Officer (Surface)

In superior commands, the XO actively supports the CO's policies, philosophy, and procedures. As we have seen, this does not mean that he always agrees with the CO's views or decisions. He brings up any disagreements he may have with the CO in private. He may even try to convince the CO to change his mind. However, once the decision is made, the XO fully

supports the decision regardless of his own preferences. He does not attempt to undermine the CO in any way.

The harmony in the CO-XO relationship in superior units is also often commented on by the crew, who typically use phrases like "a matched pair" or "You couldn't have two guys who are more alike" to describe this relationship.

Although the need for unity between commanding officer and executive officer seems obvious, such harmony is not always found in the less effective commands. In one command, the CO had a strong ethical commitment, while the XO was obviously much less committed. In another command, a pessimistic commanding officer was teamed with an extremely upbeat executive officer, and the XO continually upstaged the CO. In both of these cases, the contrast in styles and philosophies split the command, resulting in a less than total effort from the officers and the crew.

One of the most striking examples of an effective relationship occurred when the CO and the XO had come through the PCO-XO pipeline together. They knew each other's strengths and weaknesses when they walked into the command. Questions about where each one stood had been settled. They came to the command as a unified team and the command benefited from their common vision.

In another case, an executive officer first served under a relatively inflexible, autocratic commanding officer and then under a more open-minded one. Under each commanding officer he explicitly modified his leadership style to match that of the commanding officer.

CO and XO Have Well-defined and Complementary Roles

The COs and XOs of these commands accept the fact that their roles are different and that they must work together to achieve the same goal: accomplishing the mission of the command. In general terms, the CO establishes policy and procedure and holds the XO responsible for implementation. The CO has the big picture; the XO, the nitty-gritty. In most of the superior commands, the CO and XO discuss what their respective roles will be. One XO recalls his first meeting with his CO: "I remember sitting in his room when we first met and talking about his goals. I had certain goals, and I wanted to mesh my philosophy with his and to get his input on the type of relationship he wanted us to have." In this meeting the CO reports that he told the XO: "I don't want you to be a paperwork XO. I want you to be an operations XO. I want you involved in the ship's operations--to run the training program and to watch the navigation team. I also want you to start training yourself to be a CO."

What is important is not that the duties and responsibilities are the same from command to command in the same community, because, as we have seen, each CO emphasizes different areas. Rather, it is that the roles are made clear and are mutually accepted.

CO and XO Communicate Frequently

"The XO and I meet constantly. There's seldom a day that we're not talking to each other by phone or in person." This is typical of the amount of communication between the CO and XO in superior commands. In some commands, the communication is more formal and regular. Most COs meet regularly with the XO early in the morning to review message traffic and plan for the day. In others, it is more informal and more on an as-needed basis. The CO of a submarine says: "We talk to each other all the time. Whenever he wants to talk to me or I want to talk to him, we walk over and talk to each other. There's no formal procedure; we have complete access to each other. My door is always open." In another air squadron, the CO and XO usually tour the shops together on a daily basis.

In addition, the COs of superior commands are continually discussing long-range plans, telling their XOs what's coming up, and getting ideas on how to prepare for upcoming tasks. In turn, these XOs keep the CO informed as to how plans are being carried out, not hesitating to bring to the CO problems that need his attention.

CO and XO Respect Each Other's Abilities

Although the COs and XOs of the superior commands studied are not usually close friends, they do enjoy working together and appreciate each other's strengths. For example, one XO mentioned how he thought his CO was the best pilot he had ever seen. Another CO approvingly describes his relationship with his XO as "a dynamic duo; a one-two punch." In contrast, on one average submarine, the crew was quick to point out that on more than one occasion the CO had belittled the XO in front of the crew, thereby communicating to them his lack of respect for the XO. This profoundly affected morale on the boat. It undermined respect for the XO, and the crew reasoned that if this could happen to the XO, then it could surely happen to them.




THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

"Order is Heav'n's first law."

-- Alexander Pope, 1688-1744, Essay
on Man, iv

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Chain of Command

- The Chain of Command is Respected, But Flexible
- Information Flows Both Up and Down the Chain of Command
- Responsibility is Delegated

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chain of command provides the organizational structure for the Navy. This hierarchy, with each person reporting to someone of a higher rank, establishes authority for decision making, sets the channels for communication flow, and assigns responsibility for carrying out work. It also is through living and working within the chain of command that naval officers and enlisted petty officers learn how to lead their men. It is the experience of moving up the hierarchy and knowing first-hand what it is to obey that forges the mettle of those who know how to command. In this sense, the chain of command enables sailors to live up to the maxim "Learn to obey before you command."

But how does the chain of command really work in superior commands? And does it function differently in average commands? In fact, this study found significant differences between the two. In superior commands:

- The Chain of Command Is Respected, but Flexible
- Information Flows Up and Down the Chain of Command
- Responsibility Is Delegated

The Chain of Command Is Respected, but Flexible

There is no doubt that the chain of command is adhered to in superior commands; at the same time, however, it is flexible. It is never allowed to become a cage that inhibits people from getting the job done. There are two ways in which the chain of command is flexible. First, in special circumstances, such as in a time crunch, someone may bypass a person he is ordinarily supposed to go through. In these cases, however, people in superior commands notify the bypassed person either before the action or immediately afterwards. The other way consists of informal means of communication and influence. However, as one XO emphasized, "You can't go wrong by sticking to the chain of command."

The commitment to following the chain of command starts at the top but is carried out by all levels. One CO who has an open-door policy welcomes anyone who wants to talk to him. But he says:

If they want to talk to me about a problem in maintenance, then the first thing I'm going to ask them is, "Have you talked to the maintenance chief or the main-

tenance department head?" They know I'm going to say that to them, so they don't come in here unless they've already done that.

Chiefs in superior commands are especially mindful of following the chain of command. In particular, they object to interference of division officers and department heads in the running of their area. They insist that officers go through them if they want the junior enlisted to do something. One chief reports:

It's destructive when a division officer or department head interferes with the operation of your division. That happened to me once here. A division officer told one of my guys that he couldn't leave the boat until he got a haircut. When I found out about it, the first thing I did was I told the guy to leave and go get a haircut. The second thing I did, and I usually don't lose my temper, is I called the division officer topside and said to him: "What are you doing telling one of my guys that he has to stay on board until he gets a haircut? If you want one of my men to get a haircut, you tell me, and I'll tell him!"

In one average command, there were significant problems with the chain of command: the department heads were going directly to the LPOs to get work done. After this began happening, the LPOs started bypassing the chiefs and going directly to the officers. Morale was extremely low, especially among the chiefs. They complained that they did not know what their role was on the boat. To make matters worse, people believed that it was the XO who was really running the command. The CO did not walk about but instead stayed in his stateroom much of the time. The XO was a screamer, and attempts by the chiefs to discuss the issue with him and bolster their role were fruitless.

Information Flows Up and Down the Chain of Command

In superior commands, information flows freely and frequently up and down the chain of command. In general, when it is from the top down, information flows in an ordered sequence from higher to lower levels of authority, and the reverse for bottom-up communication.

These commands work hard at putting the word out and listening to people. For example, the department heads realize that the chiefs are the ones most in touch with the day-to-day running of the command and have the most technical know-how, so they actively seek out the input of the chiefs without undermining the authority of the division officers. Similarly, it is the department heads who are closer to the big picture and

the plans to implement it, so the chiefs maintain open channels of communication to them through the division officers. In particular, superior commands welcome new ideas and even disagreement over the best way of doing things. They know that this means that people are interested enough to speak up and that, out of the exchange of ideas, the best one will surface. Also, if something is going wrong, they would rather hear about it than not.

The most frequent breakdown of the chain of command occurs at the division officer - chief interface. Because of the inexperience of the division officers, there is a temptation for both the chiefs and the department heads to bypass them. In superior commands, this is realized and steps are taken to ensure that it does not happen. In one command, the CO reduces the managerial duties of his division officers so they can concentrate on becoming qualified and on learning the tremendous amount of information they have to master. Although this allows for the DO's unique situation, it still keeps him in the chain of command. When the division officers are shunted out of the chain of command, their credibility is undermined and they lose the opportunity to learn to lead.

Responsibility Is Delegated

One of the strongest distinctions between average and superior commands is how much work and decision making are delegated to lower levels. This begins with the CO, who focuses on the big picture and then delegates to the XO the task of turning the broad brush strokes into a working plan. The XO in turn delegates to the department heads the task of generating a plan for their department and holds them accountable for the implementation of the final plan. Each successive level then delegates as much as possible to the level below it. This goes all the way down to the work center supervisors, who are given the responsibility for running their own areas.


These commands realize the benefits of delegating. Not only is it efficient because time and energy are limited and one cannot do everything; it is smart because it allows the person with the expertise and the one closest to the situation to decide what to do. It also builds morale because people feel trusted and valued: they are more than robots who merely take orders. In addition, it fosters high standards because people take ownership for their areas; they learn that they will receive the credit when things turn out well and the blame when they don't. And through delegation, people develop. They learn how to lead and make decisions, and how to learn from their mistakes. The chain of command is not a democracy; yet it is through delegation that the same kind of commitment to decisions is won.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

"The squeaky wheel gets the grease."

-- Traditional saying

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



External Relationships

- Command Builds Networks with Outsiders
- Command Advocates for Its Interests with Outsiders
- Command Promotes a Positive Image

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Every organization is influenced by the larger environment that surrounds it, and, in turn, it has an impact on that environment. To understand the success or failure of a Navy command, it is necessary to look at the environment within which it exists. This was strikingly illustrated when it was discovered that two of the air squadrons that were identified as superior had won their Battle E when deployed on a carrier that, itself, had won the Battle E. Both of the COs of the air squadrons stated that they could not have been so successful without the support of the carrier. For example, they could not have flown as many consecutive sorties if the supply department on the carrier had not been so well run.

The intent of our study was not to investigate how the outside environment helped or hindered a command; however, it was impossible to ignore the environment because there was a marked difference in how superior and average commands interacted with it. How superior squadrons dealt with the commodore, squadron or wing commander, squadron or wing staff, tenders, the shipyard, contractors, other commands, detailers, and the local community was different from how average commands did. And this difference had a direct impact on their operational performance and combat readiness. Putting it simply, superior commands managed the outside environment while average commands were managed by it.

We previously discussed the role of the CO in building positive external relationships. Here we focus on the management of external relationships by the command as a whole. Here's what superior commands do to build these relationships:

- Command Builds Networks with Outsiders
- Command Advocates for Its Interests with Outsiders
- Command Promotes a Positive Image

Command Builds Networks with Outsiders

Superior commands establish and cultivate a web of relationships with significant people or groups in the external environment and then use those relationships to accomplish their goals. This involves getting information from people, treating them professionally, doing things for them, explaining things, and, in general, being able to influence and work with them successfully. It requires a mindset that sees the larger

environment as full of resources rather than obstacles to be avoided or overcome. This is not to say that "outsiders" do not at times make life miserable, but the general orientation in superior commands is how to respond positively in these situations and, preferably, prevent such aggravations from occurring. Having wide and frequently utilized communication links to these "centers of power" makes it possible.

The CO of one air squadron reports that he does not hesitate to call the squadron maintenance officer if he needs help in getting parts. He says this works because "We trust each other." The CO of one surface ship was able to get an experimental computer placed on his ship with a resulting savings in time. He learned of this opportunity through his many contacts at the squadron. He explains:

I tell my officers and chiefs that it is imperative that their relationships with the squadron staff are good. This is so that we can always get what we need from the squadron. I tell them to ask the squadron to come over here and look at the ship. If they are here, they will see what's happening and feel comfortable about the ship. But you need to take the initiative.

When we pulled into port, the squadron staff did not come to meet the ship as I expected they would. So I said, "All right, guys, march over to the squadron building and introduce yourselves." The squadron was incredulous that this was happening; they were really impressed.

COs and XO's were not the only ones taking this kind of action; there were plenty of examples of chiefs and officers building a network of relationships with outsiders. Here's an example of how a chief was proactive in using his contacts to help his ship get test equipment for a systems readiness test in preparation for a Fleet Operational Readiness Calibration inspection:

For this test we have to get the test equipment from the tender, but at this time there were two other boats along the pier doing the same tests, so it was very difficult to come by the test equipment. I know a lot of the people on the tender, so I brought some of our equipment there to be calibrated. Then I went to the shops in the shipyard to find out if they had any of the test equipment we needed. I know just about everybody in the shops from before. I used to get out and mingle with the people. They said they didn't have an antenna simulator, but I knew that this other boat had one.

So I went right down to Combat Systems and explained our situation. They told me that the equipment we needed was on this other boat. Well, I knew Fred was working there, and he and I are friends. He's also one of the most knowledgeable individuals there is on this system. So I went down and chatted with Fred for a little while and brought back their static antenna tester.

I also talked to Fred about our progress on our systems readiness test because some of the other boats were having maintenance problems in trying to finish the test, and I wanted to avoid those problems. He pointed out to us five or six things that we had to do to avoid these problems. There's no doubt we would have flunked that test if we hadn't found these things out.

Command Advocates for Its Interests with Outsiders

Superior commands know how to work the system. They are not shy about asking for help. These commands establish contacts at other commands to recruit good people, talk to detailers to fill billets with the people they want, arrange for technical assists from the squadron, approach local businessmen to help raise money for rec funds, get good schedules for inspections, get needed training opportunities, persuade Disbursing to give out checks when needed, and get materials and services from the shipyard or outside contractors.

In superior commands there is a widespread feeling of ownership for the command and each person's area of responsibility. There is an identification with and protection of the command's interests and welfare. So, when these commands feel that they are not getting a fair shake, they speak up and act to correct it. Here's how an air squadron CO reacted to a maintenance advisory team visit that he thought was not done properly:

I found out what had happened when I got back and saw a lot of chins dragging. My maintenance people were real upset because they thought this maintenance advisory team, which is supposed to help us improve, had done a hatchet job and put us on report. What I told the guys was, "Hey, you've done great. You're a great squadron. We didn't handle this as well as we could have, but I'll get it sorted out. I'm the interface here. You guys keep on doing your job. Here's what I want you to do. The sun's going to come up tomorrow, so let's press on." And what I had them do was to begin to correct the discrepancies that the advisory team found.

That was on a Friday, and Friday afternoon I called some people I know at the wing and said that I wanted to see everyone concerned and tell them what happened from our point of view. Two of the commanders over there came here, and I told them, "Take a look at this squadron's records, take a look at a year's worth of data, look at our inspection results, and then tell me that any wing maintenance unit that's supposed to be an advisory team has the right to come in here and hatchet my people! No, that's not right! We've got to resolve this."

And they agreed with me. Soon after that this advisory team came back to see me with their tail between their legs, saying, "Hey, your squadron did great. No problem." The officer who led the team and I sat down and talked about what had happened. We both learned something. So, we successfully turned a negative situation into a positive one.

In contrast, the CO of one average command believed that a tech assist team had conducted themselves as if they were doing an inspection. Even though he did not like this, he made no protest to them but seemed to take his frustration out on his own men, whom he criticized for not doing well.

All of the COs we interviewed resented what they considered unwarranted interference in the running of their command by outside groups, such as wing or squadron staff. Paradoxically, however, the superior commands were best able to chart their own course by having frequent contact with these groups in order to influence them. To avoid them was to become a pawn.

There is a saying that contains part of the secret of how superior commands are able to use external resources so effectively: "If you don't know where you're going, you're liable to end up somewhere else." These commands do this successfully because they have a clear understanding of what their interests are. They have done their homework to develop long- and short-range goals and objectives for the command as a whole and for departments and divisions. They know what they want. With this in their pocket, they can then figure out whom to talk to, how to talk to them, and what to ask for.

Command Promotes a Positive Image

Superior commands believe they are the best and they want other people to know it, so they promote their command to outside groups. They want to be seen in as favorable a light as possible. Several of the COs of superior commands make sure that messages leaving the unit are free of errors because they

know that errors will reflect poorly on the command. The same thing holds for cleanliness. They do not just want to be sharp; they want to look sharp. They know that people who tour the command will make judgments about their ability to perform, based on how spic and span the command appears. They make sure that work areas, equipment, mess areas, and berthing spaces all look good.

One submarine we visited liked to do things with a lot of pizzazz. As part of their tactical readiness examination they had to do a war brief. The navigator-ops officer decided to do something special. He explained:

To prepare for our brief, I went to see how this other boat did theirs, which was not very well. I said, "Why don't we make a slide show for our brief that will knock their socks off! We need to improve our photo capability anyway, so this will give us practice under time pressure." We ended up with about 15 slides in a top secret format. The commodore said it was the best he had ever seen. We've also been asked to do it on the fleet level. It's been good publicity for the command.

Superior commands also work hard at presenting a good image to the civilian community. The men realize that they are diplomats for the command and the Navy. They know that people will judge the command based on their appearance and behavior. Their appearance is sharp, they are polite, and they communicate their pride in their command.

One reason these commands promote a favorable image is given by a CO who says: "If you demonstrate your inability to do your job, you get an awful lot of help in doing it. And that's not the way I want to do business. I want to keep this command off of people's hit lists. I want to solve this command's problems in this command." This requires getting the message that "This command is a top performer" across to the powers that be.

This does not mean that these commands are merely engaged in politicking or that they get recognition for things that they don't really deserve. On the contrary, the promotion of the command has to be backed up with genuine accomplishment.



ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITIES

Every Navy command has to perform certain standard tasks or activities. As we indicated in our initial discussion of the organizational model used, we chose to focus on Planning, Enforcing Standards, Building Esprit de Corps, Communication, and Training and Development. These were targeted because they were most often mentioned by the people interviewed as being the most critical activities for successful operation of the command. In addition, they are functions that most organizations need to pay attention to in order to excel.


For each activity, we identify those characteristics, or themes, that distinguish superior from average commands. Examples are given for each characteristic. Although examples are cited of how the various command levels perform these activities, the principal focus is on what the CO and XO do.

PLANNING

"If I always appear prepared, it is because before embarking on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation."

-- Napoleon I, 1769-1821

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Planning

- Planning is a Regularly Scheduled Activity
- Planning Occurs at All Levels
- Planning is Long-Range
- Plans are Specific
- Plans are Publicized
- Systems are Put in Place to Implement Plans
- Command Makes Every Effort to Stick to the Plan

PLANNING

"If you plan ahead, you can accomplish anything." This observation by one of the COs of a superior submarine captures a major difference between superior and average commands--superior commands do a lot of planning, and they do it well.

Although the best-laid plans of even Battle E winners are waylaid by unforeseen events, the general impression one has of a superior command is of things running in a calm and orderly fashion. These commands look far ahead and prepare for contingencies, whereas the men in average commands often complain of crisis management, of continually having to put out fires.

These top commands know the advantages of effective planning and the disadvantages of poor planning. The resulting uncertainty from the latter takes its toll on morale. For example, often and unexpectedly having to work late disrupts family life and causes resentment. Having to scramble to adjust to a constantly changing schedule adversely affects job performance. And not having a well-defined plan to present to the squadron or wing causes a command to be more vulnerable to outside manipulation.

There are several characteristics that distinguish planning in superior commands from that in average commands. Again, although average commands do some of these things some of the time, superior commands do them consistently. It is the combination of all of these that causes the planning in superior commands to be so effective. Here are these characteristics:

- Planning Is a Regularly Scheduled Activity
- Planning Occurs at All Levels
- Planning Is Long-Range
- Plans Are Specific
- Plans Are Publicized
- Systems Are Put in Place to Implement Plans
- Command Makes Every Effort to Stick to the Plan

Planning Is a Regularly Scheduled Activity

Planning is a regularly scheduled activity in superior commands. The XO on one submarine indicates that he meets weekly

with his department heads to plan the following week's training schedule. Besides planning for ongoing events, these commands have special planning sessions for major events, like deployment or upcoming inspections. The CO of a surface ship reports that his command met every evening from 1800 to 1830 for months in advance to plan for an important mission.

Planning Occurs at All Levels

Superior units know that to plan well one must get input from the people with expertise, from those who will carry out the plans, and from those who will be affected by the plans when implemented. This process begins at the top, with the CO explaining in a general way what needs to be done. Then it is up to the XO to formulate a plan and make sure it is carried out. He does this by delegating planning tasks to the department heads. These, in turn, involve their division officers and chiefs. These chiefs get input from their LPOs and work center supervisors. In addition to generating a better plan, this process creates high commitment to making the plan work. It also decreases the likelihood of crisis management, since there is more widespread anticipation of obstacles.

To illustrate this involvement, the engineering officer on a submarine talks about preparations for upkeep after returning from a deployment:

Our upkeep doesn't officially start until Friday, but we have essentially already done it. We planned it out with the LPOs while we were at sea. I had three meetings with the chiefs, LPOs, and division officers all together. What we did first was to identify all the areas that needed taking care of. They later talked to me individually about their jobs. A few days after that, we all got together to coordinate the effort and resolve any conflicts. Then everyone went and made necessary corrections. The third time we got together, we identified what we still had to do. This session, which was a few days before we pulled in, was basically getting all the details straightened out.

Planning Is Long-Range

"I don't know if it's the XO or his tickler system, but we seem to see our problems a little bit further ahead of time than the other commands I've been in." This statement by a division officer on a surface ship indicates one of the strongest characteristics that distinguishes superior from average commands: their emphasis on long-range planning.

Superior commands plan six months to a year or more in advance. For example, the XO of a fighter squadron describes their planning process:

We have a long-range planning meeting at least once a month. We take a look at our calendar six months in advance and point out the events that are coming up. We lay every commitment out there on that calendar. Then we break it down into three months ahead. I say, "Okay, we're going to do this, we're going to do that, we're going to take that day off, we're going on a detachment here, and so on."

In order to be successful at long-range planning, a unit needs to get the necessary information on upcoming events. This requires good communication and coordination with outside groups. Approaching the squadron with a well-defined schedule makes life easier for squadron staff; having a good relationship with the squadron or the shipyard, for example, makes putting together a realistic schedule that much easier. So long-term planning and the relationship with the external environment are synergistic. One CO says:

We take planning very seriously. We have a monthly schedule of events, and we put this out in several forms. One is a list of meetings; another breaks things down by days and months; another is a proposed schedule for shipboard events, mainly including ship's force work which is going to affect other departments on the ship. I then take these over to the Readiness Support Group and tell them: "This is what we have planned. Let's try and dovetail your plans and ours, so that we're not duplicating efforts, or planning to use the same space at the same time." What I'm trying to do is be the dog wagging the tail, instead of the tail that somebody else is wagging.

Plans Are Specific

Superior units know that in order for plans to be effective, they must be specific. They should state who is responsible for what activity, what is to be done and to what standard, and when it should be completed. The CO of one air squadron discusses the planning they did for an off-load:

We had regular meetings with the people who were involved, probably two or three weeks in advance. We put out our own LOI even though the ship had one. And we assigned responsibilities. One of the most important things I've learned is that you have got to assign responsibilities in writing. The other thing is accountability. You've got to tell people, "This is

what your job is," and clarify how they're going to do it. There's too much of a tendency to say, "We'll just work it out when we get there." We had a preliminary meeting and asked: "What sorts of things do we need to be concerned about? What will be problem areas? Who's going to take care of this? Who's going to take care of that?"

Plans Are Publicized

After plans are formulated, superior commands make a special effort to publicize them. They do this in a variety of ways, primarily through the POD. PODs on superior units are clear, accurate, succinct, and specific.

One superior unit distributed a plan of the week, and on the back of it they had the plan for the quarter. In still another command, the XO had monthly calendars prepared with the unit's major events listed. Each page represented a day and had lots of space for making notes. These were distributed to his officers and chiefs, who could rip off a page as that day passed. He encouraged his men to share the calendars with their families, so that they too would know what was coming up.

Systems Are Put in Place to Implement Plans

Superior commands work hard, but they also work smart. They do not constantly reinvent the wheel. When they find that something works or needs to be done regularly, they develop systems or routines to make sure those tasks get done.

One example of this is the use of a matrix planning form by an XO to make sure that evaluations are done on time. The form includes the names of everyone and dates by which the evaluation steps have to be completed. On another ship, officers talk to each person coming up for reenlistment. These talks take place at monthly intervals beginning eight months ahead of time.


Still another example is the goal-setting system used on one frigate. Each week the supervisors must turn in to their chiefs a list of their work goals for the next week. The chiefs then use these to submit a list of goals to their division officer. The procedure is followed on up the chain of command until, finally, the department heads turn in a summary statement of their goals to the XO. They are careful, though, not to make this an exercise in micromanagement--the eventual goal statements include only completion dates.

MAINTAINING STANDARDS

" . . . Doing the right thing when there's no one to tell you right from wrong."

-- Traditional Navy saying

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Maintaining Standards

- Standards are Clear and Consistent
- Standards are Realistic and High
- Standards are Continuously Monitored
- Positive and Negative Feedback is Frequently Given
- Performance Problems are Handled Quickly and Appropriately
- All Levels Participate in Enforcing Standards

MAINTAINING STANDARDS

Superior commands pay special attention to establishing, communicating, and enforcing standards. First, they are concerned about job performance standards, knowing that how well they perform affects safety, accomplishing their mission, and, ultimately, the security of our country. But they also act according to General George S. Patton, Jr.'s rhetorical question, "If you can't get them to salute when they should salute and wear the clothes you tell them to wear, how are you going to get them to die for their country?" So they also enforce military standards concerning dress and protocol. Although all superior commands set high standards, they vary in how their standards are established and enforced. As in other areas, this depends mostly on the personality and leadership style of the commanding officer.

Superior commands maintain standards in a way different from average commands. Here's how they do it:

- Standards Are Clear and Consistent
- Standards Are Realistic and High
- Standards Are Continuously Monitored
- Positive and Negative Feedback Is Frequently Given
- Performance Problems Are Handled Quickly and Appropriately
- All Levels Participate in Enforcing Standards

Standards Are Clear and Consistent

In superior units there is no mystery about what the standards are and the consequences of meeting or not meeting them. The men know what the standards are by being told and by observing the behavior of those whose job it is to enforce standards. In these commands, standards are enforced fairly: the same standard is applied equally to all groups and individuals. Particularly in the area of establishing and maintaining standards, the leadership of the CO and XO is decisive. The following observation by one CO captures the sense of clarity and fairness that exists in superior commands:

There are certain facts of life that exist in this command so that there's no doubt, no equivocation in

anyone's mind about what the end result is going to be. If you are overweight, you are not going to be advanced. No matter who you are, from XO down to seaman recruit, you aren't going to get ahead until you meet weight and height standards. That's in accordance with Navy directives, but in many commands it sort of slides under the table, or we fib about it. Here, it does not happen that way, and everybody knows it.

The XO in another command points out that either he or the CO meets with every new person, and at that meeting the standards of the command are clarified, especially those regarding drug abuse. He says:

I emphasize to them the policy on drugs--that if they have any prior experience with drugs, they'd better knock it off right now because we have urinalysis down pat. So I tell them that if they're using them, they are going to get caught. Then, they're going to go to the old man, and they can expect the maximum punishment the first time.

In one superior air squadron, there were complaints from the enlisted that a double standard existed--the regulation that protective headgear be worn while off the ground was being enforced for enlisted personnel but not for officers. As a result, the CO, through his safety officer, made sure that the regulation was enforced impartially.

Standards Are Realistic and High

"We are the best!"

"We're going to do it, and we're going to do it better than anybody else can. There's nothing that we can't do."

"If a job's worth doing, it's worth doing right."

Time and again when visiting superior commands, we heard statements like those quoted above. Top commands want to be the best. Starting with the CO, these commands do not accept second-rate or even average performance. Some of this desire is bound up with a keen sense of competition that permeates the whole crew--of wanting to beat another squadron at the consecutive number of sorties off the carrier or getting more missile hits in a target shoot or even having a bigger rec fund than other commands. But not all of it is competition. A lot of it is just the desire to do things right--and to do them right the

first time. These men know that mistakes may come back to haunt them in the form of malfunctions, safety problems, low inspection scores, or not being able to accomplish their mission. It's the determination to be the best that causes them to excel, which, in turn, fuels their pride in being the best.

Here's an example of these high standards in action. The senior chief of an aviation squadron is describing what happened when he took over as chief of the quality assurance division:

When I took over, the files, the paperwork, the whole way of doing business was in a mess. There was no schedule, no monitoring, hardly anything. When I pointed out to the people in maintenance control an omission in the log book, they really gave me a hard time. I told them we were going to do what the book says, which called for an audit. So that's what we did. We eventually rewrote the entire quality assurance program to make it in accordance with the maintenance manual.

When we started out, we had a hard time passing Wing inspections for corrosion control. We barely skinned by on pre-cruise, but had progressed to the point of getting two excellents and three outstandings on the mid-cruise. But I wasn't satisfied with that, so we revamped and refined. I assigned each person a task and was available to them if they had problems. On the post-cruise inspection, we got five outstandings. So we went from just barely satisfactory to a solid outstanding.

Although superior commands aim high, their standards are realistic. Based on an accurate assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, they set goals that are challenging but attainable. In the example above, it would have been unrealistic for this chief to try to go from barely satisfactory on the pre-cruise to all outstandings on the mid-cruise. Publicly announcing this and pushing his men to achieve it would have been a high-risk strategy with demoralization as the probable result. However, going from a mix of excellents and outstandings to all outstandings was a reasonable goal to shoot for. On one average sub the crew attributed part of their low morale to the fact that the standards were so high that it was difficult to become qualified.

Standards Are Continuously Monitored

Superior commands don't just tell people what's expected and then assume that things will be done right. They are con-

stantly monitoring how well things are going, and they are on guard for problems that may arise.

A lot of this occurs because the officers and chiefs walk about and chat informally with their men. Much of it also happens through more formal programs. For example, although all commands have some system for monitoring progress towards becoming qualified, at the suggestion of one of his chiefs, the CO on one ship started a qualifications delinquent program, in which the LPOs decide among themselves which crew members are delinquent. These names are then listed in the POD and the crew members are required to muster on Saturdays for two hours of additional training. The muster is done by the duty chief or the chief of the watch, so the program involves the chiefs and gains their commitment.

Monitoring is done not only to catch problems with current or past performance but also to prevent problems from occurring in the future. The CO of an aviation squadron talks about three new pilots they got after they won the Battle E:

We just got three aviators who I think are going to be very weak around the ship, one in particular. I've got to watch them very closely and maybe put a Field Naval Aviation Board on one of them to see if he should continue flying. We knew they were weak by their grades coming out of the RAG, so we sent them for a little carrier qual training, and that confirmed our fears. Their performance on landing on a carrier was poor, so we're going to have to monitor them very closely and work with them real hard.

What distinguishes the monitoring of standards in superior commands from that in average commands is that it is an on-going, day-to-day activity. In average commands, the monitoring seems to ebb and flow in time with the cycle of inspections. When there is no inspection coming up, things seem to slip a little; as an inspection draws near, things are scrutinized more. You get a sense of this "ingrained" quality from an XO's account of his daily inspection of the mess and berthing compartments on his ship:

We have exacting specifications put on them that their racks, their lockers, or whatever are maintained to boot camp standards, which is higher than a lot of other ships. We started that in precommission days and have just continued it.

If I go into a berthing compartment in the morning and there are three or four bunks that are not made to exact specifications, then this will be pointed out to these individuals via their department head. They will then have to go back and correct that by noon.

If you start the morning off with the individual making his bed and making sure that everything is shipshape, he will carry that throughout the day--that everything he does requires the same exactness and perfection that he started the day off with.

Positive and Negative Feedback Is Frequently Given

A striking difference between average and superior units is the preponderance of positive feedback in the outstanding commands. The officers and senior enlisted go out of their way to find something positive to say about their men's performance, even if it isn't entirely satisfactory. They don't ignore the weaknesses, but they know that they will get better results by focusing on what has been done right.

A good example of this quality in the context of realistic goals is how the CO of a submarine responded when his men got an above average on an ORSE:

I had told the men to just train to do the best they could. We came close to getting an excellent but only got an above average. The engineering department was devastated; they thought they had really screwed up. It took me about a week to convince them that above average is a super grade. Hey, less than ten percent get above average. So, here you have this crew who got an excellent on the ORSE the previous year and an excellent on their last TRE, and they're walking around saying, "Gee, we didn't do so well this year."

Well, after the exams, I always get them together and tell them how good they did. So, I got everyone together on the mess decks and told them they had done a super job. And the commodore came down and also told them they had done a super job. I was a little disappointed because we screwed up on just a few technical errors. But not to the point that I would say that to the crew. After all, we had done this well with brand new engineering officers, and we only had a few months to get ready because we had been in the yard for five months before that. So I was pretty happy with our performance.

One might think that average commands give more negative feedback than superior commands. But this also is not true. Because superior commands are so "standards conscious," they promptly tell people when they are not performing up to snuff. Indeed, one difference seems to be that in the superior commands telling people when they are not doing things right is almost

an obligation. Their commitment to upholding standards tugs at people to get them to speak up--even to their superiors--when they don't think things are as they should be. In average commands, more misses and near-misses are tolerated.

To get people to improve their performance, at least three things have to happen. First, they need to be told what's wrong. Second, they need to be told what they have to do to get it right. This is the "how-to" or "who can help you?" part. And there also needs to be created the desire to improve.

We saw more examples in average commands of people being told they had screwed up, without follow-up help being offered. It was not made clear to them what they had to do to get from poor performance to acceptable or excellent performance. On one submarine, an LPO told his chief he was having a problem writing a report that was due in a few days. The chief handed him a book and told him to figure out how to do it. When the report was two days late, the chief began yelling at the LPO for not knowing how to write the report. In a superior command, the chief would have explained to the LPO what needed to be done or would have helped him learn how to use the book. In superior commands, officers and enlisted take the time to explain what needs to be done and make more of an effort to help the person after giving negative feedback.

Superior commands are more adept also at giving negative feedback in a way that creates a positive general climate and the individual motivation for the recipient to want to change his behavior. The way negative feedback is given in average commands sometimes leaves a person feeling resentful or even humiliated. For example, a chief on one sub reports how the XO chewed him out in front of several petty officers, going so far as to insult and even curse him. The chief later confronted the XO in private. When it happened several more times, the chief put in for a transfer. This is not to say that people don't get chewed out and hollered at in superior commands. But there is more emphasis on the specific behavior that needs changing. Although reprimanded, they are left with their dignity intact.

Performance Problems Are Handled Quickly and Appropriately

When superior commands become aware of poor or unacceptable performance, they act quickly and fairly. For poor job performance, feedback and counseling is given. If that doesn't work, the individual is moved out of his job into another one in which he will do better. If that is not possible or still does not work, the person is fired. The overriding criterion in these cases is what's good for the command, not what's good or pleasant for the person.

The chief in one superior submarine talked about how he dealt with a petty officer who was not doing his job and was constantly complaining about the long hours drilling in preparation for deployment. He says:

First, I figured it was an attitude problem, because this guy knew how to do the job. I sat down with him and asked him questions like: "What do you think about the way we're preparing for the inspection? Do you think we're giving too many lectures? Do you think we're spending too many hours drilling?" And all I'd get was that everything was screwed up. So I went over our schedule and tried to show him that we had much less time than it appeared because there are only certain things you can do in port.

Well, my philosophy is you counsel first and confront second. When things didn't improve, I told him he had an attitude problem and that he'd better do something to change it. After that, the engineering officer spoke to him and finally the captain saw him. The captain's counseling finally got him to shape up.

In another air squadron with a reputation for poor performance, a maintenance chief had been recruited and given the job of turning around his department's performance. When he arrived and looked at the aircraft and the books, he was disgusted. He felt that the supervisors had a poor attitude--they had no pride in what they were doing. He was unable to get several of the supervisors to cooperate, so he fired them. In contrast, the CO of one average submarine reported having repeated problems with his navigator. He went to the commodore and complained about the man but did not have him removed.

Although every command has XOI and Captain's Mast, we found reactions to them varied in superior and average commands. In average commands, there seemed to be more complaints that discipline was either too lax or too harsh and, in particular, was inconsistent. Justice in superior commands was seen as fast, fair, and firm.

Superior commands have well-oiled mechanisms in place for handling discipline problems in a timely and routine fashion. In one aviation squadron, the Chiefs Disciplinary Review Board examined the case of a yeoman who had not been doing his job with sufficient attention and dispatch. They gave him EMI, and things improved. Then he mistakenly threw away a large amount of the day's message traffic--unfortunately including the notification that they had won the Battle E! This time the Chiefs Board recommended XOI. The XO found the charges substantiated, and he was brought before Captain's Mast the next day.

COs of these commands are also not afraid to make tough decisions that communicate their commitment to standards. The CO of one helicopter squadron, for example, learned that a man who was supposed to get frocked to be a second-class petty officer that afternoon had gotten a DWI the night before. As a consequence, he refused to frock him, despite grumbling from the crew. Shortly thereafter, a sailor from the same division was nominated for Sailor of the Month, and the next day he got a DWI. The CO refused to select him for the award.

All Levels Participate in Enforcing Standards

In superior commands enforcing standards is a consciousness that more fully permeates the entire command. It's not something that only a few people do. In average commands, all the elements of maintaining standards that we have identified above occur more sporadically. There is not the command-wide commitment that there is in top units.

This commitment starts at the top with the CO and XO, who communicate their expectations to the officers, chiefs, and crew. The CO of one air squadron emphasizes to his officers and chiefs that he expects them to give out EMI and to not always pass the buck to him to do it. He also reports the following incident:

A situation had come to me at Captain's Mast in which two third-class petty officers got in a fight in one of the shops. I looked over at this guy who was a witness and was telling me what had happened, and I said, "Who are you?" He said he was a second-class petty officer, and I said, "You're a second-class petty officer and you let this go on down there?" And he didn't have anything to say. No comment. He didn't attempt to step in and say, "I'm senior, and we're going to stop this" or "You in that corner, you in that corner." Nothing. So I stopped the proceedings and sent him back outside, had him given his rights, and convened XOI on him. That's the way I feel about it. If it's your job, do it. Don't pass it on to somebody else.

In another unit the engineering officer talks about how the men in his present command work differently from men on boats he's been on in the past:

If you have a job for them to do, they don't procrastinate; they go out and do it. You don't have to do the detailed supervision that you normally see. The LPOs have the same attitude that I do, which is, "If it's broke, you fix it." They are very conscientious

about their equipment. If they have a problem, they usually come to me and tell me, instead of my finding the problem and telling them to correct it. It's nice because it means they are out in their spaces checking things. I guess they care about what goes on.

This participation also extends to standards involving protocol and appearance. For example, a chief in one command talks about how his men monitor their performance on their own. They periodically get together as a group and give each other feedback on how they are maintaining their equipment or what their appearance is like, including whether or not someone needs a haircut.

In contrast, a chief in an average submarine reports being dismayed about the lack of command-wide commitment to standards. He says:

I saw that sometimes a chief would tell, say, a third-class to do something and the guy would say, "____ off, man, I'm not going to do it." And the chief wouldn't say anything. So I said to this chief, "Wow, that guy just told you to ____ off and you just turn around and walk away from him." He said, "Why should I write him up? It won't do any good." I told him that he didn't have to write him up, that there were other things he could do. To which he replied, "Yeah, but the command won't let you do this and the command won't let you do that. So forget it."

Well, it wasn't long after that that this same third-class told me to ____ off when I told him to do something. I grabbed him and chewed him out and told him he was going to get some EMI. Then I took him to his chief. I told this chief what had happened and that he had better talk to this guy, and all he said was "Oh yeah?" and let the guy go away. And he then told me I didn't need to give him EMI. I said, "Yes I do. You guys might let him get away with it, but I'm not going to stand for it." So I gave him EMI, and a few days later the third-class came down and apologized to me. I haven't had any problems with him since then.

COMMUNICATING

"The power to command has never meant the power to remain mysterious."

-- Ferdinand Foch, Precepts

explanations takes more time upfront, as opposed to just ordering someone to do something, superior commands realize that people will be able to work smarter, more efficiently, and with greater commitment if things are explained. Here's the XO of a submarine reflecting on the importance of explaining things:

Instead of just having officer call, we have officer-LCPO call. In that way we get the information out to more people. So at the division level there will be two guys, the division officer and the LCPO, who know the information and the reasons for what we're doing. This goes back to my philosophy that the more people that know what is happening and have the background information, the better it is.

I believe that if someone knows why we're doing something and when, then even if he doesn't like it, he'll do it. If you tell somebody, "Do this because I said to do it," very likely he'll throw his hands up and say, "Sure, I'll do that." But he'll wander off for 20 minutes and maybe then start doing something.

I remember how I felt when I was a junior officer and didn't get much information. I had to support the ship's policies as a division officer, and I wasn't really sure why I was supporting them. I want my division officers and LCPOs to know the background information so that they'll know why they're supporting this command's policies.

From another perspective, here's the admin officer in an air squadron talking about the value to him of having things explained:

Knowing what's expected of us helps make this unit effective. Of course, knowing what we're going to be doing is sometimes just a best guess. But it even helps to know that. I like to know what we've got planned a week or two in advance so I can set my priorities. I think the troops also would like to know a few weeks in advance what we've got planned. I don't mind working every day for the next ten days straight if you tell me that in two weeks we're going to take a few days off.

Another example is an aviation squadron deployed on a carrier in the Middle East during a tense political situation. The CO and XO spent a lot of time explaining the political situation and why they were there. The CO also acknowledged the crew's feelings about possibly going into combat and talked about his own reactions when he was in Vietnam. And while the pilots were flying their missions, the CO and XO regularly made tours of the

shops to explain the mission to the men there, keep them informed about how things were going up top, answer questions, and tell them what a great job they were doing. The CO also had the air crews visit the shops to let the men know what was happening topside and to tell them how good a job they were doing.

In one average command we visited, morale among the troops was very low. One of their complaints was that the schedule was constantly changing and they had been deployed for a much greater time than is usual for their type of boat. There was considerable bitterness expressed towards the CO for continually volunteering for last-minute missions. When we asked the men why they had spent so much time at sea or why they had done so many of these missions, there was little agreement or clarity. The chain of communication had somewhere broken down.

We visited another submarine, which also had been at sea more than usual. But the morale on this boat was upbeat. They were returning from three months at sea and were scheduled for a two-month, Christmas-holiday standdown. The men were eagerly looking forward to an easy schedule in the days before Christmas. One week before arriving in port, though, the CO was asked to take on another mission, which he accepted. He immediately met with the officers and chiefs to explain the change in schedule and why it was important for them to accept this mission. This was followed by an explanation to the crew as to what they would be doing and why. The crew openly expressed their disappointment but said they were ready to go. They said it was easier to accept the last minute change because they felt the CO understood their disappointment, had let them know immediately, and had explained why it was necessary.

Communication Flows Up, Down, and Across the Chain of Command

Because communication is a matter of sending and receiving messages, each management level in a command can be seen as a message relay station. For communication to be successful throughout the command, each level must receive and transmit the message quickly and accurately. On superior commands, communication flows more freely and clearly up, down, and across the various management levels.

These commands also know that it is just as important that communication flow up the chain of command as down. Starting with the CO, the norm is established that if someone sees a problem, thinks there's a better way to do something, or has a question, then the command wants to hear it. It was this willingness of his command to have people speak up and provide alternative perspectives that led one chief to say: "Playing the devil is advocated here." This behavior is premised on the command's respect for its men's judgment and expertise. It's also

a smart use of resources, since often the person who is raising a question or suggesting another way is the person most intimately involved with the situation. Furthermore, they know that getting input generates commitment to a decision.

It was a breakdown in the flow of communication up and down the chain of command that led to one submarine's average performance. When the CO took over, he emphasized he wanted his division officers to become as technically knowledgeable as possible. Whenever they came to him with a problem, he would ask them what the technical manuals said. The way this got communicated to the chiefs was that if there was a problem and a chief made a suggestion on how to fix it, the division officers frequently said, "Okay, I understand what you think, but what does the book say?" The message the chiefs got from this was that the CO and officers did not respect their knowledge and ability. Because of this and the fact that the department heads began more and more to go directly to the LPOs, the morale of the chiefs plummeted. They felt they were not being listened to and were confused about their role on the boat. They started staying in the chiefs quarters more, became cynical, and stopped making suggestions and taking initiative.

Superior commands also communicate well across departments and divisions. They are aware of the tendency of certain splits to develop, and one way they prevent this is by making sure people are talking to each other. One submarine promoted this kind of communication in preparing for an ORSE by making checklists of things that needed to be done and then having people from other departments go over each department's preparations. In one air squadron, all of the department heads tried to meet together regularly, knowing that effective performance requires good coordination between departments.

Coordination problems between departments and divisions are more common in average commands. Divisions and departments tend to feel that others are not pulling their fair share of the burden or that they are not getting enough recognition. What often happens in these situations is that the division or department starts putting itself--not the command as a whole--first. Then the pattern of noncommunication becomes even more entrenched.

Officers and Chiefs Get Out and About

Officers and chiefs in superior commands also frequently walk about. The safety officer of an air squadron explains what he does when he's out and about:

I try to get to most of the shops every day. When I'm there hopefully someone will say, "I meant to ask you about this," or "How come we're doing this?" The

other thing is, I can ask, "What do you think about this?" or "What do you want to do about this?" Another thing I'm doing is making sure the safety chief is hitting on the things he's supposed to be doing. I make sure he takes a look at the line every day. I make sure he checks the fire extinguishers every day. Part of my day is also putting out the word on some item. It might be off the message board or a call from the FITWING safety officer or from the enlisted safety council. And I'm always checking on the flight schedule, making sure they're not screwing it up. I'm like the watchdog of the schedule; every day I put myself in the watchdog position.

A master chief on a submarine likens his position to a plant foreman. He says: "The plant foreman doesn't sit at his desk all the time. He's out moving around and making sure that everything throughout the plant is running right. And that's what I'm doing."

Getting out and about, though, is not looking over people's shoulders and telling them how to do their jobs. In average commands walking about doesn't occur as frequently, and when it does, it turns into getting into people's knickers. In a superior command, for example, if an officer is walking about and sees a discrepancy, he usually does not step in and correct it himself. Instead he notifies the proper person to take care of it unless it constitutes a threat to someone's safety.

In contrast, the CO of one average submarine walked about a lot, but he was constantly questioning his men to test their technical knowledge of their equipment. If they could not answer his questions, he would chew them out and give them a lecture on the right answer then and there. If a piece of equipment was down, it was not uncommon for him to get involved in repairing it. Although his men respected the range of his technical knowledge, they resented his continually putting them on the spot. They felt so intimidated when he was around that they said they often performed below their potential in his presence.

Personal Issues Are Discussed

Superior commands realize the importance of learning about personal difficulties and helping people overcome them. They do this for two reasons. First, they believe that everyone has something to contribute and that the command is a family where everyone's welfare is important. Second, it's based on the awareness that personal distress affects job performance. If people are continually worried about marital, financial, or health problems, these worries take away from their energy and ability to do the job. These commands are not only willing to

put in the time to talk about such issues, but they are also on the lookout for clues that someone may be struggling with a personal matter. In particular, they take a lot of pride in turning someone around--helping someone who was considered incorrigible and molding him into a star performer.

This is most common with the chiefs, who often spend time counseling their men on personal issues. One chief estimates that about 60 percent of his time is spent counseling his men on personal issues. Here's the chief in an air squadron describing his and the command's efforts to turn around a young man who was new to their squadron:

We were real concerned when he came to the squadron because he had tried to commit suicide a few times and it seemed he had taken just about every drug possible before he joined the Navy. We worked with him a lot; we gave him a lot of personal guidance and motivated him. And it wasn't just me. Two other chiefs and a petty officer talked to him a lot. We even talked to the skipper about him, too. At first, we just kept him in sight because we thought he might jump off or something like that. We tried to make him feel a part of the organization--that he was important and that he was wanted here.

A lot of times I'd just go grab him and say, "Come on, I want to show you something on this airplane." And we'd get to talking, and I'd ask him what he was doing before he got in the Navy. That's how we got to talking about this drug thing; it was just through informal talk.

Today, I'd put him up against any plane captain in the Navy. In fact, the skipper has a couple of letters of congratulations on him. But I think the biggest thing we did--and what a lot of people miss--is caring. You've got to care about these kids. You've got to make sure that they're taken care of. If you don't do that, you haven't done your job. It takes a personal touch.


Although superior commands do make this strong effort to help people deal with personal problems and to turn around problem performers, they also know when to cut bait. They do not sacrifice accomplishing the command's goals for the sake of soul-saving.

BUILDING ESPRIT DE CORPS

"There will be no liberty on board this ship until morale improves."

-- Excerpt from a Plan of the Day

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Building Esprit de Corps

- Positive Regard and Expectations Occur at All Levels
- Teamwork is Promoted
- Morale is Monitored
- Rewards and Recognition are Given Frequently
- Command Integrates Incoming Crew Quickly
- Command Focuses on Successes
- Command Encourages Social Activities and Having Fun
- Symbolic Activities Used to Promote Esprit

BUILDING ESPRIT DE CORPS

One of the most immediately noticeable differences between superior and average commands is their esprit de corps. Although the research teams visiting the various commands were not told which ones were identified as superior and which ones as average, the differences were obvious. In some we were greeted warmly and enthusiastically. People at all levels welcomed us. Their liveliness and sharpness were contagious. In these commands, if we appeared lost, people would ask if we needed help. They also appeared relaxed, and there was a lot of good-natured ribbing. Things seemed to move in an orderly and calm way. Things were under control. In these commands, we often received informal invitations to go to sea with them, or they might say, "It's too bad you couldn't join us for our next mission." Invariably, these turned out to be the best commands.

In other commands, though, the feel or mood was different. In a few, we had the sense that we were being tolerated as opposed to welcomed. Walking around, one sensed a flat or even sullen mood. In our group discussions with junior enlisted, there would be frequent complaints and frustration expressed. Sometimes, people openly disparaged the command--not just one or two people, as one will find in any command--and there was much more cynicism and a lot less smiling. Drills were more disorganized and lackadaisical, or, at the other extreme, people often seemed to be looking for something they couldn't find. There was also a subtle aura of tension, a sense that people were playing catch-up and were worried they'd be caught doing something wrong. In such commands, we discovered at the end of the day that we were much more tired than we were on days spent with superior commands.

We decided to break esprit de corps apart and look at the elements of morale, pride, and a sense of unity and teamwork. We found that superior commands have high morale, great pride, and feel and function like a team or family.

By "high morale" we mean that people feel good about being part of the command. They talk about how much they enjoy their jobs, despite the problems that even top commands have. They are vital and energetic. The mood in spaces where people get together is relaxed, open, animated, and friendly. People feel good about the fact that the command does its job well and they are pleased with how it gets the job done.

Superior commands believe that they are the best and they have the self-confidence that they can succeed at whatever is

asked of them. This leads them to volunteer for detachments that other commands turn down. It also leads them to look for ways to put a little extra shine or pizzazz in what they do. They do not fear inspections. Instead of "Let's stay out of the limelight because they may discover our weaknesses," their attitude is: "Come aboard! We want to show you how good we are." Although this pride starts with the CO and XO, it permeates the entire command.

Often these commands take pride not just in being the best but in being different: they have their own special way of doing things. There is often a sense of tradition, an awareness of special events in the commands' past that mark their excellence. These commands are proud of this tradition, publicize it, and are committed to living up to it. It is a part of their culture. Even when the command has not recently been a top performer, the desire to restore it to the proud place it had occupied in the past contributes to greater accomplishment by producing a determination to go that extra mile and uphold the command's reputation.

Superior commands also have a strong sense of unity. They work harmoniously to accomplish a common mission. Members at all levels speak about being a family, of feeling that they belong. They talk openly about how well they get along, mentioning, for example, that there is no backstabbing in the wardroom and chiefs quarters, and that people put the good of the command over their own self-interest. They willingly help each other out if it will benefit the command.

Here's what characterizes esprit de corps in superior commands:

- Positive Regard and Expectations Occur at All Levels
- Teamwork Is Promoted
- Morale Is Monitored
- Rewards and Recognition Are Given Frequently
- Command Integrates Incoming Crew Quickly
- Command Focuses on Successes
- Command Encourages Social Activities and Having Fun
- Symbolic Activities Used to Promote Esprit de Corps

Positive Regard and Expectations Occur at All Levels

The leaders in superior commands have positive regard for the men in the command--they care about them and see them as

having something important to contribute. They are confident that their people can and will succeed. We found numerous examples of people expressing confidence in the people they work with. One chief simply said: "I've got good guys." A department head on a surface ship stated: "The attitude of this ship is that people are competent and that they can do their jobs."

Some of these commands deliberately take advantage of the Pygmalion effect--if you treat people as winners, they will more likely act that way. And they know the opposite is just as true. Here's the COB on a submarine describing his job:

My job is to motivate the crew. The easiest way to do that would be for me to walk in the door and start kicking ass from minute one and kick ass until the day I leave--under the assumption that they might not have liked me but they will never forget me. When you do that you destroy the morale of the crew. You wind up treating the other chiefs like seamen, which they naturally resent, and guys start shipping over just to get off the boat. In that situation, you get false respect because it's based on fear. However, that's not the way I do business.

I try to motivate these guys by getting them to perceive themselves as winners. If they believe they are winners, they will be winners. I also try to get them to believe they are part of a team, that they are all part of a family.

The following example illustrates how this attitude led one command senior chief in an air squadron to work with a group of "rejects":

When I took over I became responsible for the welfare and recreation fund. One of the main tasks confronting me was to raise money for the Christmas party. One of the things I thought about doing was having a fire sale, selling the assets we had, like pictures and T-shirts and so on.

So I went out and got myself some volunteers. Most of these guys were on restriction or were getting drummed out of the Navy, a lot of the undesirables in the First Lieutenant's division. These guys are supposed to be nobodies. But I don't buy that "nobody" crap. Every man has feelings and every man has pride to some degree.

This was my first speech to these guys. I said: "Hey, listen. You are paying your price right now for

whatever you did before. You are starting at zero right here. But it's what you do from this day forward with your work here with me that's going to determine what happens next. So make up your mind right now. You either do it the way it is supposed to be done and reap whatever benefits I can get you, or you continue on with whatever got you into trouble in the first place, and I can guarantee you that you will be in trouble again. You work for me, and I will work for you."

Next thing I said was: "How do you feel about doing something constructive? We're going to take this broom closet over there and we're going to turn it into a fire sale department. I want you guys to handle it. I'm going to tell you right now that there are a lot of people who feel that I should not allow you to handle the squadron's welfare and recreation money. But you haven't done anything to me and until you do, I have no reason to feel that way."

So I started each one off with \$30. I had several officers and chiefs come tell me that some of these kids had over \$400. I had one kid come back with over \$700. And they would say, "Hey, you know that kid could have beat feet." But he didn't. So I told this one maintenance chief, "Look, his personality and 'go-get-em' attitude made us \$700. Now, what else you got to say? If you don't want to go sit there and do it yourself, then shut your mouth. Let the man do his thing; he's into something he enjoys. Just because a guy has been kicked in the head doesn't mean you have to stomp on him. Give him a chance to prove himself. If he can't, then he's out."

So we made it. We had this big fancy shindig and still had about \$400 left over. And I think that of all my accomplishments in this command, that's the one I'm proudest about.

Teamwork Is Promoted

Superior commands work hard at getting people to work together as a unit, both on the department and division level and in the command as a whole. This starts at the top with the CO and XO explicitly endorsing a team or family model of operating. This requires getting people to communicate frequently with each other, clarifying roles, coordinating with each other, allocating resources fairly, and praising people equally for their contributions.

As already acknowledged, superior commands act to minimize organizational conflict. One CO holds officer training after every evening meal in the wardroom to make sure that all the officers see each other at least once a day and in relaxing circumstances. It also allows him to discuss the command with everyone present. Another CO of an aviation squadron had to prepare for a corrosion control inspection by working all weekend. Instead of just bringing in the maintenance department, he had the whole squadron come in, including the air crews and administrative people, and had them help the maintenance department work on the airplanes. He saw this as an opportunity to foster a sense of teamwork and mutual help.

Some of the superior commands attack this problem through training. For example, for submarines, they try to make the training shipwide instead of just focusing on one department or the other. Here's the engineering chief describing how his boat conducts training:

The TRE, or Tactical Readiness Evaluation, is performed at the end of one patrol, and it looks at the ship's control party. The ORSE, or Operational Reactor Safeguards Exam, comes at the end of the next patrol and looks at the engineering and propulsion plant. Most boats, when they make a patrol prior to their TRE, forget all about engineering and hammer everyone on ship's control. And then when they do an ORSE run, they forget all about ship's control and hammer engineering. Our boat balances it for every patrol. We do ship's control and engineering drills on every patrol.

As a result, neither end of the boat feels that it is working harder at drilling than the other. It also produces a sustained, high level of all-round performance rather than performance that waxed and waned depending upon which end of the boat was being inspected.

There are more subtle ways, though, for senior officers to achieve teamwork and unity. The CO in an air squadron had a chief who wanted to be promoted to maintenance control, a position considered necessary for a chief to move up the career ladder. After this chief was denied the promotion, he asked the other chiefs why they thought he was denied. They candidly told him what they thought his weaknesses were. As a result, he began feeling he was of no value to the command and that he was never going to achieve his career goals. The CO learned of this because the command master chief told him and because the chief himself took advantage of the CO's open-door policy.

Here is the continuation of the story in the words of the CO:

He told me he didn't think he could meet his ambitions in this command and repeated what the other chiefs had told him was wrong with him. He was real down on himself. But I felt like I would be doing him a disservice if I told him he did not have these problems. So I said, "Tell me all the things the other chiefs said." And we made a list of them. Then I told him: "Chief, you are right. You do have these problems. What we have to do is outline a plan of action of how you are going to overcome each one of these." Well, it took him aback because I reinforced what the rest of the chiefs had said about his problems. Then I said: "You need to overcome these before you can be assigned to maintenance control. You're not going to escape these problems by transferring to another command, because, for one thing, your reputation will follow you. And secondly, I will not approve a transfer to another squadron because I like you too well and you do too great a job for us."

After that, I called all of the chiefs together except him and said: "I want you to know my policy first-hand. I don't object to your responding candidly to Chief So-and-So about his problems. But let me tell you one thing: from today forth your total goal in life is to make him the best chief petty officer in this squadron. If you don't help him overcome his problem, then you are not doing your job as a fellow chief petty officer." Nobody said anything. I then said: "I will not tolerate one chief petty officer backstabbing another. We have identified Chief So-and-So's problems, and he feels badly about them. What we do now is build him up. I want you to support him and strengthen him and help him overcome his weaknesses." And boy, they did! He has just turned out super!

Morale Is Monitored

Realizing that morale is vital to top performance, all levels of superior commands pay attention to it. When they become aware of clues that suggest a morale problem, they bring it up and act quickly to remedy it. If there is a problem in the wardroom or chiefs quarters, usually the chiefs or officers themselves act to correct it. If it cannot be handled on a lower level, it is brought to the attention of an appropriate superior.

Much of the monitoring of morale, especially by the CO and XO, is done by getting out and about. The CO of one surface ship reports how he walks through the whole ship—including the

mess decks and the berthing spaces--at least every other day. He says that one of the things he is looking for is whether or not "somebody's got his lips on upside down." If he does see signs of discontent, he tries to find out what's causing it. The chiefs play a special role in monitoring morale because they are most in touch with the crew. This is one reason the COs of superior commands meet regularly and frequently with the command senior chief and periodically visit the chiefs quarters.

One aspect of morale that superior commands monitor closely is whether or not their men are getting burned out from working too hard. They know that when people are tired they get careless and that this increases the likelihood of accidents and diminishes the quality of performance. In one command, the CO had made it clear that it was not the quantity of training that counted but the quality. He did not want "negative training" to occur. If he saw that the men were so exhausted that they were not learning, he or the XO would cancel the drill, give the men some rest, and start it again when they were fresh.

Several of the superior commands planned things so that work was done by Friday and their weekends were free. Even in those superior commands that did work long hours, the norm was that the chiefs would let their men go home when the work was done. Average commands often made their men stick around even if there was nothing for them to do.

Rewards and Recognition Are Given Frequently

Superior commands realize that one of the best ways to motivate their men is to recognize and reward success. So, in these commands there is a continual attempt to do this by formal and informal means and by all levels. Recognition and rewards include informally praising a person in a one-on-one conversation, mentioning people in the POD, giving recognition at Captain's Call, letters of achievement and commendation, and Navy medals. Average commands reward and recognize people less frequently than superior commands.

Several of these top commands recognize men who became qualified by presenting them with a certificate or letter of congratulations or even a ceremony. One command wrote the man's family, congratulating them and telling them about the man's achievement. When the navigator of one surface ship gets a report that his radiomen made no errors for that period, he writes "Well done" on it and has it distributed throughout the command, with a copy to the CO.

Command Integrates Incoming Crew Quickly

Superior commands pay special attention to making sure that incoming crew are quickly integrated into the command. This involves explaining to them what's expected, introducing them to other people, showing them where things are, assigning work, and generally getting them to feel at home. Although all commands have indoctrination and sponsorship programs, superior commands put more time and effort into them than the average commands do. They try to leave nothing to chance. They develop systems so details are not overlooked. The CO on a surface ship describes their system:

The first 30 days--that's when you make an impression and the guy decides if he's going to stay or not. That's where our sponsorship program comes in. I send a naval message to every new man that comes on board the ship. This started out as pretty basic, but we have added to it as we have gone along and created a whole system. For a while we were having difficulties with the sponsor sending the new guy information about the ship, but now we have a checklist and when stuff goes out, it's checked off.

The chief stands up every week and says, "Here is who is coming in December, and the sponsor assigned to him is so-and-so." And the sponsor package goes out shortly after that. The guy doesn't fall through the cracks and get lost. When he comes on board, somebody knows about it. Then the chief master-at-arms has a welcome aboard kit, which contains sheets, shower shoes, toothbrush, some other stuff, and a brochure about the command.

Some commands also send a letter to the man's family, telling them about the new command and that they are pleased to have the man join them. One command arranges to have the new person's name stenciled above his bunk before he arrives.

In average commands, things are less systematic. New members may have received no advance welcoming literature, or the indoc program will be delayed for a few months. In some cases, a person will not have a bunk assigned. In these commands, men are left more on their own to get oriented and up to speed.

Command Focuses on Successes

Superior commands often refer to their tradition of success. One air squadron we visited had on display in the ready room photograph albums with pictures of the squadron going back over 40 years. Significant accomplishments of the squadron

were emphasized in the albums. One outstanding submarine traditionally referred to whatever it did as "the best ever." The navigator explains how the tradition developed:

It started in the new construction phase when we went to sea for the first time. We were in a heavy fog, couldn't see the next buoy, and there's a four-star admiral riding with us, and he said, "That's the best I've ever seen." And then our sea trials were the best ever done by a 688. So we started to kid ourselves--every time something would go right, it was, "Hey, we're the best ever!"

Sometimes a command's tradition of success can work against it. The XO of one average submarine kept telling his men that they should live up to the command's proud past. In his zeal, he continually pressured and micromanaged his men. When they did not do well, he rubbed it in by pointing out how they had failed to live up to the command's tradition. They became disheartened by always having this thrown in their faces.

Command Encourages Social Activities and Having Fun

"If you're not having fun, you're not doing it right."

-- Commanding Officer (Submarine)

"I use the principle of work hard and play hard."

-- Executive Officer (Air)

Although all commands have social activities like parties, ball games, and family picnics, superior commands seem to have more attendance at them and more participation in organizing them. They realize that all work and no play makes a dull command.

The CO of a surface ship explains his views on social activities:

The XO and I participate regularly in the ship's picnics. We have picnics that dependents are invited to, along with some organized sports. It's generally a good time for the crew. We make sure they get to do it during working hours so that they see it as a "bene." A lot of commands have picnics on Saturday. Well, I don't consider that much of a bene. This way they'll enjoy themselves even more.

We had an organized softball team that performed well and was second in the league. There was a lot of

general participation there. The XO played on the team, and I went to all the games. We publicized it a lot. There were also lesser athletic endeavors: a five-man basketball team, bowling league, racquetball, and some other things too. I think it helps to lower people's frustration.

Superior commands also pay attention to the families of their men. Some send out a family newsletter outlining upcoming events and noting accomplishments or significant events. Others have special briefings for families before deployment. Many have family night when families are encouraged to visit and tour the command. And, as we have seen, families are invited to social activities and awards ceremonies.

Several COs of superior commands encourage the wardroom and chiefs quarters to socialize among themselves. They believe that if the men get to know each other informally, they will work better as a team.

Symbolic Activities Used to Promote Esprit de Corps

Superior commands use symbols and rituals to build morale, pride, and team spirit. In one aviation squadron, at the first quarters for new arrivals, the CO ceremoniously takes off the man's old cap, replaces it with one bearing his new command's name and insignia, shakes the man's hand, and welcomes him to the squadron. Most superior commands enthusiastically sell and wear t-shirts, belt buckles, caps, and other memorabilia advertising the command. Here's the department head of another air squadron describing what they do:


Recognition is a big thing. It helps a lot if everyone's peers can see that certain individuals have done well and contributed to readiness and have been recognized for it. People like to see their names. They like to see pictures of themselves. Here on shore, we sometimes get the press involved. They come and take pictures. Supply is always there to give everyone a nice folder to put their picture in, which everybody likes.

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

"It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, and especially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of war."

-- Theodore Roosevelt: Graduation Address, U.S. Naval Academy, June 1902

MODEL FOR COMMAND EXCELLENCE



Training and Development

- Value of Training is Recognized
- Training is Kept Realistic and Practical
- Training Programs are Monitored and Evaluated
- All Levels Participate in Training and Development
- Command Emphasizes Professional Development and Career Planning

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

We have seen that COs of superior commands ensure that training is effective. To do this, they explicitly emphasize the importance of training to the crew, monitor the quality of training, try to get special training billets, work hard to get schedules with time to follow through on planned training, and make sure that training is realistic and linked to combat readiness. Here we further develop this theme by presenting what the command as a whole does to support training.

Specific ways in which superior commands promote training and development are as follows:

- Value of Training Is Recognized
- Training Is Kept Realistic and Practical
- Training Programs Are Monitored and Evaluated
- All Levels Participate in Training and Development
- Command Emphasizes Professional Development and Career Planning

Value of Training Is Recognized

In superior commands, people at all levels take training and development seriously. Considerable time goes into planning the training and then attending it. The quality and frequency are monitored; training is not gundeked, as it sometimes is on average commands. People are given time and resources to organize and prepare for the training they deliver. Training opportunities, especially those with big payoffs for combat readiness, are sought out and fought for. Not only is there a lot of formal training, like drills and classroom exercises, but there is a lot of informal, one-on-one training. There is also a training mind-set that is alert to opportunities to become more proficient or to help someone else do so. In addition, in these units, there is a lot of cross-training. This allows men to learn new skills and is valuable to the command because it means that if someone leaves or cannot do his job, there is a ready replacement.

Training is also used to promote professional development. People are expected to become qualified on schedule, and there are penalties if they do not. For example, in one command, if people do not make continued satisfactory progress towards be-

coming qualified, they have to attend several hours of mandatory "study-hall" in the evening or on the weekend. In superior commands people are not left to their own devices to become qualified; help is offered. These commands also try to get formal training through schools for their men whenever possible, and they spend a lot of time counseling people on their careers.

In average commands, training tends to be more casual, is cancelled more often because of recurring crises, is not attended as well, and is not monitored as frequently. On one submarine we visited, the crew referred to the training with amusement and said that it was usually boring. Often people repeated the same lecture just to fill up the time. It was common for training not to occur and for records to be gun-decked. The uniform perception on this boat was that what mattered to the CO and XO was what looked good on paper.

Training Is Kept Realistic and Practical

The purpose of training is to be ready to wage war. Superior commands never forget this. Training is not an end in itself. Average commands tend to focus more on getting awards and high inspection scores; superior commands see beyond these to their overall mission and being ready to carry it out. For this reason, and because they do not have unlimited time, energy, and resources, they emphasize that training be realistic and practical.

The CO of one VS squadron made a special request to go to Bermuda to practice antisubmarine warfare even though this had not been done by a VS squadron for several years. The request, which was granted, was prompted by his feeling that continuing to practice in the usual trainer was insufficient. He wanted access to the acoustic signatures of real submarines. Another CO on a sub tried to keep a training missile on board as much as possible because he wanted his men to get accustomed to its presence and to have a vivid reminder of their mission. The CO on one ship insisted that his men make a fire control drill realistic; consequently, his men rigged heat lamps to make the doors hot to touch.

Another squadron had a choice between competing in a fighter derby against other air squadrons or flying for the President's inaugural ceremony. The CO chose the derby because he recognized the training opportunities. And instead of using his most experienced pilots--a common practice that would have guaranteed a high score--he and the XO decided to use a number of the junior pilots in order to allow them to get more experience dog-fighting. In order to help develop the junior officers, both he and the XO did not fly, despite the fact that they had the most experience in the command.

Training Programs Are Monitored and Evaluated

Superior commands monitor their training on an ongoing basis to make sure it is high-quality. Both the CO and the XO periodically attend training. For example, one CO attends all officer training, which occurs several times per week on his ship. These officers want to make sure that the content is accurate, up to date, interesting, and practical. Here's the XO of a submarine discussing what he does:

I try to get to each division's training in the morning. I normally stay about 10 or 15 minutes to make sure things are going the way I want them to go. If they are not, I stop it, have them regroup, and do it over. When I stop it, I get the division officer up here and the man conducting the training. Then we have a session on why I stopped it.

These senior officers also make sure that people are attending training. Another CO states:

Officers always come up with excuses why they can't go to training. Here everybody goes. Even at sea, people get out of the rack and come to officer's training because they know they are required. And we make sure everybody is there.

As an example of monitoring training and being closely involved, the CO of one submarine reports learning that his sonar tracking team had not done as well as anticipated during the two weeks they were using the trainer. By meeting with his weapons training officer he was able to correct the problem and make sure it would not happen again. He explains that it was by talking to the training instructor that he found out that things were not going well:

I talk to him every day. I ask: "How did we do today? What problems do we have?" Of course, they're very hesitant to talk to a commanding officer and even more hesitant to tell him what they really think. So I normally have to break that down. You can't be concerned about getting your feelings hurt. You only get to use the trainer for a limited time, so there's no time for egos and all that stuff. If you're not doing hardcore training, if you're not finding mistakes and fixing them, then you're not using the trainer effectively.

All Levels Participate in Training and Development

In superior commands, all levels are involved in training and development efforts. Although the sanction comes from the

top, officers continually help each other train, while chiefs help train other enlisted. Generally it is the most experienced person who does the training, but this is not always so. If someone has just returned from a school on learning how to work with a new system, he may be asked to do some training even if he is junior to his students.

Although the chiefs have the unofficial job of training the junior officers, they are most active in training the enlisted personnel below them. They are continually involved in planning, preparing, delivering, and evaluating enlisted training. Most of the training they do is on-the-job training. One chief in charge of the flight deck for an aviation squadron trains his new men by tying a rope around his waist and having them grab hold and follow him around for several days. He says that one reason he does this is that "They have no idea what a jet blast or prop wash will do to you." Another chief reports that they needed to check some valves on a piece of equipment that was rarely taken apart. Realizing this was an unusual training opportunity, he had his three watch standers take it apart, clean it, and reassemble it with him supervising. He says he never fixes a piece of equipment without having someone at his side to learn what he is doing. In many superior commands, it is the chiefs who monitor and implement the enlisted qualifications program. They check people's qual cards, counsel, and offer or arrange for help.

Here's an XO describing the commitment to training on his submarine:

There's a grassroots interest in training here. The men see the benefit of a sound training and qualification program. We have a chief who is the training petty officer, and he keeps track of the quals status and he schedules the boards when an individual completes all of his checkouts on systems and compartments and what not.

Even when you get all the way down to the second-class petty officer, they see the value of training. They keep the standard where it's at right now. They love to make it hard on each other in the boards without being jerks. They want to make sure that when a guy qualifies, he's got the stuff. We fly under both the gold and silver dolphins. If you've been on board here the maximum amount of time, you should have your dolphins.

In superior commands people are ready to help each other learn. They realize that the more proficient each person is, the better the overall performance of the command will be. In addition, as we saw previously, they also are motivated to help

each other because of the positive regard and concern they have for each other. On one average ship we visited, people often did not help each other because they were too busy fighting fires or felt that they weren't getting much support. They could not see beyond their own self-interest.

Officers are also involved in pushing training for the command. The senior officers, in particular, help the more junior officers learn certain aspects of their job. Several commands have officer development programs. For example, in one there is a monthly lecture given that deals with such topics as retention or how to write a naval message or how to provide counseling. In another command, the CO has weekly "management seminars" for his officers and some of the senior enlisted.

Command Emphasizes Professional Development and Career Planning

Officers and chiefs of superior commands are actively involved in assisting their men with professional development and career planning. This comes right from the top, with COs being very involved with retention programs and encouraging people to advance. Accordingly, they support people going to schools and spend a surprising amount of time talking to people about their future plans and trying to sell them on a Navy career and re-enlisting. Here's the weapons officer on a submarine describing the involvement of his CO:

He knows who's coming up for re-enlistment and pays close attention to the re-enlistment bonuses that people are eligible for. For everybody that's going to re-enlist, he's intimately involved in figuring out when is the best time and the best program for them. If you are coming up for re-enlistment, he'll talk to you about what you are going to do when you get out.

Then he'll go down to the chiefs' quarters and ask, "What are you guys doing to get people off to school?" --because we have three months now where there's very little sea time. And they'll look a little bit harder to find another guy to send to a school.

In these commands, the command career counselor is seen as playing a special role. In contrast to the practice in average commands, this person is often handpicked by the CO because of his commitment to the job and his ability to interact with people. In particular, he maintains a close working relationship with detailers and works hard at staying current with all the Navy's re-enlistment programs. In one superior command, the CO himself wore the insignia of the command career counselor. With this push from the top, all of the superior commands had above-average retention rates.

The chiefs are the driving force behind professional development for enlisted personnel. One command career counselor reports how, within a week of a new person's arrival, he and the command master chief sit down with the person and discuss his advancement. They let the person know when he can expect to advance to various positions during the next two years and then help him set specific advancement goals. About six months later this chief contacts the person again to see if he's accomplished what he said he would do. "I might tell him: 'You know, we talked about you having a certain course done by this time. Have you done it?'" The various messages that come in about new schools or programs are conspicuously posted on a bulletin board in a main traffic area. And as the time draws near for re-enlistment, chiefs in superior commands, particularly the command career counselor or the command master chief, will meet with individuals to discuss their future.

All of the superior commands take great pride in getting someone to re-enlist. They often mark such occasions (as they do when a person becomes qualified) with some type of ceremony. In one command, the CO gathers all those re-enlisting together in a group and urges them to really think about the meaning of the words in the oath they are taking. He believes that most men just do it automatically the first time they sign up, or are too nervous to pay much attention to the words. The second time, though, is based on experience in the Navy, and he wants his men to make a deliberate and informed decision--to fully realize the commitment contained in the oath.

CONCLUSION



CONCLUSION

"Leadership is a difficult but not impossible quality to acquire. Any individual who really wants to be a leader can be one. It takes hard work. It takes knowledge. It takes enthusiasm. But it can be done."

-- Admiral Arleigh Burke

In preparing this text, we have made two assumptions. The first assumption is that you want to improve the effectiveness of your command. This may seem easy enough to agree to on the surface; however, seriously pursuing this goal requires dedication, hard work, and an openness to different ways of doing things. As you know, it is not easy to engage in self-examination or to change old habits. The second assumption we have made is that change is possible. We are convinced that such an effort is worthwhile--not only for you, individually, but for the men and women whose welfare you are entrusted with, and, ultimately, for the security of our country.

In the Introduction, we discussed some of the general ways in which Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! can help you. These uses include:

- diagnosing the causes of command problems
- preparing an action plan to solve them
- targeting your efforts to save time and energy
- anticipating obstacles and benefits of intended actions
- generating new and better ways to do things
- deciding what works best for you
- inspiring you to achieve new heights of leadership

In order to give you a sense of how Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! can be applied to specific areas, we want to offer some examples of things you can do. We hope our list will suggest other ways to apply the principles presented.

1. Our data indicates that the commanding officer, the executive officer, and the CO-XO relationship are the most important determinants of command excellence. Given the impor-

tance of the role of the CO and the XO, we suggest you start by writing down your command philosophy. How do you think your command should function and why? Try writing descriptions of how each of the People, Relationships, and Activity areas discussed here should function in your ideal command. Try visualizing the command as it carries out an evolution, say, preparing for an ORSE or deployment. What does it look like? Are there any special sayings or slogans by which you would want your ideal command to be governed?

2. Identify three or four key issues that any command needs to take care of to be successful. Prioritize them if you can. Think about how you have seen people act to carry them out successfully and unsuccessfully in other commands you have been on. What do you think has worked and what hasn't worked? Can you think of times or circumstances when these priorities might change? How would you currently rate yourself and your command at taking care of these things?

3. Our data indicates it is important that the CO and XO work together as a team. What can you do to achieve this? First, it is helpful for both the CO and XO individually to clarify their command philosophy and the roles that they think a CO and XO should play in a command. Then, they can meet to discuss and clarify these roles with each other. Besides a general discussion of beliefs and preferred modes of operating, they can focus on respective "hot buttons," things that one person could do that the other would not like. Another way to structure this discussion is by talking about specific examples in the past when a command you were in functioned well or poorly. The overall point, though, is to begin a process of open, frequent, and frank communication. You can't work well as a team without knowing where the rest of the team is coming from.

4. Another area of importance is selling your philosophy to the entire command. Again, to do this you need first to be able to articulate your philosophy. Then ask yourself if you think the crew understands and is committed to your goals and the way you want to achieve them. Have you been successful at communicating your priorities to them? One way to find out is to get out and about and ask people to tell you what they think you consider important. Is it the same as what you think is important?

If you discover that people don't know how you want your command to operate or don't seem to be committed to it, think about what you could do to change this. As we have seen, techniques include getting people together and telling them, having "management seminars" with the officers or senior enlisted, and repeatedly using and emphasizing special slogans or mottos. Another possibility is to present examples of outstanding performance from other commands, or to point out when some evolution

or action occurs in your own command that could serve as a prime example. If you can give them a picture of where you want to go, why, and how you want to get there, the chances are much greater that they will work hard to get there.

5. We saw that another strong distinguishing characteristic between superior and average commands is how they manage the external environment. What is your attitude toward the various groups in the outside environment--your immediate superiors, squadron or wing staff, the shipyard, tenders, other commands, etc.? Can you make a list of the important outside groups or organizations with which you have frequent contact? Which groups are most critical to your success? How would you rate your relationship with them? Do you see them as sources of help or as obstacles? Can you identify one of these groups with whom having a better relationship would pay off handsomely in getting the job done? Or can you identify any problems, either short-term or long-term, that could be alleviated if you had more help from someone in the external environment? If so, what could you do to improve this relationship? If there are things you can see that would help, but you don't have the time or personality to do them well, is there someone in your command you could ask to do this? Are there resources that you could turn to, such as officers in other commands who could suggest ways to work more effectively with these potential sources of help?

6. Another way you can use Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best! is by having your officers or senior enlisted read it or relevant parts of it and discuss how it applies to your command. A discussion could follow or be integrated with a statement of your command philosophy or your views on leadership and management.

In addition to the concepts presented here, you may be wondering what other sources of help or guidance there are. If you want to read more about the command effectiveness study, there is the final report, Command Excellence in the United States Navy, which goes into more detail about methodology and survey results. There is also the report prepared by McBer for the Navy called Navy Leaders: A Profile of Exemplary Commanding Officers and Executive Officers (1983). For experience in learning how to apply the command excellence model to your own command, the Leadership and Command Excellence Division offers a two-day Command Excellence Seminar for senior officers. And the nearest Organizational Effectiveness center can provide information and consultation on applying the results of the study. There is also a resource guide prepared for the LCPO and RCC LMET courses that contains related articles on leadership and management.





APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

Methodology of the Command Effectiveness Study

A desire to know the facts led the Navy, in 1976, to contract with McBer and Company for the purpose of finding out what distinguished superior performers from average performers. The results of this study were used as the basis of the Navy's Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET) courses. Not being content with subjective opinion on what makes for superior performance, McBer used a special interview technique to discover what superior performers actually do in order to excel that average performers do not do. Having identified the "competencies" of these superior performers, the Navy began teaching its sailors (1) to assess their performance against this "competency model" and (2) to strengthen those skills they were weak in.* Although the overall goal of the study was to enhance command excellence, the focus in the LMET courses has been on improving individual performance.

The Navy realized, however, that superior-performing individuals are not all there is to achieving command excellence, the ultimate goal of all of its training programs. As any sports fan knows, a collection of superstars does not necessarily make a great team. So, in 1982, the Navy asked McBer to elevate its methodology to the organizational level--to find out what are the organizational competencies that distinguish superior Navy commands from average ones.

A joint Navy-McBer team did a pilot study to see if such an investigation was feasible, and the results of that effort were published in 1984 as an interim report. That study allowed us to refine our questions, develop some preliminary hypotheses, and determine what other questions we wanted to answer. After another year of research, the final results are in, and a de-

* "Competency" is used in a special sense here, to refer to any personal attribute that underlies effective performance. Competencies include knowledge, abilities, personality traits, motives, and self-concept. A "competency model" is a set of those competencies that distinguish superior from average performers. It also includes behavioral indicators of the competencies--that is, statements of specific behavior that show how the competency looks in action. For example, one competency that distinguishes superior from average senior officers is Initiative. A behavioral indicator of this competency is Introduces new ideas or procedures to the command.

tailed presentation of our findings is contained in the report Command Excellence in the United States Navy (October 1985).

Who was studied, and how was it done? As the first step in the McBer-Navy command effectiveness study, a panel of Navy experts established criteria as to what would be considered a superior command. These experts agreed that a command would be considered superior only if it met all of the following:

- Won the Battle E or was a runner-up
- Won a departmental E
- Passed all major operational readiness inspections or exercises
- Maintained command retention at a level equal to or above the fleet average
- Maintained a strong safety record
- Had a general reputation as being outstanding, as confirmed by flag officers in the chain of command

The study teams visited a total of 21 units: 6 superior and 3 average air squadrons; 3 superior and 3 average submarines; and 3 superior and 3 average surface ships. Each team spent from 4 to 5 days on a unit, with one team visiting a superior command at the same time another team was studying an average command. At the end of each day, the teams presented their findings to one another, noting similarities and differences and identifying unanswered questions or issues that required more data collection.

In each unit, two-hour structured interviews were conducted with the CO, XO, several department heads and division officers, the command master chief or the chief of the boat, and several other key people identified by the CO. On 13 of the units, we also did intensive individual interviews with 6 or 7 chief petty officers. On all 21 commands, we conducted group interviews with junior officers, chief petty officers, petty officers, and other junior enlisted personnel.

In the majority of the individual interviews, the person was asked to describe several incidents when he felt the command as a whole performed effectively, or not quite as well as it could have. In the group interviews, open-ended questions about the command were asked. Topics included the CO, the XO, the CO-XO relationship, the wardroom, the chiefs, the crew and such activities as maintaining standards, planning, and communication. Both individuals and groups were asked to identify those factors that helped or hindered the command's excellence.

The study teams also spent extensive time "shooting the breeze" in the wardroom and chiefs quarters and observing as many unit activities as possible, including repair and maintenance, training, briefings, inspections, Masts, awards ceremonies, FOD walkdown, and even unit reactions to emergencies. The teams reviewed such command records as the Nonjudicial Punishment Log, PODs, human-resource-management survey results, retention records, and public affairs documents. Navy members of the team reviewed CASREPS, NAVFORSTATS, and related classified documents.

Surveys were used to gain further understanding of how these units function. On the eight units that made up the pilot study, the people interviewed were given the Navy Competency Assessment Profile and a Work Group Rating Survey. The Navy Competency Assessment Profile asks respondents to rate themselves on 16 generic competencies of superior performers in the Navy. The Work Group Rating Survey asks for a self-rating as well as ratings of others to find out what roles people play in their work group. (The technical name of this instrument is the Systematic Multiple-Level Observation of Groups Questionnaire, or SYMLOG.)

The 13 units visited after the pilot study were given the Work Group Rating Survey and a two-part Command Information Questionnaire. The second instrument asks respondents to rate their unit on the characteristics of superior commands identified in the pilot study. They are then asked 20 questions designed to find out how committed they are to their jobs.

The command effectiveness study is valuable for several reasons. First, it is an empirical attempt to answer the question of what produces superior command performance. There are many theories on what produces effective leadership and organizational performance. In addition, people's opinions of what it takes to excel at a job--even the opinions of those who in fact do excel--are not always reliable. This is because what people actually do to succeed is not always what they think they are doing. A merit of this study is that it tries to uncover the facts--what it is that commands really do to be superior commands.

Secondly, the study is based on information from many different sources. As noted above, data was gathered through individual and group interviews, observation of the daily activities of the unit, surveys, and written records. Men at all unit levels were interviewed, from the CO down to nonrated seamen, as well as a variety of staff personnel. Using multiple sources of data allowed the results to be cross-checked. It could be determined, for example, whether or not the conclusions reached from the interview data matched those from the survey data--and, in fact, they did. We therefore believe that this study

is more reliable than those based on only one source of data, such as interviews.

Other strengths of our study of command excellence are that it is comparative and community-wide. Units from all three communities--air, surface, and submarine--were studied. This provided the opportunity to see what applied to all communities and what was unique to each. Also, superior commands were not the only units studied; each time a superior command was visited, a simultaneous visit was made to an average unit. This contrasting of units enabled us to visualize more clearly what distinguished superior from average commands.

APPENDIX B

The View from the Top: The Views of Flag Officers on Command Excellence

At the end of the command effectiveness study, we decided that it would be worthwhile to include a section on how flag officers view command excellence. After all, they have been COs and XOs themselves, have served in numerous commands, and are in the position of observing and working closely with many others. What do they think distinguishes a superior from an average command? Their answer to this question is the basis for much of their daily decision making, since they are the ones who must identify the superior operational performers and the most combat-ready commands. We were eager to find out whether or not their views would support the results of the command effectiveness study.

We interviewed officers from the ranks of vice admiral, commodore, rear admiral, and admiral. Although none of the flag officers interviewed were briefed on the study before their interviews, we were surprised at how much congruence there was between their views and the results of the study. And between the different ranks, we did not find differences of opinion so much as differences of emphasis. Though the same elements were mentioned in most of the interviews, each person focused on some elements more than others.

We asked these officers "What distinguishes a superior from an average command?" The following is a summary of their answers.

First, there was agreement on the significance of the role of the commanding officer as being the most important single determinant of a command's excellence. As one vice admiral stated, a command "reflects the performance, the attitude, and the style of the commanding officer." Another said that a command "takes on the personality of its commanding officer, and it does this so quickly, it's amazing." One commodore said he looks for the "footprint" of the CO when he visits a command:

When you visit a command, you can see the "footprint" of a good CO. The spaces are squared away, the people are smiling, they stand up and say "hello" when you come in. If you ask them one question, they'll give you 20 minutes worth of stuff about their division, their equipment, and their function in the mission. That's the footprint of the CO. He's making them do that as a way of getting them to be proud of their part in the mission execution.

Several flag officers mentioned the importance of enthusiasm and pride permeating the command, and that this process starts with the CO. One officer cited the role of enthusiasm in getting the entire command heading in the same direction. The job of gaining the command's commitment to the CO's philosophy is like that of a salesman, he observed: "You've got to be enthusiastic and believe in what you're doing. Once you do that, you can sell vacuum cleaners. But you've got to believe in that vacuum cleaner."

One of the rear admirals interviewed emphasized that the superior COs are able to walk a fine line. On the one hand, they have to get people to live up to their potential, "to inspire people past their previous point of achievement." At the same time, they have to have "a barometer within themselves so they don't push people too hard."

A commodore stressed the importance of the commanding officer's focusing on the big picture and managing the external environment. He also said that the superior submarines try to be as independent as possible of the squadron--in other words, that their COs take the initiative to prepare their own schedules and solve their own problems, only coming to him to inform him of what they are doing. His reaction to this is, "Shoot, if I see somebody who's willing to take some initiative and march off on their own, that frees up part of my time. And that's the way it ought to be."

But being operationally independent does not mean avoiding contact with the squadron or wing staff; rather, the CO must learn to use them as resources. This same commodore felt that most COs need to take more initiative to communicate with squadron or wing staff. He encourages the COs who report to him to stop by his office at the end of the day when things are quiet, to talk informally for a few minutes. He also said COs should talk with each other about what went well in their command and what was disappointing. By doing this, they learn from each other. He said too many COs have the attitude, "It's my ship, and I'll do it my way. I don't need the advice of the guy next door."

Another major concern was delegation and the avoidance of micromanaging by the CO. One objection to micromanaging is that it inhibits development. It takes away the opportunity to learn from the person who should have been allowed to do the task in the first place.

In order to focus on the big picture, outstanding COs have a plan or a set of long-range goals that they want to accomplish. This enables them to assert their interests with their superiors, inspire their crews, and leave their imprint on their command. As one rear admiral put it, "The mission and goals of the command have to be clearly defined."

These flag officers also believe that a concern for maintaining standards is characteristic of superior commands. One commodore thought that people should be willing to confront poor performance more than they do. He stated: "If a guy is overweight, then you just have to say, 'You're fat, and if you don't lose weight, I'm going to throw you out of the Navy.' You just have to look people in the eye and tell them what you think." And one vice admiral said that superior COs act like firm but fair fathers of teenagers. He thinks that COs gain the commitment of their sailors by providing strong, positive direction:

The great majority of sailors want to do well, and they want to contribute to the good reputation of the command. Unfortunately, there are a small number of incorrigibles. They are a tiny percentage, but no matter what you do as a leader, you're never going to turn them around. They are not contributing to the good of the command, and they should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. There is a point beyond which you should abandon soul-saving and get rid of the nonperformer, because he is demanding more of your time than his skills are worth.

This same flag officer also mentioned the importance of administering discipline fairly and swiftly. He stated: "The troops need to know that when they go to see the captain, they are going to be listened to with a sympathetic ear, and if they are wrong and have broken the rules, they will be dealt with decisively." He affirmed that the CO must deal with second-time offenders especially firmly or risk "losing control of the situation."

These experts also stressed the importance of teamwork. One emphasized the critical importance of the CO and the XO working well together. Another commented on the importance of having the chief petty officers involved in the day-to-day running of the command:

They must be recognized as the technical experts in their own fields, but more than that, they and the junior officers are the middle management of the ship. They lead the division, organize and assign the work, and see that it is properly done. They are also responsible for training the junior officers, helping them along, and teaching them how to be responsible.

Another necessary ingredient is caring. A rear admiral observed:

Also essential is the feeling that the number-one guy genuinely cares--and that feeling must be pervasive. If it's apparent to the officers, it will be reflected

in their behavior. It's extremely important that it reach down to the lowest airman or seaman. Ultimately, of course, it reaches dependents, too.

He added that it is possible to discern the level of caring "without ever really walking through the door of the command." To do this, he uses indicators such as how long it takes for a person who committed an infraction to be taken to Captain's Mast, how long it takes special-request chits to be acted on, and if such a request is denied, how and what the person is told.

One flag officer expressed a similar idea, but he put it in terms of being involved and making a commitment to the command. By this he meant having a sense of ownership of the command--taking responsibility for its successes, but also standing up and being counted when things go wrong. He also saw this involvement manifested as getting out and about, noting that "the bridge is important, and you have to be there--but you have to get down to the deck, too."

A vice admiral touched on the issue of giving people positive feedback and recognition:

If someone does not do a good job, then they need to be told, "Hey, that's not up to standard," or, "Here's how you should fix it." And if a job is done really well, then the person who did it owns some of the real estate. He ought to be told, for instance, "That really is the best-looking trash disposal unit I've seen in the whole Navy." Everybody needs to be praised. Fireman Gronk or MM3 Smith needs to be told periodically, "Your diesel is really good." It's very important that good performance be recognized promptly and with sufficient fanfare.

Related to the issue of morale, another flag officer mentioned that the superior commands he had been in generated a feeling of electricity:

It's a command atmosphere that either you have or you don't have. You can see it very quickly just by walking around through hangars, passageways, or mess decks. Do the people put their heads down, or do they look you in the eye and say, "Good morning. How are you?"

One element mentioned by all the flag officers interviewed was the importance of good communication throughout the command. One emphasized communication following the chain of command, in particular, keeping one's superiors informed. He says that, throughout his career in the Navy, he has observed the following to be true of superior commands:

In these commands, the chain of command can handle almost any news, bad as well as good, as long as they get it in a timely manner. No commanding officer likes to be blindsided or get the news from somebody other than his own chain of command. "Keep the boss informed!" I think that should be an axiom of military life. Even if it's bad news, even if it's incomplete, make sure that you get the word to him first. That is critical to maintaining support and loyalty, up and down the chain of command.

Self-control was also seen as a distinguishing feature of the COs of superior commands. An admiral explained:

We've all worked with guys who are emotional. Hell, I get emotional at times, too. But you should never get emotional when there's a crisis going on. Uncontrolled emotion is terrible.


I can remember being in the ready room of one air squadron, about to see a training film, when something really big happened. The commanding officer, who I greatly admired, was being bugged by everyone to do something. He said, "Roll the movie." The others couldn't seem to comprehend that. But he was so confident of the squadron and their ability to handle the situation that he just took himself out of it and told them to keep him informed of developments. When a situation threatens to get out of hand, I think it's important to stay calm and be able to say, like that CO did, "Roll the movie"--and then to get on with it.

The following list summarizes the main elements of command excellence identified by these flag officers:

- The CO is the most important determinant of command excellence.
- Enthusiasm, pride, and commitment are essential to command excellence.
- The CO needs to build positive external relationships.
- The CO needs to focus on the big picture and avoid micro-managing.
- Standards need to be maintained through performance feedback, staffing, and firm, fair, and swift discipline.
- Teamwork is critical.
- The chiefs have a special role to play.

- Starting with the CO, superiors need to communicate to subordinates that they care about their welfare.
- Recognition must be given for a job well done.
- Good communication is vital, especially keeping superiors informed.
- The CO needs to exercise self-control.

Leadership Is Flesh




“... if technology is to serve mankind, people must come first.”

The Navy faces a period of fiscal constraint. Although support for the military remains strong throughout the country, and although many people understand that the recovery of defense strength over the last seven years did not cause the budget or trade deficits, it is clear that a consensus has been formed to limit de-

and Blood

By Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost,
U. S. Navy



fense expenditures as one step toward solving our economic problems. As directed, we are executing to lower budget levels.

How long this will go on and how deep the cuts will prove to be no one can say: the consensus expands and contracts in response to many factors. As we have in the

past, we will continue to make the strongest possible case for an adequate national defense in the future. We may disagree with some of the rationale behind cutting the budget, but we support the democratic process that results in the decision.

Many of our people have never known a period of fiscal



"The idea that a commander sitting at a display terminal far removed from the source of his information—for example, on patrol under the sea or escorting tankers in the Persian Gulf—could push a button and neatly excise an opponent is ludicrous."

reinforcing, throughout his career, the ethical base as the source of his decisions.

Two: Leadership must deal with reality, the reality of the sailors and the equipment in the spaces, not the monitoring systems inside the neat, air-conditioned, sound-proofed consoles. All the technology in the world cannot substitute for getting out and observing things firsthand, for finding the inconvenient details that would otherwise merge into the background. This should be done both formally and informally, through programs like zone and personnel inspections and through the time-tested practice of being with one's people.

The pictures that emerge from such experiences may differ widely, for we cannot assume that reality will always fit into familiar patterns. Leaders must learn to deal with various levels of disorder. The Harpoon engagement may have neatly defined parameters; the discipline problem is unlikely to be so neat; and as we saw last spring in the aftermath of the attack against the USS *Stark* (FFG-31), the response to fire or flooding or other emergencies may require the book to be thrown out. But whether pre-planned or improvised or something in between, all actions must begin with an understanding of what in fact is taking place, and all must be approached with a zeal to get to the heart of the matter and apply one's best energies against it.

Three: Leadership must make the most of all available assets. As leaders, we must consider the individual in every aspect—not only as a provider of services but also as a living entity. Knowing your people means much more than simply memorizing a few facts about them. It means knowing their capabilities and limitations, their ambitions, how they communicate, and how they approach a problem. It means developing a sensitivity to all subordinates, including minorities and women, so that we can ensure that they are full participants within the command.

We must never forget that, with all of their strengths and weaknesses, our subordinates are under our charge 24 hours a day. Many of them are young, and perhaps on their first tour of duty. Many are married. Their parents, guardians, or spouses have lent them to us with a faith that the Navy "system" will look after their welfare and safety, help them through the maturing process, and make them better citizens through challenge and responsibility.

That, too, is a 24-hour-a-day charge. We live up to it by showing our interest in our subordinates from the moment they first cross the quarterdeck. We take time to train them. We give them the resources to do the job. We instruct them if they fail and recognize them if they succeed. We go to court with them if they get into scrapes. We visit them in the hospital. We concern ourselves with their medical and dental care, and—almost obsessively—with their safety, both on duty and off, and particularly on the highways. And we want them to succeed, and expect that they will.


More than anything else, we must decipher and explain the situation so that all our subordinates will understand our perspective and will have the best chance of acting on it. This is one of the most significant changes from leadership in the past. The Navy is not a democratic institution, but implicit in any task is the vital necessity of understanding why it is to be performed. When a trained, highly motivated subordinate—with whom our service is blessed in great numbers today—understands the why of a task, if he confronts a change in circumstances, he will be able to reconstruct the what and the how even if we aren't there to guide him. And he will be motivated to perform that task to the highest standards we set for him. The great strength of our people today lies in this: give them a challenge, and they will not stop until they master it.

Four: Good leadership must provide that spark of relevance that foretells success. Human beings respond to clear direction; they accomplish tasks under good management; but they will give their all—and even more than their all—to the leader who stirs their blood, shows them how unique and remarkable they are, and how valuable their contribution. The obligation of a leader is to be successful. But if he can find the right word to animate the moment as well, his task will be that much easier. Leadership depends on good judgment, cool and detached, but it expresses itself through living people, not caricatures, whose emotions become engaged in carrying out the Navy's vital missions.

Mastering the Challenge: As we enter a new era of constrained resources, but with no constraint on explosive technological growth, many assume that the role of people has diminished. That is not my view, and I am determined that whatever the size and composition of the Navy in the future, the quality of our personnel, our support for them, and our leadership will not change. The challenges may be more complicated today, but the principles that we rely on are the same that saw our predecessors through many wars and intervening periods of peace, through recoveries of defense strength and relative periods of decline. Now and in the future, if technology is to serve mankind, people must come first.

and Blood

By Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost,
U. S. Navy



fense expenditures as one step toward solving our economic problems. As directed, we are executing to lower budget levels.

How long this will go on and how deep the cuts will prove to be no one can say; the consensus expands and contracts in response to many factors. As we have in the

past, we will continue to make the strongest possible case for an adequate national defense in the future. We may disagree with some of the rationale behind cutting the budget, but we support the democratic process that results in the decision.

Many of our people have never known a period of fiscal

constraint, while the rest of us recall very well the serious problems we confronted following the defense cutbacks in the 1970s. There is bound to be concern for the impact that budget cuts may have on the levels of readiness that we enjoy today. But there should not be alarm: in fact there should be sober confidence. Today's situation bears no resemblance to that of the 1970s. We are not trying to recover from the strain of a seven-year conflict. Our ships and personnel are not worn out. The reputation of the United States is not in tatters around the world, and Americans are not wary of their fellow citizens in uniform—quite the contrary.

In the long term, that is the most important point of all. The country recognizes and appreciates the contributions of its outstanding military people, and it is determined to protect personnel readiness, the key element of defense strength.

Our role in this area is to continue to be good leaders, no matter how hard that becomes. More than any other factor, more so even than programmatic support by the Congress, good leadership produces good people. The challenge to leadership is especially critical now, in an era not just of fiscal constraint but of explosive technological growth—when all of us will become ever more tired of being told to “do more with less;” and when the marvelous capabilities of the machine will tempt us to overlook the genius of the person who operates it.

Leadership Is Flesh and Blood: Throughout history, the greatest challenge to command has been the need to reconcile the big picture held by those at the top with the detailed knowledge available only at the scene. All leaders, consciously or unconsciously, concern themselves with the reality gap. They know that when viewed from a distance, the disorders of a problem tend to merge into a neat, comprehensible whole, satisfying to those who like neatness, but hardly representative of the way the battle is going. In the past the wise leader went to the scene and saw for himself.

Now for the first time, we are being conditioned to think that data links can transmit reality, that command and control can replace leadership. In society, many people view life as a stylized video game, dazzling and bright, where all behavior is predictable, all parameters are consistent, and there is no pain or hardship, only the electronic tote. In our profession the equivalent of this is the antiseptic view of naval warfare, in which leadership has no place.

Such a view is completely wrong.

The idea that a commander sitting at a display terminal far removed from the source of his information could push a button and neatly excise an opponent is ludicrous. Operational situations are not that regular; data links are not that comprehensive and reliable; the world is not painless nor devoid of consequences; and machines do not decide contests of will—people do.

Now more than ever, success in combat depends upon “that gift of command,” in Marshall Foch's words, “which can still animate the troops at the last stage of exhaustion.” Leadership is not captured technology but

inspired flesh and blood.


The Challenge of Leadership: Today, leaders at all levels in the Navy face a different set of challenges, more complicated and in some ways more difficult than our predecessors knew. The challenges are significant, but we can overcome them. Lessons from the past, principles learned from our own experience, and the advice and counsel of other leaders can help guide us. We must make time to bring these home to our people. The values that inspire them to do their best are eternal. In particular, we must concentrate on the intangibles:

One: Leadership must flow from strength, both physical and moral. This begins with the leader's personal ex-



ample and does not end until the organization comprehends, accepts, complies with, and resonates with the highest possible standards. Physical strength means physical fitness and more. Under the exceptional stresses to which we subject our people, the leader's vitality must be the last to fail. When the issue is in doubt, frequently his subordinates will look to him to see how things are going. If he is positive, they will try harder with a greater will to win. Ultimately, his own energy will return to him through them, and he will be stronger.

Moral strength cannot be quantified, but is easily felt within the command. It begins at the point where people accept that the leader must know what he is talking about. If he does and is therefore not to be taken lightly, the next concern is whether he is empowered by the right motives. The leader must always work from an ethical base; the art of leadership depends on value judgments. The leader's personal ability to discriminate between right and wrong may be the only resource at his disposal. Time may not permit him to consult with others. He must stand up for his beliefs, even if he stands alone. The expedient and the right courses of action may coincide; if not, the leader must choose. And we must prepare him for his choice by



"The idea that a commander sitting at a display terminal far removed from the source of his information—for example, on patrol under the sea or escorting tankers in the Persian Gulf—could push a button and neatly excise an opponent is ludicrous."

reinforcing, throughout his career, the ethical base as the source of his decisions.

Two: Leadership must deal with reality, the reality of the sailors and the equipment in the spaces, not the monitoring systems inside the neat, air-conditioned, sound-proofed consoles. All the technology in the world cannot substitute for getting out and observing things firsthand, for finding the inconvenient details that would otherwise merge into the background. This should be done both formally and informally, through programs like zone and personnel inspections and through the time-tested practice of being with one's people.

The pictures that emerge from such experiences may differ widely, for we cannot assume that reality will always fit into familiar patterns. Leaders must learn to deal with various levels of disorder. The Harpoon engagement may have neatly defined parameters; the discipline problem is unlikely to be so neat; and as we saw last spring in the aftermath of the attack against the USS *Stark* (FFG-31), the response to fire or flooding or other emergencies may require the book to be thrown out. But whether pre-planned or improvised or something in between, all actions must begin with an understanding of what in fact is taking place, and all must be approached with a zeal to get to the heart of the matter and apply one's best energies against it.

Three: Leadership must make the most of all available assets. As leaders, we must consider the individual in every aspect—not only as a provider of services but also as a living entity. Knowing your people means much more than simply memorizing a few facts about them. It means knowing their capabilities and limitations, their ambitions, how they communicate, and how they approach a problem. It means developing a sensitivity to all subordinates, including minorities and women, so that we can ensure that they are full participants within the command.

We must never forget that, with all of their strengths and weaknesses, our subordinates are under our charge 24 hours a day. Many of them are young, and perhaps on their first tour of duty. Many are married. Their parents, guardians, or spouses have lent them to us with a faith that the Navy "system" will look after their welfare and safety, help them through the maturing process, and make them better citizens through challenge and responsibility.

That, too, is a 24-hour-a-day charge. We live up to it by showing our interest in our subordinates from the moment they first cross the quarterdeck. We take time to train them. We give them the resources to do the job. We instruct them if they fail and recognize them if they succeed. We go to court with them if they get into scrapes. We visit them in the hospital. We concern ourselves with their medical and dental care, and—almost obsessively—with their safety, both on duty and off, and particularly on the highways. And we want them to succeed, and expect that they will.

More than anything else, we must decipher and explain the situation so that all our subordinates will understand our perspective and will have the best chance of acting on it. This is one of the most significant changes from leadership in the past. The Navy is not a democratic institution, but implicit in any task is the vital necessity of understanding why it is to be performed. When a trained, highly motivated subordinate—with whom our service is blessed in great numbers today—understands the why of a task, if he confronts a change in circumstances, he will be able to reconstruct the what and the how even if we aren't there to guide him. And he will be motivated to perform that task to the highest standards we set for him. The great strength of our people today lies in this: give them a challenge, and they will not stop until they master it.

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NOBODY ASKED ME BUT . . .

Fish Rot from the Head

By Major General J. D. Lynch, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

The Navy recently has had more than its share of nasty problems and publicity concerning professional ethics and morality. But so has the nation. We are rapidly becoming a morally standardless society. Ultimately, the military of a democracy directly reflects the mores of the society from which it is drawn.

There is nothing new or startling in the description of American moral decline or its spillover to the naval service. Recent reports point out that the nation's youth have received little or no training in the realm of such values as integrity and honesty—and the young have come publicly to agree. Last year, a senior midshipman was quoted as having written earlier that he and his classmates grew up without any entity or person to show them right from wrong. Consequently, the problem has been defined as the young and their lack of moral lighthouses. The solutions—including pronouncements by senior officials in and out of uniform—are in place and at work. The problem is so simple. Its solutions are so good and effective and self-righteous.

And maybe so hypocritical, because it's likely that the young are not the problem. Before continuing to pummel American youth for their lack of moral virtues—and by inference, extolling those of their elders—we might ponder the degree to which those elders (or seniors) are responsible. We should remember that fish rot from the head.

As an example, when General Colin Powell reached retirement, one of the candidates for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was eliminated fairly early because, while serving as a commanding general, he had prosecuted several homosexuals under his command. He had upheld the law and had had the courage to put himself and his command under intense media scrutiny. Yet his reward was a public explanation of why he was found wanting as a candidate for the nation's highest military position.

There are two lessons here. The first is that if you want to get ahead, it's a good idea to test the winds of political correctness before fulfilling the responsibilities of command. The second is

that there was no perceptible outcry or defense from the highest levels of military and civilian leadership. Ultimately, the young will conclude that their own seniors have gotten where they are by maintaining silence in the face of obvious wrongs.

It's an odd situation. The elders work from the belief that the young have no abiding standards—they lack integrity; they don't know right from wrong. And the young think that they have encountered hypocrisy in high places and may be drawing conclusions not intended by those who are spreading the gospel.

We know that problems inherent to the standardless society have spilled over into the military; and we would be wise to admit that the spillover has touched more than just the young. As a solution, we should emphasize the positive in the form of strong example.

Such is the story of Lieutenant General Charles G. Cooper. By June of 1951, the Korean War had become a slugging match with an enemy who gave up nothing and refused to surrender. The 1st Marine Division had undertaken an offensive designed to seize "The Punchbowl," a valley dominated on its southeast by Hill 907. On 17 June 1951, Charlie Cooper, then a lieutenant commanding the 3rd Platoon of "A" Company, 5th Marines, was ordered to seize Hill 907. He initially was numbed by the order, because a successful assault would mean heavy casualties, including all of the North Koreans and most of the U.S. platoon. Looking back later, he recalled thinking that, "as a Marine officer, the only thing worse than dying was to fail your troops in battle."

Cooper took advantage of folds in the terrain and what little cover and concealment existed as he led his men toward Hill 907. The platoon maneuvered squad by squad past enemy bunkers to attack them from the rear. Each success in their tortured progress upward brought increasing difficulties. Moving deeper into the North Korean defenses, their location and tactics became more obvious, and maneuver space was reduced to almost nothing.

The noise, smoke, confusion, killing,

and increasingly fanatical enemy resistance combined to put the issue in doubt. The last hope was two Air Force F-80s orbiting overhead with napalm tanks slung underneath. However, the pilots could not see well enough to identify a target, so it was agreed that the lieutenant would use his last white phosphorous grenade to mark the general positions of the enemy. As he threw the grenade at the counter-attacking troops, machine gun slugs tore into Lieutenant Cooper's side, tearing a large hole and knocking him down as though he had, "been hit with an axe." The jets roared in and put the napalm on the white smoke, stopping the counter-attack.

Lieutenant Cooper was dragged to a position of relative safety by, among others, Sergeant Bill B. Case and was evacuated to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka. He was told that he would never walk again, but through sheer will power and painful effort, he recovered fully in less than two years. It was an inspiring performance. More significant in this day of the standardless society, however, is what happened some 11 years later.

During early 1963, Major Cooper was serving on Okinawa as the G-3 Training Officer of the 3rd Marine Division. One morning, a saddened Cooper was informed that Sergeant Bill B. Case had been selling dud ordnance on the Okinawan black market. On Major Cooper's authority, Case had been confined to the brig, eventually to stand trial by a general court-martial.

It could not have been easy, but Major Cooper upheld professional standards in both the legal and moral senses. But he did one more thing. When the trial was conducted, he testified on Case's behalf and made certain that the justice required to maintain good order and discipline was tempered with mercy befitting the circumstances.

The best approach to motivating and leading our young—rather than to merely criticize—is to set a living example of professional standards and moral courage of the highest order.

General Lynch was Operations Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines, during the Vietnam War.





AIR TEST AND EVALUATION SQUADRON TWO ZERO

Mission

Our mission at VX-20 is to provide Full Spectrum Flight Test for the Fleet. It is our obligation to safely conduct flight and ground test operations, gather facts and report our findings in detail. Our goal is to provide our Marines, Sailors, Airmen and Soldiers with the best possible aircraft, weapons systems and technical information to support our nation's warfighting needs.

Command Philosophy

We are a unique team. We cannot do our mission alone. We must work with our NAVAIR and Industry partners to accomplish this mission.

To accomplish our mission we must focus on these core guidelines:

♦ **Operate Safely** - We must protect our people and our equipment. Nothing in our mission environment overrides safety. All hands must be alert to known hazards, work smartly, stay focused and be prepared for the unknown. The dynamic experimental nature of our mission demands this absolutely.

♦ **Respect our People** - Value our differences. Acknowledge and respect each other's positions, responsibilities and our chain of command. Admit our errors and learn from them. Provide every person the opportunity to reach their full potential through qualifications, education and advancement. Be professional, demand professionalism.

♦ **Expect and anticipate change** - Our test environment frequently produces changing/new information. We must anticipate change wherever possible, communicate options to all effected persons and get feedback. As our government and our service responds to new situations and new requirements, we must adapt.

♦ **Keep our commitments** - Stick with the plan, execute the schedule. Promise only what we can deliver. Our service and program customers work with significant constraints and our products are critical for timely and accurate decision making. Communicate early and often. Our teams must be the "go to" teams for effective and efficient testing.

These core guidelines are central to our quality of life and quality of work here at VX-20 and the FORCE Region. They require our constant attention and vigilance. I am privileged to be part of this team and look forward to serving with you through these changing and challenging times.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Randal D. Black".
Randal D. Black

CO's Policy, Thoughts and Expectations

This first and only edition of the CO's newsletter is for all hands to review and become familiar. This is how I expect people to conduct themselves. I am not the original author of most of these subparagraphs but I share them with you because I agree with their message. Read and heed my policy statement on the back page. Make this document part of your required reading and ensure all hands are familiar. This format, although a bit unusual, is intended to convey the most important aspect of our service: *Taking care of People*. Total command involvement and commitment in the workplace and at home is what separates us from General Motors or IBM. I need your support and charge every member within our command to ensure we are ready to perform our duties.

Loyalty:

Be committed to your family, your country, our Navy and Marine Corps and yourself. **YOU CAN BANK ON MY PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT.** In turn, I expect you to support our command.

Time...But not to Waste!!

Time is an ally to the organized...and an enemy to the unprepared. Time is to be valued and conserved, and should drive us to do things right the first time – simply to avoid doing things a second time.

Every facet of our lives competes for our time. Families, the squadron and yourself all deserve a measure of your time. The better job you do planning your time, the more discretionary time you will have. I will respect your time...and will expect you to return that respect for time throughout the chain of command.

Safety: Again and Again!!!

How safely we operate is a function of our individual and collective courage and judgment. We must have the courage to make the tough safety call, be it reminding our people to put on their cranial, throwing a red flag about an impending crisis or exercising the "no vote" when a situation is not well understood or explained. Judgment is deciding that an accumulation of in-flight aircraft problems merits going home. Judgment is deciding that working double maintenance shifts in the heat of summer should be elevated to the highest levels in our chain of command. Simply stated, judgment is knowing when to push and when not to. Canceling a sortie for safety concerns due to degraded range facilities, poor weather conditions or marginal airframe status are examples of courage and good judgment by my standards.

Be nice: No extra charge

There is no substitute for teamwork. Teamwork within and IPT/ITT or between Squadron operations and maintenance is our lifeblood. There is nothing you will achieve during this tour at your contemporaries' expense that is worth having. I fully expect each of us to support

unequivocally our subordinates, fellow workers (Sailors, Marines, civilians) and the command. If you make someone else look good, you are looking better! The converse is also true.

Administrative Stuff:

Paperwork. Recognize that our ability to moderate administrative stress is a function of our collective ability to complete our work on time. Quality paperwork could be defined as simply work which had to be done only once. Better yet, if you do the job right the first time, you are able to move on to something else. Do not abandon people or projects because of the paperwork hassle. Get it done, decide to do it right the first time, take on our paperwork burden and win! Work smarter, not harder.

Chain of Command:

Shall we have chaos or order? I pick order. To best support our people we will support the chain of command. This is pretty straight forward stuff for our military. Our civilian leadership must be supported as well. Both squadron and competency leadership must be informed and involved in all aspects of our mission. I fully intend to "walk around" and "walk about" ...but every issue that is brought to me "VFR direct" will get the same initial response: What did the TD, CTP or XO say? Has the CTE and competency leadership looked at this? What is the Department Head cut? Command Senior Chief? Division Officer /Chief? LPO? There is simply too much talent in our command and on this Base to not give every level of the "chain" a chance to work the issue, chop the plan or package. Staffing (read sharing) your idea/problem/issue ensures that we have a fully supportable solution and we will likely accomplish our objective faster!

Key Footnote: In particularly sensitive issues such as sexual harassment, equal opportunity or verbal/physical abuse, every member of this command should feel wholly comfortable going to any and every level of the chain of command to allow us to rectify the situation.

Test Integrity:

Our product, our facts, our reported information enables our present readiness and sets the stage for our future warfighting capability. Within the entire Department of Defense, no one can make the tough calls like we can. But know what you know. Know what you don't know and know the difference. We are about facts and data. Don't let emotion cloud our reporting. I will not allow you to be second-guessed around the decision making "table".

Security:

There are enough secrets in our spaces to keep every JAG officer on active duty busy doing Article 32 investigations until the year 2020. Let's not give them the opportunity. Caring for classified material is a matter of professionalism. We have seen first hand recently that there are people in this world that would like to destroy our way of life. Our ability to defend our nation requires absolute discipline in the security arena.

Policy, Here is what you can expect!

Here is a short list of "things" I want NOT to happen in our command. As you read this keep three things in mind. First, the list is in no specific order. Second, it is my considered opinion that we are each other's keepers. Third, I hope I never have to address a single person concerning one of these areas. If you are unsure where I stand, ASK!

1. Alcohol Related Incidents (ARI). Don't drink and drive! Designated drivers are a must. If you're drinking alcohol, get a ride home. If you see a shipmate or friend about to get in trouble because of alcohol, step in.

What to expect if you are involved in an ARI: You can expect a CAAC screening and all the command support to get yourself "right". If you have broken the law, violated regulations or the UCMJ, you can expect to be handled accordingly. Do not expect favors or soft treatment. Expect your qualifications as aircrew, QA/CDI, maintenance control and instructor status to be reviewed and challenged. You stand to lose a lot. The command depends on your 100% performance and an ARI brings your personal conduct and judgment into question.

2. Drug Use. I have absolutely ZERO, repeat ZERO tolerance for abuse of controlled substances. Oh by the way, so does the entire Department of the NAVY.

What to expect: Expect to be processed for discharge/termination in accordance with DON policy.

3. Lying – Directly or indirectly. A direct question merits a direct answer. "I don't know" is acceptable if you do not know. Do not misstate or misrepresent facts of a situation to accomplish an objective. We have earned tremendous public trust as service men and women. We must preserve that trust.

What to expect: I will take at face value your words and recommendations. Fool me once – expect to sit and talk a spell. Fool me twice – I will likely not trust you with significant responsibilities for the remainder of my tour.

So, you make a mistake, do something wrong...

I expect each of us to admit our mistakes and learn from them.

What to expect:

Did you do it thinking it was right, within the test plan, NATOPS, 4790, etc.? If so you are golden. Share and learn! These kinds of things "steepen" the learning curve. No foul.

Did you do it not knowing whether or not it was correct and did not bother to check? You can certainly count on being corrected, but not crucified. At least the first time!

Did you do it knowing it was wrong, and figured it did not matter or no one would find out? Stand by for heavy seas!!

**OPERATE SAFELY – FOCUS ON THE TASK AT HAND
WORK HARD – PLAY HARD**

Air Test and Evaluation Squadron TWO ZERO

Safety Policy Statement

Mission

Our mission at VX-20 is to provide Full Spectrum Flight Test for the Fleet. It is our obligation to safely conduct flight and ground test operations, gather facts and report our findings in detail. Our goal is to provide our Marines, Sailors, Airmen and Soldiers with the best possible aircraft, weapons systems and technical information to support our nation's warfighting needs.

Safety as a Way of Life

My number one concern as your Commanding Officer is your personal safety. Whether you are active duty Navy, a civil servant or a contractor, I want to ensure you come to work each day to the safest possible work environment. In fulfilling our mission, we must operate our equipment safely and conduct our day to day lives with safety and risk management at the forefront of all activity. Nothing in our mission environment overrides safety. All hands must be alert to known hazards, work smartly, stay focused and be prepared for the unknown. The dynamic experimental nature of our mission demands this absolutely.

Our primary safety goal at VX-20 is sustained MISHAP-FREE OPERATIONS. In order to achieve this goal, VX-20 must adopt a "safety first" way of life and continuously monitor our policy and programs.

To achieve our goal, I expect the following from each member of VX-20:

- Ensure safe operations remain your number one priority at all times
- Identify hazards and report them to your supervisor and Safety Representative
- Be assertive in challenging the actions of others if unsafe practices become apparent
- Supervisors ensure safe work practices are known, understood, and enforced
- Never accept marginal or down equipment and aircraft
- Thoroughly plan each flight, fly the plan, and debrief the flight.
- Exercise the "No Vote" whenever it appears that safe operating practices may be compromised
- Aircrew and equipment operators must know their procedures cold
- In the absence of specific guidance, exercise sound judgment by seeking the most qualified persons on procedures to be followed.
- Never allow established safety procedures to be sacrificed in order to meet increased operational demands or any special requirements.
- Employ Operational Risk Management as a way of life. Both on and off-duty.
- Approach every task with the understanding that NO operation is so important that it must be accomplished at the unnecessary risk of loss of life or serious injury.

I consider mishap and injury prevention a critical responsibility I share with each of you. All members of the VX-20 team have a duty to serve with me as safety officers. Join me in committing to the goal of sustaining a "world-class" safety environment because we can afford to do no less.



CDR Randal D. Black
Commanding Officer



24 June 2000

From: Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron FIVE
To: All Mad Foxes

Subj: COMMAND PRINCIPLES AND PHILOSOPHY

Patrol Squadron FIVE is a **WINNING TEAM**. We plan for success and constantly seek ways to improve the squadron, the Navy, and ourselves. **HONOR, COURAGE** and **COMMITMENT** are at the center of everything we do. Principles and philosophy to guide us as we pursue our mission of fighting and winning our Nation's wars can be summed up as follows:

- DO WHAT'S BEST FOR THE SQUADRON.
- DO THE RIGHT THING, ESPECIALLY WHEN NO ONE IS WATCHING.
- DO YOUR BEST ON THE TASK AT HAND. THE STANDARD IS "EXCELLENCE".

- THINK FIRST, THEN ACT.
- IF SOMETHING ISN'T RIGHT, SPEAK UP.
- IF WE MAKE A MISTAKE, LEARN FROM IT, DON'T REPEAT IT.

- KNOW YOUR WARFARE SPECIALTY. KNOW YOUR RATE.
- TRAIN YOUR RELIEF.
- DEVELOP YOUR MIND AND YOUR BODY.

- BE OPTIMISTIC.
- HAVE FUN AND KEEP YOUR SENSE OF HUMOR.
- BE CONFIDENT - YOU ARE THE BEST.

Leadership. Actions speak louder than words. Every Mad Fox is a leader. Every one of us is responsible for the success of VP-5. Each of us will be held accountable for our area of responsibility. Your level of authority will be based strictly on individual performance and experience.

Training. The foundation of command success. Conduct quality training -- every day. Certain training is planned and scheduled. However, most meaningful teaching is "by example". This includes leadership, ethical and moral training, as well as technical and professional training.

Planning. Simply stated, planning is putting people, materials and training together in a logical way to reach our objective: mission readiness. Therefore, all of us must be involved. We have to understand the plan to know where we're going and how we're going to get there.

Communications. The key to successful Leadership, Training and Planning. Each of us has a duty to speak up when we see a better way of doing things. Be honest, yet constructive. Keep an open mind to new ideas.

T. E. BOOTHE



VP-5 COMMAND SAFETY POLICY

The best measure of our safety program is Operational Readiness. A squadron is designed to have a certain number of Sailors and aircraft. If we damage aircraft or equipment -- or worse -- if we injure or lose shipmates, our operational readiness suffers. On and off duty, your wellbeing is important to the Navy and to me.

Everything we do is based on time-tested instructions, directives and procedures. These rules, often written in blood, ensure we are ready to do our job -- to meet operational commitments effectively and SAFELY! That is precisely what Patrol Squadron FIVE will do. Every Mad Fox will know and follow the rules to the very best of his or her ability.

All Mad Foxes should make every effort to do each job right -- the first time. The job will get done ... we just shouldn't waste time attempting to do it more than once. I would rather you spend your time with family than to waste it doing a job over.

How can we ensure VP-5 maintains peak operational readiness? Before you do anything, at work or at home, ask yourself the following questions:

- What's going to hurt me?
- What am I going to do about it?
- If I can't do anything, who do I tell?

This means each Mad Fox must:

- Think before you act.
- Speak up when something isn't right.
- Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
- Ensure decisions are made at the right level.

If ever there is a reason to put you in jeopardy, I will personally tell you. If you don't hear it from me, then violating an instruction, directive or procedure is not authorized-- under any circumstance.

THINK BEFORE YOU ACT!

T. E. BOOTHE

24 JUNE 00



NAPRA COMMAND MISSION, VALUES & PHILOSOPHY

Our **Mission** is to manage and perform depot level rework on designated weapon systems, support equipment, and associated components in support of USN and USMC aircraft in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf theaters. NAPRA, the forward-based arm of the NAVAIR TEAM, has a tradition as the **global first choice in depot repair**. Our standard is **excellence in everything we do**. The following are values and philosophy (in no particular order, since they are all important) that are foundational to our team in accomplishing our mission:

Battle Readiness: Our reason for being is to ensure aircraft and equipment that we repair get back to the war fighter as quickly and safely as possible, with the highest possible quality repair.

Customer Service: As such, our Sailors and Marines deserve only our finest product. They must be our focus. We must maintain continuous honest communication with all internal and external customers.

On-Time and Under Budget: Our customers demand and deserve a quality product that is delivered back to them at or before the time we promised and at a competitive cost which keeps them coming back.

Safety: NAPRA can be inherently dangerous if caution and safety by All Hands are not taken. Adhere to authorized repair practices, don't cut corners, and watch out for yourself and your fellow coworker.

Honor, Courage, and Commitment: We have a tradition of firm adherence to high moral and ethical standards. We must demonstrate these lofty words in everything we do.

Personal Integrity, Accountability, and Responsibility: The conduct of All Hands must be incorruptible, straightforward, and trustworthy. Each member of our team should strive to do his or her best and is expected to perform as a responsible professional.

Personal Behavior: We represent NAPRA, the US military and government 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Inappropriate personal behavior, sexual misconduct and fraternization detract from our mission and adversely affect morale. I will not tolerate abuse of drugs or alcohol.

Personal Dignity, Worth and Mission Contribution of All Hands: Each member of the NAPRA Team is vital to accomplishing our mission. Harassment and hazing will never be tolerated.

Decisive Leadership, Supervision, and Planning: Take care of your people; know your people. Provide clear guidance, and follow-up to ensure compliance. Plan well, communicate your plan, execute your plan.

Effective Chain-of Command: Communicate both up and down the Chain-of Command. Communicate!

Preservation of Equipment, Tools, and Assets: Through cleanliness, good housekeeping, preventive upkeep, and adherence to material condition standards, we must continually maintain our tools, equipment and facilities to ensure the safest, state-of-the-art working environment and quality of life for our personnel.

Proactive Environmental Responsibility: We must always lead in this area by maintaining good material stewardship and ensuring our industrial "footprint" on our environment is minimal.

Continuous Improvement, Innovation, and Initiative: Continuous improvement through training and the application of innovative ideas and processes allows NAPRA to maintain its position as a leader in global depot repair.

Recognition: We have a responsibility to identify the accomplishments of and retain our quality people.

Family and Community Involvement: Our families are NAPRA's backbone and support. We have a responsibility to reciprocate our support to them and the community when they are in need.





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SANTA FE (SSN 763)
PRECOMMISSIONING UNIT
SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING
CONVERSION AND REPAIR, USN
GROTON, CT 06340-4990

29 April 1992

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, PCU SANTA FE (SSN 763)
To: All Hands

Subj: COMMAND POLICY

1. This letter provides you my thoughts, goals and priorities for the command. It contains what I expect from you and some important policies you can expect the command to follow. The items discussed below may seem obvious, but they must remain clear in everyone's mind. Focusing on these primary goals is the key to our success.

2. Primary Goals/Objectives:

a. OPERATE SANTA FE SAFELY. Safety of ship, people, and equipment is paramount. There is no peacetime requirement which overrides it. All hands must be alert to identify unsafe practices and to take immediate action to correct them.

b. TRAIN TO BE READY FOR WAR. We will fight the way we train. In war and other stressful situations, we will perform as effectively as we've trained ourselves and prepared the ship, falling back on the knowledge and habits developed through training. We must thoroughly understand SANTA FE and its capabilities, develop the finest in teamwork skills and learn to fight hurt. Further, unless we keep SANTA FE in top material condition and clean, we can't expect to be fully effective in wartime or peacetime missions.

c. SMART, CORRECT, AND PROFESSIONAL EXECUTION OF OUR MISSION. In peacetime, our missions will range from special operations or deployments to operational examinations or upkeep/shipyard periods. Each crewmember makes a contribution toward how we complete every assignment. "Smartness", professionalism, and technical competence must be our hallmarks.

d. PROVIDE EACH CREWMEMBER EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO REACH HIS FULL POTENTIAL. This is most effectively done through qualification, leadership development, education, and advancement in rate/promotion.

3. Below are some specific policies to accomplish the above stated goals. These areas represent the foundation of what I expect. SANTA FE must fulfill not just the letter, but the spirit of these policies:

a. INTEGRITY. There is no more valuable attribute in submarining than integrity. A man's word is his bond, and we depend upon each other for the safety of the ship and crew. I'll

trust you until you prove otherwise. When mistakes happen (and they will), be straightforward and honest.

b. RESPONSIBILITY. We are responsible for the lives and safety of our shipmates. Don't make excuses or use phrases such as "They want..." or "They said...". Be responsible for each of your actions. You will be afforded as much responsibility as you are willing to accept and competently execute. Performing each assignment to the best of your ability will lead to additional responsibility on board SANTA FE and will improve your opportunity for long term advancement within the Navy.

c. MATERIAL. "Fix it now." That's the only successful approach to material. Every problem is important and has a place in the overall priority. Every deficiency goes in the ESL. The LPO is the key manager in accomplishing this and planning/tracking prompt corrective action.

d. CLEANLINESS. SANTA FE was designed to be a powerful front-line national asset for 30 years. Experience has shown that inadequate attention toward preservation and cleanliness can result in serious material failures and jeopardizes the ability to operate the ship to its design lifetime. Only a clean, well-stowed ship is ready to go to sea. High standards of cleanliness ensure safe and operable equipment.

e. ALCOHOL/DRUGS. Drug and alcohol abuse cause a multitude of problems in an organization and pose a significant safety hazard. I will not tolerate abuse of drugs or alcohol. Further, I will not tolerate those who condone such behavior by knowingly ignoring it. If you find yourself drinking to excess, are unable to control your use of alcohol or alcohol use is affecting your life, seek help through the command's Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA). If you demonstrate a serious effort to correct this problem, I will provide you full support. However, you will be held accountable for your actions.

f. HAZING/HARASSMENT. Hazing or harassment comes in many forms - from abusive treatment or involuntary/undignified pranks directed toward new crewmembers to offensive racial or sexual comments directed toward others. Such actions are forbidden. An individual's sense of dignity is very important and sometimes fragile. Treat others with the same consideration you would expect from them. If you observe or are the subject of hazing/harassment, report it immediately to the chain of command.

g. PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE. Do it by the book and use the book. However, do not blindly follow procedures. You must thoroughly understand what you are doing, so that you can identify errors in the procedure or ship/equipment conditions which make it impossible to safely execute the procedure. If the procedure is wrong, fix it. We'll generate and use Temporary Standing Orders, where applicable, while permanent corrections to the manuals are pending.

h. COMMAND PRIDE. We are the SANTA FE. If we degrade the command, we degrade ourselves. When our appearance is sloppy, we embarrass the ship and our shipmates. Likewise, our accomplishments, individually and as a crew, enhance the ship's reputation. We work too hard to have malcontents or immature individuals downgrading the ship through irresponsible statements or actions. Again, we are the SANTA FE. People form their opinion of SANTA FE based upon us. Likewise, people form their opinion of us based upon SANTA FE's overall reputation and performance.

i. IMPROVEMENT. If you identify a problem, don't ignore it. Either fix it yourself or talk to someone in the Chain of Command who can do something about it. Complaining leads nowhere. Every man on board can improve things through constructive suggestions or actions.

j. CHAIN OF COMMAND. Use the Chain of Command for routine operational and administrative matters. I have an "open door" policy for crewmembers. You should inform your Chain of Command of your desire to discuss something with me. Although you need not inform the "Chain" of the topic, you will typically find that someone in the "Chain" can answer your question or help you resolve your problems. The command and the outside resources at its call represent a wealth of experience in helping sailors deal with their job, the Navy, and life in general.

4. The above reflects my beliefs on what we should strive for on a daily basis. We expend too much effort to settle for being rated "average". The better we are at every task, the more we'll control our destiny.

5. Submarining is hard work, but can be incredibly rewarding. Each of you is an essential part of SANTA FE - don't ever lose sight of that fact. Our success depends upon our readiness. Our readiness depends upon each and every crewmember.


R. F. KRULL

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS INGRAHAM (FFG-61)
FPO AP 96668-1515

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer
To: All Hands

Subj: COMMAND PHILOSOPHY AND STANDARDS

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide every member of INGRAHAM some of my thoughts on command-wide standards and principles, to eliminate much of the uncertainty surrounding every change of command. It is easier to perform well, if one knows the Commanding Officer's philosophy and expectations. In short, the standard is EXCELLENCE in everything we do. Personal excellence and professional excellence for each man and command excellence for us all.

Who We Are: We are the UNITED STATES SHIP INGRAHAM - a warship manned by professionals, ready to execute all assigned missions, to go into harms way and to FIGHT and WIN.

What We Do: Our MISSION is to conduct prompt, sustained, combat operations at sea, in defense of our nation's interests.

In war, our Combat Mission will be our first priority, all else follows. We will fight this ship to the maximum extent of her capabilities.

In peace, OUR SAFETY will be first priority, closely followed by our preparations for combat operations, and then our peacetime tasks.

Guiding Principles:

FOLLOW ME- We all lead our people by example, based on our Navy's core values of honor, courage and commitment. I alone am ultimately fully responsible and accountable for this command.

BE RESPONSIBLE- for yourself, for your family, for your shipmates, for your subordinates, for your equipment (it is our gear-we fix it), for your training qualifications and for your watchstanding. Our lives depend upon each other's vigilant performance of duty.

DO THE RIGHT THING- To the best of your ability in all things that you do. Approach your life and this profession with a positive attitude based upon honesty, integrity and the drive for excellence. Be proud of your conduct and accomplishments. Admit mistakes, learn for your own and those of others. Always look for improvement. **THINK FIRST-THEN ACT.**

TAKE CARE OF YOUR PEOPLE- Help them to achieve their personal best. Ensure they know what is expected of them, have the support they need to get the job done properly and receive feedback appropriate to the results of their efforts. INGRAHAM can not accomplish her mission without a well-trained, well-led, motivated and happy crew. My goal is for each man feel he has grown and improved both personally and professionally for his experience in INGRAHAM. Work hard, work smart and have fun.

OPERATE BY THE GUIDANCE- Know and follow the rules which govern our profession. Our regulations, instructions, training qualifications, operating and casualty control procedures, standing orders and maintenance documents provide the proven framework for safe, effective accomplishment of our mission. I am the only one aboard who can authorize the bypass of a safety device or procedure.

DEAL WITH PROBLEMS DIRECTLY- The only problems we can not solve are the ones we do not know about; the only question which will go unanswered is the one that is not asked. I will keep you informed, do your utmost to keep me informed. There will be zero tolerance for drug/alcohol abuse or harassment of any kind. Each man is a valued contributor to INGRAHAM's mission, personal problems will be dealt with fairly and in a caring manner. Use the chain of command for routine operational and administrative matters. I will maintain an "open door" policy. You should inform your chain of command of your desire to discuss something with me. Although you need not inform the "chain" of the topic, you will typically find that someone in the "chain" can answer the question or offer help. There is a wealth of resources, inside and outside the command to solve problems-remember **YOU ARE NOT ALONE**.

BE A TRUE SHIPMATE- Earn each other's respect for your integrity, character and professionalism. Carry your share of the load and help others with theirs. Deal fairly and equitably with everyone. Treat everyone with dignity and respect.

EXECUTE THE DAILY ROUTINE, ROUTINELY WELL EACH DAY- INGRAHAM must be a safe, clean, smoothly functioning place to live and to work. We are entrusted by the nation with her care and safety.

OUR lives depend upon effectively and fully employing the operational capabilities of this ship. Our reputation and self-respect as sea-going professionals depend upon the way INGRAHAM, her crew and her operations appear to others. **BE PROUD, FEAR NOT and ALWAYS STRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE**.


G. J. FULLERTON



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDING OFFICER
USS PASADENA (SSN 752)
FPO AP 96675-2408

9 June 1999

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, USS PASADENA (SSN 752)
To: All Hands

Subj: COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

1. We, as PASADENA submariners, are at the "tip of the spear," defending democracy, freedom and U.S. national interests worldwide. We are combat-ready, multi-mission warfighters in the world's most powerful and capable Submarine Force and Navy serving during an era of tremendous challenge. I am privileged to have the opportunity to command PASADENA.

2. Five simple words serve as guideposts on PASADENA: character, people, growth, standards, and communication. I consider these guideposts fundamental to our success, and I ask you to take an even strain in adopting their underlying principles.

- **Character.** We adhere to the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. These values guide our every action. Self-discipline and integrity preserve our reputation.
- **People.** We lead others in realizing their fullest potential and achieving their dreams. Our legacy lies in forging tomorrow's citizens and submarine warriors, today.
- **Growth.** We constantly strive to grow both professionally and personally. Training and teamwork are vital to our individual and command development.
- **Standards.** We choose excellence. We value innovation and view change as a natural part of the improvement process. Safety is our watchword.
- **Communication.** Open, effective communication is essential for success. We provide frequent feedback and we match expectations throughout the chain of command.

3. The themes above are central to PASADENA life and require our attention, effort, and vigilance. I look forward to serving with you through the challenges and excitement ahead of us, as we carry out our mission and further PASADENA's proud heritage, "Anytime, Anywhere."

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. S. Ginda", is located at the bottom center of the page.

M. S. GINDA



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS CALLAGHAN (DDG-994)
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96662-1266

IN REPLY REFER TO:

28 JAN 92

From: Commanding Officer, USS CALLAGHAN (DDG 994)
To: All Hands

Subj: INITIAL THOUGHTS ON COMMAND POLICY & STANDARDS

1. Purpose. The purpose of this letter is to provide all hands in CALLAGHAN some of my thoughts on command policy and standards while I am in command of CALLAGHAN. I plan to update this letter from time to time while I am aboard to ensure that everyone understands clearly my expectations for CALLAGHAN and for each of you personally in the wardroom and crew.

2. Command Goals and Priorities. To augment these thoughts on command policy and standards, I will also provide, on at least a quarterly basis, a written statement of my command goals and priorities -- to assist all hands in planning and focusing their efforts in the months ahead. Our focus this quarter is clear: "The true worth of any warship is her ability to give and take hard knocks." We will be ready to enter the Gulf!

3. CALLAGHAN is a Warship. Above all else, CALLAGHAN is a warship. CALLAGHAN exists to support the interest of the United States and our Navy. We, the crew, make CALLAGHAN what she is. Our primary task is to maintain CALLAGHAN ready in all respects to go to war -- not only the equipment, but also in every facet of training.

4. The Standard is Excellence. The standard for CALLAGHAN is excellence. This means striving to do everything we do the right way, the first time. Quality control is a function of every level of the chain of command. Remember that it takes less time to do something right the first time than it does to do it twice. If something is worth doing, it is worth doing right. In meeting these standards I expect an atmosphere of open honesty. I will accept honest mistakes from a man trying to do well. (However, let us strive to learn from the mistakes of others -- it is not necessary to do all our learning by making mistakes!) Every man doing his best has my complete backing and respect.

5. Know your Men. High standards begin with knowing your men. I expect every leader to know the man under his charge -- everything from his hometown and details about his family, to his progress in watch qualifications and toward advancement.

6. Know your Equipment. Every man must know his own equipment cold! This includes its proper operation, all its safety features, and how it relates to the other systems in the ship. Use the Technical Manuals. Know the standards to which the

Subj: INITIAL THOUGHTS ON COMMAND POLICY & STANDARDS

equipment must be maintained and its proper operational parameters. Maintain the equipment so that the standards and parameters are met. Sincerity is not enough -- deeds, not just good intentions, are what matters. Know things!

7. My basic Philosophy. "Every job is important. Every system is a combat system. There is no such thing as an unimportant job on CALLAGHAN. The ability of CALLAGHAN to perform as a fighting warship depends totally on the combined performance of each member of the crew. In this sense, every system in CALLAGHAN is a combat system. For example, without the engineering plant, CALLAGHAN is useless as a warship. Without a healthy and properly fed crew, CALLAGHAN would quickly become a less effective warship. The points here are: every man aboard is an important factor in CALLAGHAN's readiness and sustainability in combat and every system and function aboard CALLAGHAN can directly affect the ability of CALLAGHAN to fight and win.

8. What's the CO's Job. My duties and responsibilities are clearly defined in Navy Regulations. As described therein, I am utterly accountable for the condition and performance of CALLAGHAN in all its aspects. However, I feel strongly that Navy Regulations are only part of the story. I consider that a key aspect of the duties of a Commanding Officer is to see that every man in CALLAGHAN has what he needs to perform his duties properly -- including training, materials and time. Another key duty of the Commanding Officer is to be the ship's long-range planner -- looking downstream at the ship's schedule, reducing uncertainty in everyone's planning and eliminating to the maximum extent possible the need for "crisis management."

9. You make your own Luck. While being lucky is handy, I believe strongly that you make your luck, through careful planning and lot of hard work. The harder you work the luckier you get! We've all heard the motto "prior planning prevents poor performance."

10. Safety is Key. Safety is an absolutely vital consideration in every evolution -- including routine ones -- in a Navy Warship. Safety precautions are written in the blood of sailors who failed to heed them. I expect each of you to be intimately familiar with the safety precautions and features associated with the equipment you operate and to ensure that they operate properly. I am the only man onboard who can authorize the bypassing of any safety feature or procedure.

11. On PMS. The Planned Maintenance System has my complete support. The goal is to accomplish all required PMS actions each

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quarter. The PMS should be continuously validated against the equipment onboard. If the PMS coverage in your work center does not match your equipment, or the PMS action seems to be incorrect, submit a feedback and get it fixed. Do Not Gundeck PMS! You will not fool the equipment. Do it right the first time. If you don't have the tools or special material that you need to perform the PMS, let your LPO, Chief, Division Officer and Department Head know -- and get what you need to do your maintenance properly.

12. On Procedures. As mentioned earlier, program procedures shall be followed with any operation related to equipment or machinery. Where it exists, always use EOSS, CSOSS, etc. Never "wing it." If you need more time to review a procedure before operating equipment, ask.

13. On PQS. Our Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program is only as good as our standards, and the qualifications of our senior qualifiers. All qualifications will be pursued as though they will soon be experienced in combat.

14. On ESWS. Our Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist (ESWS) program will be the capstone of our shipboard PQS qualification program in CALLAGHAN. It is my policy that every sailor, E-4 and above will pursue ESWS qualification in accordance with the current program. I believe that this is important for a number of reasons, including enormously increasing the combat readiness of the ship, adding extensive additional damage control and fire fighting expertise crew-wide and generally making every man in the crew better able to understand where he fits into the ship's organization as part of a smoothly operating combat team. The emphasis here is on "warfare specialist."

15. On Mutual Respect, Cooperation and Teamwork. There will be no "unions" on CALLAGHAN. There is only one crew and we will all work together to meet our standards of excellence. Every man in CALLAGHAN is on the "first team." Our lives in combat will depend on every man doing the right thing without having to be told -- This is the essence of teamwork. The crew of a modern warship is the "ultimate team." Every man doing his job to the best of his ability no matter what the level of the job within the team deserves the support, cooperation and respect of every other shipmate.

16. On "I" Division. For new men onboard, the quality of our "I" Division Indoctrination is a key element in how quickly they can come aboard as a contributing member of the CALLAGHAN "first

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string." Making new crew members feel welcome, and showing them the ropes, is the responsibility of all hands, not just those men giving the indoctrination briefings. And, if you have any good ideas on ways that the current "I" Division Indoctrination could be improved (based on your own experiences with "I" Division), be sure to pass your ideas to the Command Master Chief.

17. On Guests and Visitors aboard CALLAGHAN. Any guest and visitor (yes, even inspectors) aboard CALLAGHAN will be treated as though they were my own personal guests. They will be afforded every courtesy that you would provide me. They will be made to feel comfortable and welcome in CALLAGHAN. Treat visitors, in other words, as you would like to be treated if you were aboard another ship helping to accomplish a task. A little courtesy can go a very long way toward making activities "outside the lifelines" aid and want to help CALLAGHAN. Courtesy and thoughtfulness cost nothing, but can provide enormous dividends - and have a large impact on the reputation of the ship.

18. On Recognition. I strongly believe in the value of recognition for excellent performance. Crew members in positions of leadership should ensure that proper recognition, at the proper level is given to performance above the norm -- to exceptional efforts that deserve special merit. Every man wants to do a good job; every man doing a good job wants to feel that his superiors have noticed just how hard and effectively he is working. Be sure that your top performers get the recognition that they have earned.

19. On Retention. It is the responsibility of every man in a leadership position to strive to retain in the naval service their best and most effective sailors. Our Navy and the Navy of the future, deserves nothing less. The command will do what ever efforts are necessary to obtain the best possible choice of duty for those who decide to make the Navy a career.

20. On Keeping the Crew Informed. I will strive to keep all hands informed concerning the current and future operations of the ship, recognizing that the uncertain and volatile nature of the world's operational environment means that we can expect changes in our projected future from time to time. To the extent possible, I will seek to reduce the uncertainty about the future for both your work planning aboard the ship and for your family. To put the word out, I will use the Site TV, LMC, periodic Captain's Calls and such tools as the Plan of the Day. When I know, you will know.

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21. On the Appearance of the Ship and Cleanliness. First impressions of the ship, in addition to personal courtesy are most often built upon the visitor's impressions of the ship's seamanship appearance and general cleanliness. Our standards will be an immaculate appearance, both topside and inside the ship. Every space should be ready to "show off" to a visitor at all times. We should never have to go into a "crisis mode" to prepare for a distinguished visitor; rather, our standards will be such that we are always ready to receive outside visitors. Run we must; shine we will.

22. Keep me Informed. To plan and direct the near and long-term activities of CALLAGHAN, I need to understand completely the capabilities and limitations of the ship. In order to do this, I need continual feedback from the chain of command. I do not like surprises. I need to know everything related to the ability of CALLAGHAN to fight, in all her missions areas. If you are in doubt whether I would want to know something -- pass it up the chain of command. Err in excess -- you will not be able to tell me too much. In particular, let me know where there's an area where I need to apply my influences "outside the lifelines" to help someone in the ship to do his job.

23. On Watchstanding. I expect all watches to be stood in a proper and formal manner. We stand no unimportant watches! For example, most "disasters" that occur to Navy ships in port are directly attributable to sloppy watchstanding procedures -- like flooded spaces unnoticed by Sounding and Security or Cold Iron Watches. When on watch, know your duties and carry them out to the best of your abilities. Take pride in doing a job well done -- its important.

24. On Supervision and Following Up. It is the responsibility of men in leadership positions in CALLAGHAN not only to supervise the work of the men under them, but to follow up on the proper execution of orders made. Proper supervision and follow-up can not be conducted from the Wardroom, Chief's quarters or First Class lounge. I expect the leadership of the CALLAGHAN to be visible and available in their working spaces often throughout the working day. Such attention to detail is vital if our efforts are to be done the right way the first time -- rather than supervise only after inexperienced men have made a preventable mistake had there been proper supervision in the first place. Management without proper supervision and follow-up is one of the primary causes of "crisis management." Don't let it happen to your workcenter.

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25. On the Chain of Command. The chain of command must work up as well as down the line. The command will provide help to any crewmember or dependant who seeks it. Each member of the crew is encouraged to keep his superiors advised of problems that he may be facing. Each man should feel free to discuss personal problems with me or others in the chain of command at any time. If you need to discuss personal matters, matters of official nature, or to air a grievance, I urge you to apply for request mast via the chain of command if you feel that the chain of command is not responding effectively. The chain of command requires the cooperation of all hands to work properly. Without it, a warship cannot function in combat.

26. Personal Qualities I Value. The following are a few personal leadership qualities which I particularly value, and look for in each man in a leadership position.

- Loyalty
- Military Bearing
- Intelligence
- Judgement
- Initiative
- Force
- Moral Courage
- Cooperation
- Perseverance
- Stability under Adversity
- Endurance
- Industry
- Enthusiasm

27. Things I will not Tolerate. The following are a few of the things I will not tolerate as Commanding Officer:

- Sloppy or informal watchstanding
- Disrespect to a superior (or any other crew member)
- Disobedience of a lawful order
- Any form of drug abuse, including alcohol abuse
- Anything other than professional and gentlemanly behavior ashore
- Any form of discrimination -- religious, racial or otherwise
- PMS gundecking
- Lying, cheating or stealing
- Initiations not approved by me.

28. Things I don't Like. The following are a few things I don't like as a naval officer and that all hands should strive to avoid:

- Unauthorized absence or lateness
- Laziness or shirking of assigned duties
- Dirty spaces
- Unshined brightwork
- Sloppy, dirty uniforms
- Sloppy paperwork
- Shaggy hair
- Water and oil in bilges (or any place else where it does not belong)
- Incomplete homework, sloppy preparation
- Uncooperative attitudes

29. Summary Thoughts. In summary, to make CALLAGHAN an effective, efficient warship, we must:

- Operate CALLAGHAN smartly and skillfully, meeting every import and operational commitment on time
- Exercise every design capability regularly
- Be ready for combat on short notice
- Maintain CALLAGHAN in the highest possible state of material and training readiness
- For each man in the crew, actively encourage personal and professional growth; provide each man and his family with fair and human treatment
- Retain every crew member who meets our high standards of naval service.

I expect every member of the crew to:

- Develop the practice of initiative -- doing the right thing without having to be told
- Develop and exercise leadership, including setting a good example for others
- Use standard procedures, the ship's organization and the chain of command to get things done
- Delegate responsibility to those who can do the job
- Exercise authority at the lowest possible level
- Never exceed the boundaries of safety -- only I can order that


30. As I mentioned in my remarks at the change of command, I am proud and honored to be a member of the crew of USS CALLAGHAN. The men of CALLAGHAN have proven themselves as first-rate

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destroyermen and proud professionals. I intend for us to continue that great tradition. Our duty in the Persian Gulf is fast approaching. We will be ready.

Respectfully,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David M. Ryan".

David M. Ryan



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL MEDICAL CLINIC

BOX 121

PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-5080

.21 Jun 94

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Medical Clinic, Pearl Harbor
To: All Naval Medical Clinic Personnel

Subj: POLICY STATEMENT ON HAZING

1. I want to be sure that each person in this command is aware that hazing is not and never will be allowed at this command or to any member of this command.
2. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Boorda, USN, has said it very clearly: "There are to be no hazing incidents in our Navy." If an incident occurs, I will have it investigated and take quick action to deliver appropriate punishment to those found guilty.
3. Hazing is when a newcomer, a newly promoted person, or anyone is subjected to pranks or humiliating horseplay. Regardless of the reasons for this activity in the past, it has ended! There will be no hazing. This policy applies to all staff members whether on or off duty, whether civilian or military.
4. If you are subjected to hazing or witness hazing, you are to stop it and report it through your chain of command. The report of hazing must be delivered to me that same day. I consider failure to report hazing the same as cooperating with and condoning the incident. The location of the hazing is irrelevant. Hazing is forbidden regardless of where it occurs.


P. J. BARNETT



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL MEDICAL CLINIC
BOX 121
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96350-5380

19 Nov 1992

From: Commanding Officer
To: All Naval Medical Clinic Personnel

Subj: SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH POLICY

1. The personnel of the Naval Medical Clinic are our most valuable asset. Injury or illness to any employee has a serious and multifaceted impact on all of us and the accomplishment of our mission.
2. We must strive to establish and maintain workplaces for our workforce which are free from hazards and conditions that may result in injury or destruction of property. In order for such working conditions to exist, each person assigned to the command, military and civilian alike, must make safety and health concerns part of their daily routine and make a conscious, deliberate effort to review each task and project in the interest of mishap prevention and employee well-being.
3. As Commanding Officer, I urge each and everyone of you to review your responsibilities in the Occupational Safety and Health Program and place them among your highest priorities. Under no circumstances shall a worker be subjected to restraint, interference, coercion, discrimination or reprisal for exercising his/her rights under the safety and health program.
4. Copies of NAVOSH standards, records of safety and health committee meetings, annual mishap summaries, safety training records, and other pertinent NAVOSH information are available upon request from the Command Safety Manager.
5. I look for your full and enthusiastic support of the NAVOSH program. Our safety and well-being depend on it.


J. BARNETT



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL MEDICAL CLINIC

BOX 121

PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96360-5080

20 Mar 93

From: Commanding Officer
To: All Naval Medical Clinic Personnel


Subj: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
POLICY STATEMENT

1. The Equal Opportunity (EO) (military)/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) (civilian) programs are an integral part of the Department of the Navy and Naval Medical Clinic, Pearl Harbor. My policy for EO/EEO is simple. No individual or groups of individuals will be denied any opportunity because of race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, or physical or mental handicapping conditions. EO/EEO are fundamentally sound management practices that help fully utilize and develop employees' capabilities. To act in any other manner would be a waste of human resources and a violation of an individual's rights that will not be tolerated.

2. I fully support these programs and am committed to achieving a fully integrated workforce. When equal opportunity is the standard, each manager and supervisor will support this policy and be responsible for ensuring equal opportunity for all command members. Equal opportunity must be a team effort to be successful. The work environment and quality of life in the workplace must provide an atmosphere conducive to a professional, harmonious, and productive working relationship.

3. As the EEO Officer, I am responsible for the implementation of this program. I expect every member of the Naval Medical Clinic, Pearl Harbor to understand this policy, cooperate fully during complaint resolution, and base personnel actions on merit and fairness.

4. We must maintain a continuing awareness of equal opportunity and affirmative employment goals. I task each of you to assist me in ensuring that, without exception, equal opportunity will have top priority throughout this command.


F. J. BARNETT



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL MEDICAL CLINIC

BOX 121

PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96360-5080

17 Dec 92

From: Commanding Officer
To: All Naval Medical Clinic Personnel

Subj: PREVENTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY STATEMENT

1. As Commanding Officer, Naval Medical Clinic, Pearl Harbor, I am personally committed to providing a work environment free of sexual harassment and will not tolerate any behavior that does not treat every command member and our customers with the human dignity they deserve.
2. Sexual harassment is an infringement of an employee's right to work in an environment free from unwanted sexual attention or sexual pressure. It is a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
 - a. Submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay or career; or
 - b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person; or
 - c. Such conduct interferes with an individual's performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.
3. Regrettably, sexual harassment occurs in many institutions and societies. But we, you and I, must be concerned about what happens inside our medical facilities. Sexual harassment affects our performance. It denies some of our people the chance to do their best. It demeans victims, and tarnishes our reputation as fair, hard working professionals. Processing for administrative separation will be mandatory for those found to have committed certain aggravated acts of sexual harassment. Administrative separation will also be considered for personnel who repeatedly commit less aggravated acts of sexual harassment.
4. Local training is of the highest quality, and all personnel, military, civilian, and contract, will receive annual sexual harassment training. Naval Medical Clinic, Pearl Harbor will also ensure Navy grievance and complaint procedures are well publicized, and those in leadership positions respond quickly and appropriately to sexual harassment complaints. All personnel in this command have the right, and the responsibility, to report all incidents of sexual harassment without fear of reprisal.
5. My policy is to treat others as you would like to be treated, be professional, and show kindness and courtesy in accomplishing our mission. Sexual harassment violates this policy. I expect all personnel to fully support this policy and help eliminate sexual harassment.


J. E. BARNETT



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SCHOOL OF HEALTH SCIENCES
BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20889-5611

IN REPLY REFER TO

7 JUL 95

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM

To: Faculty and Staff, Naval School of Health Sciences

Subj: COMMANDING OFFICER'S PHILOSOPHY AND EXPECTATIONS

1. As Command of the Naval School of Health Sciences is placed in my hands, I thought it important to clearly explain my philosophy and goals. This gives you an opportunity to know how I think on a variety of topics and how I will react to events as they occur. After reading this you will have an understanding of what I expect of you, and more importantly, what you can expect from me.

2. In summary, our job as teachers, instructors, and leaders is to unlock the creative genius in each person, beginning with ourselves. We create an enthusiasm for learning that will last a lifetime.

Battle Readiness: The reason we exist is to keep combatants fit to fight. We run a complex organization that requires flexibility, initiative, and intelligence to keep Sailors and Marines and their family members healthy. We must be on the cutting edge of medicine and leadership to accomplish this. We have a part in making sure when the Sailors and Marines entrusted to our care are called upon to sail into harm's way they return home safely.

Intelligence: The faculty of the Naval School of Health Sciences is hand picked and called upon to perform a duty that carries with it extraordinary responsibility. This does not mean a high IQ. It does mean: "The ability to learn or understand; to deal with new or trying situations." We never stop learning; we never stop trying to understand better; and we always use our creative abilities to break new ground.

Operational Readiness: This begins with our personal readiness. We must be examples of physical fitness, exhibit a positive attitude even in crisis, demonstrate good moral character, and be constantly on the search for new knowledge. Once this is part of our very being, we can pass the enthusiasm on to others.

Teaching: Teaching is hard work. It takes eight hours to prepare for one hour before a class. The teacher is a guide who leads people to understanding. The teacher excites the class to learn and keep on learning. The teacher entertains, cajoles, and humors people to make learning more palatable. The teacher is the image of what is being taught.

People: We are more than just people; we are friends, we are colleagues, we are the Faculty of the Naval School of Health Sciences, Bethesda! What an honor this is for each of us. As friends we look for ways to help each other. As colleagues, we strengthen each other through professional improvement. As a faculty, we excel through a common vision and the satisfaction of being part of a world class team.

Subj: COMMANDING OFFICER'S PHILOSOPHY AND EXPECTATIONS

Integrity: We have a firm adherence to the high moral and ethical standards developed by our Naval leaders over the past one hundred years. We stand on a firm foundation built on the lives and sacrifices of our predecessors in the Navy and Marine Corps. We will not let them down.

Responsibility: There are no walls constructed around responsibility. We are free to take on as much responsibility as we like. Responsibility is an endless reservoir of opportunity. The more we take, the more there is to take. We get involved because we thrive on being responsible and in creating a better place in which to work.

Honesty: Our conduct is like a pure glass window. We have no hidden agenda or motives when we do business. We are straightforward, incorruptible, and trustworthy.

Success: We do not strive for personal success, for this is usually self serving; rather, we strive to be of service to others. In this way we are guaranteed success.

Humor: We love humor. It is humor that makes us see the bright side of life and often picks up our spirits in the face of crisis. Humor is very effective in helping people learn. But we will never cross the line into harassment or hazing. Humor can never be at the expense of another's dignity and worth.

Courtesy: Courtesy towards another lets them know we respect their dignity. We always take the extra moment to extend our courtesy to those we meet and work with. Harmonious relationships are born out of respect and kindness. These are active behaviors, requiring our vigilance to see opportunities where we didn't notice them before.

Contribution: As faculty members we have a special obligation to contribute in a special way to the Navy Medical Department. We do this through articles, lectures, conventions, and research. Each of us must plan to contribute in a special way that fits our abilities and interests.

Alcohol and Illicit Drugs: Abuse of alcohol and the use of illicit drugs has brought disgrace to the Navy and Marine Corps for years. We are personally responsible for our own behavior with these, we are also obligated to address this issue at every opportunity. We help those who seek our assistance and separate those determined to be abusive.

Affairs and Fraternization: The Faculty does not date, have sexual affairs or fraternize with students nor fraternize with other faculty members. We have the utmost respect for the sanctity of marriage and will never interfere with the wholesome relationship of a married couple.

Subj: COMMANDING OFFICER'S PHILOSOPHY AND EXPECTATIONS

Loalty: We are faithful to the Surgeon General's vision for Navy Medicine. Our personal opinions and ideas can be expressed only in the appropriate environment. As faculty members we represent the Surgeon General, so in the classroom our expression of support is unquestioned.

Work: Work should be enjoyable. Part of my task is to make sure the faculty and staff have a work environment conducive to optimizing personal contributions to our mission. We should look forward to coming to work each day. We are teachers and leaders of the finest men and women in America. This is at once an awesome responsibility and an honor. If work is not fun, then we're doing something wrong.

Recognition: It is the faculty that receives the applause, the accolades, the great reviews; while the support staff work on quietly behind the scenes, out of ear shot of the clamor of praise. If we are successful on the podium, it is because the staff that supports us has been magnificent. We must show our appreciation to them on a regular basis.

Practice What We Teach: We teach Total Quality Leadership. We will not only be the front runners in expounding this approach to leadership, we will be using TQL principles in all that we do.

Command Pride: As faculty and staff of the Naval School of Health Sciences, we are set apart because of a proven track record of excellence. But even excellence can be improved upon. Our pride rests in the fact that we are never at rest. Wherever we go, on or off duty we are cognizant of who we are and who we represent. This is not arrogant pride, but one that is grounded in service and dedication to our profession.

3. The above reflects my beliefs in what we are and what principles I expect we all share as a Command. I look forward to two years of growth for all of us.


HARRY S. COFFEY

"PLAY AT THE LINE"

MISSION: Deploy worldwide within 24 of hours of notification to conduct operations in support of national level tasking.

Everything You Would Have Known Had I Been XO.....!

SPECIAL PROJECTS: SPECIAL PRODUCTS

Two commands in the Navy produce our "deliverable". VPU-1 brings to the table unique technology....but much more critically, **SPECIAL PEOPLE**. We pay a serious price to do the **SPECIAL** range of things we do....but that is a price that the Navy, and we choose to pay. The price includes significant expertise outside the "conventional" Naval spectrum. We are **SPECIAL** because we work at being **SPECIAL**, with unique skills. We cannot afford, nor can our customers afford, any atrophy of our skills. Our edge is perishable, we must keep it sharp. Lives depend on it.

BE LIKE BATH IRON WORKS!

(UPI) Our neighbors at BATH IRON WORKS had a saying throughout their production run of FFG-7 class frigates: "on time and under budget." The FFGs produced in Maine had a well deserved reputation as being the best built. As the ships returned from sea trials, the yard workers routinely met the ship to receive feedback on how the at sea period went. BATH was committed to building quality warships....from the pipefitters to the electricians, everyone understood the mission and where the product was going. Understand our mission and where we are going!

Loyalty

Be committed to your family, your country, our Navy and yourself. **YOU CAN BANK ON MY PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT.** In turn, I expect you to support our command.

during the next twelve months that will be at your contemporaries expense that is worth having. I fully expect each of us to support unequivocally our subordinates, fellow officers, and the command. If you make someone else look good, you are looking better! The converse is also true.

Time....But not to Waste!

Time is an ally to the organized and an enemy to the unprepared. Time is to be valued and conserved....and should drive us to do things right the first time....simply to avoid doing things a second time.

Every facet of our lives competes for our time. Families, the squadron, and ourselves all deserve a measure of our time. The better job you do planning your time, the more discretionary time you will have. I will respect your time....and will expect you to return that respect for time throughout the chain of command.

HOLD 'EM OR FOLD 'EM

How safely we operate is a function of our individual and collective courage and judgment. We must have the courage to make the tough safety call, be it reminding our people to put on their cranials, or throwing the red flag about an impending crisis. Judgment. Judgment is deciding that an accumulation of inflight aircraft problems merits going home. Judgment is knowing when to push and when not to. Courage and safety....need an example? This past spring the Blue Angel skipper decided to cancel a couple of performances due to his safety concerns. A courageous decision by any measure. Bad visibility? NO! Good judgment? By my standards, YES.

Be Nice: No Extra Charge

There is no substitute for teamwork. There is nothing that you will achieve

Important Things Not To Do

Here is a short list of things I want not to happen in our command. As you peruse the list, keep three things in mind. First, the list is in no specific order. Second, it is my considered opinion that we are our shipmates keeper. Third, I hope none of these problems develop. If you are unsure where I stand....ASK!

1. Drinking and Driving. Call the duty office for a ride. No questions asked. If you can't get them, call me. We cannot afford to lose a single person.
2. Drug Use. I have absolutely zero, repeat zero tolerance for abuse of controlled substances. Read my bio. I am confident that I know more about the cocaine, marijuana, and opium dangers than most. Remember, zero tolerance.
3. Tell the truth. A direct question merits a direct answer. I don't know is acceptable, if you don't know. The taxpayers have a right to an absolute level of integrity with respect to our use of public funds. We will not let them down.
4. Abuse within a Family. No man (or woman) can love his (or her) children so well as to love their spouse, if you need help get it, and feel confident the command will support your efforts....our business is not so pressing that we cannot support our families. A corollary, no one stands so tall as when they stoop to help a child.

Tactical Integrity

Within the entire Department of Defense no one can make the tough calls like we can make them. But Know What You Know, Know What You Don't Know and Know The Difference. I will not allow you to be second guessed on station.

Take Care of Our People

This is the final entry....and the most important. Total command involvement in workplace environment, pay problems, family issues, and supporting our squadron mates in every issue is what separates us from GENERAL MOTORS or IBM. I need your support and charge every within the chain of command with ensuring we are ready for advancement, warfare qualification and deploying for combat. Our people can ask no more....we can do no less. To that end, when in Brunswick, I expect to be personally notified of every squadron member reporting aboard. I will see that person, Officer or Enlisted within 24 hours of their arrival. I expect your welcomes to be no less enthusiastic. ONE TEAM, ONE FIGHT!

A FINAL WORD.....

This newsletter covers a lot of ground. As your commanding officer I want you to understand how I feel on key issues immediately. I am committed to a seamless transition in command to keep us combat ready and build on the success VPU-1 has enjoyed in the past.

I can promise you two things. First, during my command I expect every member of the command to make a commitment to grow personally and professionally. Our command's success will be a function of the contributions of every member of our squadron....every department, division and workcenter. Every success we enjoy will be attributable to our entire command. ONE TEAM, ONE FIGHT.

Second, we are responsible for each other, at home, deployed, in peace and combat. do not let your shipmates down. Finally, my door is always open, I look forward to getting to know you as we work together. In all issues, in every situation, you are not alone. ONE TEAM, ONE FIGHT.

Administratively Speaking

Paperwork. Recognize this, our ability to moderate our administrative stress is a function of our collective ability to complete our work on time. Quality paperwork could be defined as simply work which only had to be done once. Better yet, if you do the job right first time up, you are able to move on to something else. Do not abandon people or programs because the paperwork is too hard. Get it done, take on the "systemic problems" and win.

Chain of Command

What shall we pick, chaos or order? I pick order. To best support our people, we will support the chain of command. I fully intend to "walk-about" and "work the room"—but every issue that comes north to me VFR direct will get the same initial response: What did the XO say? What is the Department Head cut? Command Senior Chief? Division Officer and Chief? Shop Chief? LPO? There is simply too much talent in our command to not give every level of the chain a chance to work the issue, chop the package. Staffing (read sharing) your idea/problem issue ensures that we have a fully supportable solution and will likely get us there faster!

Footnote: In particularly sensitive issues, sexual harassment, EO, verbal/physical abuse every member of the command should feel wholly comfortable going to any and every level of the chain of command to allow us to rectify the situation.

Did You Do Something Wrong?

Ask these three questions:

1. Did you do it thinking it was right, within NATOPS etc.? If so, you are golden, that is the kind of thing that steepens the learning curve. No foul.
2. Did you do it not knowing if it was right and did not bother to check? You can certainly count on being corrected, but not crucified. At least the first time!
3. Did you do it knowing it was wrong, and figured it did not matter or no one would find out? Stand by for heavy seas.

The Bureau of Naval

Personnel, NMPC (Bloopers)

Nobody, but nobody, (except maybe you) is more interested in your next assignment than I am. Let the chain of command through the XO and I know what you want to do early so we can support you. Through the late summer and early fall I worked this issue with the OPNAV staff and VP-30. Post-VPU talent is in demand throughout the Navy!

Physical Fitness

There are many reasons to be physically fit, personal health, stamina, and a mid-day mental pick-me-up. Maybe even beat the Navy out of a few extra retirement checks... Whatever the motive, ensure you are ready for the PRT. Everybody that beats me uses my parking space for a day...sign up in Admin!

Security

There are enough secrets in our spaces to keep every JAG officer on active duty busy doing Article 32 investigations until the year 2015. Let's not give them the opportunity. Caring for classified is a matter of professionalism. Nuff said.

BOOK REVIEW:

THERE IS MORE TO LIFE THAN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED

Fields of Fire: A novel written by former SECNAV James Webb about a platoon of Marines in Viet Nam. Provides insight into moral dilemmas of loyalty and moral courage.
Killer Angels: A novel by Michael Shazara about the battle of Gettysburg. Provides insight into decision making and risk taking.

A SAMPLE MEMORANDUM TO OFFICERS
ON THE CAPTAIN'S POLICIES

This memorandum was issued to the officers of the USS *Clark* at about the time of her shakedown after commissioning in 1936, by Commander (later Vice Admiral) L. E. Thebaud:

At this time when we are commissioning a new ship and all starting fresh on a clean slate, practically strangers to one another, it may be of value to you to have some idea of the point of view, likes and dislikes, desires and peculiarities of your commanding officer.

Accordingly, I have set forth below a few observations, some original, some not, in the hope that they may give you a helpful insight into my philosophy of naval life.

A ship cannot be imagined without organized leadership. It is obvious that the first essential in any military body is an established system as it exists in the Navy. We are backed up by all the machinery of law, regulations, and custom. They help a lot, but such things are only externals - means toward an end. Obedience itself is not the object. It is only a step toward the end - a necessary step, but it should be a demonstration of willingness and not an evidence of compulsion. The end sought is the co-ordination of individual strength to produce the maximum concentrated effort toward the accomplishment of the object in view.

We shall never be leaders as long as our men are giving only the measure of obedience compelled by law. We shall be leaders only when our men look up to us with confidence, when they are anxious to know our wishes, eager to win our praise, and ready to jump at a word from us in the execution of our orders regardless of whether they think them right or wrong.

How is this to be done? How can we arouse this sentiment in the men of this ship? The answer is simple, but the practice is difficult: *By setting the example. By practicing what we preach.*

In the morning when we appear on deck let us think what we would like every man in the crew to be and then let us try to be that man ourselves. Men unconsciously imitate their officers. We stand before them constantly as examples. If we are military, smart, decisive in our bearing, they will brace up and try to be like us. But if we are sloppy, careless, and seem congenitally suffering from that "tired feeling," no amount of nagging will make the men otherwise. If we are active, energetic, enthusiastic, and perhaps best of all, *cheerful*, our example will be contagious.

A ship, like the navy, is as good as the men in that ship - no better.

Officers can guide, can influence, can mold men. But whether their efforts are successful depends upon the officers setting the very best example in everything and *practicing what they preach*. There is scarcely anything more infamous, more destructive of discipline and loyalty, than the officer whose philosophy of life is based on the principle of "Don't do as I do, do as I say."

Know the practical business of going to sea. The examination papers of many officers reveal the fact that while they are able to make a diagram of a radio set or sketch of a Diesel engine, they are often deplorably deficient in elementary seamanship, in rules of the road, the different kinds of buoys, and how to lower or hook on a boat in a seaway. Whatever your technical qualifications, you must be a good sailorman. I want you to know more about every man and everything in your department or part of the ship than any man in it. Know where the fire plugs are, and spanners, nozzles, magazine floods, water-tight doors, and how to handle them. Know where everything is stowed. I want every officer in the ship personally and without assistance to be able to veer chain, let go an anchor, put on a stopper, and heave in. In case of fire, collision, or other emergency, lead your men through knowledge acquired beforehand. Be able to take charge, and when you are in charge, then be in charge. You know theoretically far more than any enlisted man. The same is true of all graduates of the Naval Academy. Yet you have seen, as I have seen, a lot of officers around like tailors' dummies, afraid they might be mistaken.

If your powers of general observation are not of the best, develop them by conscientious training. When you go up to topside or walk about the decks learn instinctively to look around. Drill yourself constantly until you notice without effort and make a mental note of such things as the direction of the wind, whether or not it is freshening or the sky becoming overcast, the absence of the admiral's flag from the ship where it usually flies, that some ship has gone alongside the tanker, that another is painting or preparing to weigh, and so on. And in this process don't forget the Clath. If you see lines or swabs hanging over the side or the colors are foul, don't pass it all up because you are not on duty - do something about it. We are all on duty 24-hours a day, although not necessarily at all times engaged in executive duty. And in this connection if you return aboard at 0311 and fail to see the Petty Officer of the Deck, don't turn in and forget it because you're not on watch and it's not your pigeon anyhow. If you do you're infinitely more remiss in your duty than was the P.O.D. in being in the fireroom or on the bridge over a bowl of coffee.

It is not how much ability an officer has, but how well he uses what he *does* have that determines his value to the Navy.

A man's character expresses itself in everything he does.

It is said that "responsibility makes cowards of us all." How many of us are but too inclined to criticize and hold forth on what we would do were we in so-and-so's billet. Yet when we actually do step into his shoes and shoulder the responsibility for the success or failure of operations which seemed so simple from the outside looking in, we find this responsibility so discouraging to our dash and conceit that we only too frequently follow the path of least resistance - excessive caution.

Any fool can criticize. Most fools do.

Don't nag your men; don't neglect them; don't coddle them; don't play the clown.

Almost any man with brains can run a reasonably well designed piece

of machinery, but it takes a lot more brains successfully and continuously to run the human machinery.

Let no man leave an interview with you with a feeling of resentment in his heart.

I want you to feel the same responsibility when the man breaks down and fails that you do when the machine gets out of adjustment. I want you to use the same observation, attention, and care with the man that you do with the machine. I want you to study the human failure just as you examine the reasons for a mechanical failure. I want you to feel a personal pride in the man who, under your command, becomes a self-respecting, upstanding man-of-war's man, just as you feel a personal sense of failure for the unfortunate who becomes a deserter and a bum. I ask you to undertake your solution of the human problem with the firm belief that the personnel you are given to control and lead can be ruined or perfected, by your own individual efforts, by your own observation, foresight, care, and intelligence.

Never give an order that cannot be enforced. Never give an order that is not likely to be obeyed unless you yourself intend to see that it is obeyed!

Remember that you are by no means your own master nor even entirely your own property, and that anything you may do to bring temporary discredit on yourself may bring lasting discredit on the United States.

No important question should ever be decided without considering primarily its effects on the efficiency of this ship for war.

Know when to say *no* and have the guts to do so.

In handling men it is well to remember that often it is not so much what you do as how you do it that counts.

Cultivate a personality that will inspire obedience. You will recall those teachers at school who could keep a large roomful of boys quiet and orderly merely by an occasional glance round, while others were in a continual state of apprehension; dispensing punishments broadcast; and the tumult increased in direct proportions to the impositions inflicted. Cultivate a personality. The ingredients are: a calm demeanor, a voice and temper under perfect control, a firm conviction of the righteousness of your cause, and a fixed determination to see that cause triumph. And you *must* know what you're talking about.

Discipline is impossible without silence. So is efficiency. Whenever a general exercise such as coming alongside, casting off, inspecting the liberty party, handling stores, paying off, or the like, is in progress, *insist* on absolute silence except from those giving the necessary orders.

In matters of personal bearing, uniform, and so on, I shall expect you to be guided by my example. There are certain practices to which I strongly object. They are:

1. Failing smartly to return salutes rendered you.
2. The wearing of dirty, spotted, torn, or frayed uniforms at any time except when working on greasy machinery.
3. Lounging in the wardroom in a soiled uniform or out of uniform.
4. Pacing or lounging on the weather decks with hands in trouser pockets. If your hands are cold put them in your blouse or

jacket side pockets. It does not look unseamanlike and that is what the jacket pockets are for.

5. Chewing gum at any time in uniform.
6. Leaning over or against the life lines or against anything on the weather decks thereby telling the world that one is a victim of that "tired feeling."
7. Needing a shave after 0800.
8. Any kind of cheap, vulgar, uncultivated talk, especially to or in the presence of an enlisted man.
9. Pencils and fountain pens in sight in uniform outside breast pockets.
10. He who suddenly bursts into a frenzy of energy and zeal when unexpectedly he finds himself under the eye of the captain.

At sea in matters of uniform take your cue from me.

Avoid, as you would the plague, hostile criticism of authority, or even facetious or thoughtless criticism that has no hostile intent. One naval truism states that "Destructive criticism that is born in officers' messes will soon spread through the ship and completely kill the ship spirit."

Admiral Lord Jervis said: "Discipline begins in the wardroom. I dread not the seamen. It is the *indiscreet* conversations of the officers and their *presumptuous* discussions of the orders they receive that produce all our ills."

Appendix 1

Adm. E. J. King's philosophy of Command

"CINCLANT SERIAL (053) OF JANUARY 21, 1941

Subject: Exercise of Command—Excess of Detail in Orders and Instructions.

1. I have been concerned for many years over the increasing tendency—now grown almost to "standard practice"—of flag officers and other group commanders to issue orders and instructions in which their subordinates are told "how" as well as "what" to do to such an extent and in such detail that the "Custom of the service" has virtually become the antithesis of that essential element of command—"initiative of the subordinate."

2. We are preparing for—and are now close to—those active operations (commonly called war) which require the exercise and the utilization of the full powers and capabilities of every officer in command status. There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of the several subordinates (to say "what", perhaps "when" and "where", and usually, for their intelligent cooperation, "why"); leaving to them—expecting and requiring of them—the capacity to perform the assigned tasks (to do the "how").

3. If subordinates are deprived—as they now are—of that training and experience which will enable them to act "on their own"—if they do not know, by constant practice, how to exercise "initiative of the subordinate"—if they are reluctant (afraid) to act because they are accustomed to detailed orders and instructions—if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves in their several echelons of command—we shall be in sorry case when the time of "active operations" arrives.

4. The reasons for the current state of affairs—how did we get this way?—are many but among them are four which need mention: first, the "anxiety" of seniors that everything in their commands shall be conducted so correctly and go so smoothly, that none may comment unfavorably; second, those energetic activities of staffs which lead to infringement of (not to say interference with) the functions for which the lower echelons exist; third, the consequent "anxiety" of subordinates lest their exercise of initiative, even in their legitimate spheres, should result in their doing something which may prejudice their selection for promotion; fourth, the habit on the one hand and the expectation on the other of "nursing"

and "being nursed" which lead respectively to the violation of command principles known as "orders to obey orders" and to the admission of incapacity or confusion evidenced by "request instructions."

5. Let us consider certain facts; first, submarines operating submerged are constantly confronted with situations requiring the correct exercise of judgment, decision and action; second, planes, whether operating singly or in company, are even more often called upon to act correctly; third, surface ships entering or leaving port, making a landfall, steaming in thick weather, etc., can and do meet such situations while "acting singly" and, as well, the problems involved in maneuvering in formations and dispositions. Yet these same people—proven competent to do these things without benefit of "advice" from higher up—are, when grown in years and experience to be echelon commanders, all too often not made full use of in conducting the affairs (administrative and operative) of their several echelons—echelons which exist for the purpose of facilitating command.

6. It is essential to extend the knowledge and the practice of "initiative of the subordinate" in principle and in application until they are universal in the exercise of command throughout all the echelons of command. Henceforth, we must all see to it that full use is made of the echelons of command—whether administrative (type) or operative (task)—by habitually framing orders and instructions to echelon commanders so as to tell them 'what to do' but not 'how to do it' unless the particular circumstances so demand.

7. The corollaries of paragraph 6 are:

- (a) adopt the premise that the echelon commanders are competent in their several command echelons unless and until they themselves prove otherwise;
- (b) teach them that they are not only expected to be competent for their several command echelons but that it is required of them that they be competent;
- (c) train them—by guidance and supervision—to exercise foresight, to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves;
- (d) stop 'nursing' them;
- (e) finally, train ourselves to be satisfied with 'acceptable solutions' even though they are not 'staff solutions' or other particular solutions that we ourselves prefer."

"CINCLANT SERIAL (0328) OF APRIL 22, 1941

Subject: Exercise of Command—Correct Use of Initiative.

Reference: My confidential memorandum, serial 053, dated 21 January 1941—Subject 'Exercise of Command—Excess of Detail in Orders and Instructions.'

1. In the three months that have elapsed since the promulgation of the reference, much progress has been made in improving the exercise of command through the regular echelons of command—from forces through groups and units to ships. It has, however, become increasingly evident that correct methods for the exercise of initiative are not yet thoroughly understood—and practiced—by many echelon commanders.

2. The correct exercise of the principle of the initiative is essential to the application of the principle of decentralization. The latter, in turn, is premised on the basic principle known as 'division of labor', which means that each does his own work in his own sphere of action or field of activity.

3. What seems to have been overlooked is that the exercise of initiative as involved in 'division of labor' (as embodied in 'decentralization') not only requires *labor* on the part of those who exercise any degree of command, but, as well and even more particularly, on the part of those who exercise initiative. It also seems to have been overlooked that the correct exercise of initiative is applicable not only to operations but to administration and, as well, to personnel and material matters.

4. (a) Initiative means freedom to act, but it does not mean freedom to disregard or to depart *unilaterally* from standard procedures or practices or instructions. There is no degree of being 'independent' of the other component parts of the whole—the Fleet.

(b) It means freedom to act only after all of one's resources in education, training, experience, skill and *understanding* have been brought to bear on the work in hand.

(c) It requires intense application in order that what is to be done shall be done as a *correlated part of a connected whole*—much as the link of a chain or a gear-wheel in a machine.

5. In order that there may be clearer understanding—and better practice—in the exercise of initiative, the following paraphrase of certain passages in the reference, together with appropriate additions, are enjoined as a guide upon all those concerned in the exercise of initiative:

... active operations (commonly called war) require the exercise and the utilization of the *full powers and capabilities* of every officer in command status;

"Subordinates are to become 'habituated to *think*, to *judge*, to *decide* and to *act* for themselves'";

It requires *hard work*—concentration of powers—to exercise command effectively and, frequently, even harder work to exercise initiative *intelligently*;

When told 'what' to do—make sure that 'how' you do it is effective not only in itself but as an *intelligent, essential and correlated part of a comprehensive and connected whole*."

[The text in this block is extremely faint and illegible due to heavy noise and low contrast. It appears to be a multi-paragraph document, possibly a letter or a report, but no specific words or phrases can be discerned.]





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS HELENA (SSN 725)
FPO AP 96667-2405

28 March 1995

COMMAND POLICY

Our primary mission is threefold; we must sharpen our war fighting skills while maintaining safety in operation, we must develop each crew member professionally and personally and we must maintain the material condition of our ship.

The following items are my command policies and personal philosophies:

INTEGRITY - When you make a written or oral report, I trust you to make it honestly and thoroughly. I count on this to help make my decisions. I do not ask that you never make a mistake, only that you act responsibly and with integrity - our lives depend on it.

PROPOSED ACTIONS - Always propose a course of action when presenting a problem or concern to your supervisor, whether you are a Seaman or an Officer. In this way, you are training yourself to think like your supervisor and you will be able to make decisions in his absence.

MAKE A DIFFERENCE - Make HELENA a better place because you are here. For example, figure out a better way to stow athletic equipment for deployment or volunteer to organize the ship's picnic. If we all carry this attitude into our everyday actions, HELENA will excel beyond all your expectations.

PARTICIPATE - Get involved outside your division. Take on a collateral duty and improve it. You will enhance your professional reputation aboard ship and you will find you get greater personal enjoyment and satisfaction from your tour.

ATTITUDE - Treat others with respect, dignity and how you would want to be treated. I have far more respect for the individual who is trying his best but barely managing than the talented individual who is doing the absolute minimum to get by.

QUALIFICATION - I believe that each crew member should strive to qualify as fast as possible. It should be your top priority until you have qualified in submarines.

UNIFORMS - Wear your uniform with pride and professionalism both in port and underway. You are an ambassador for the Navy and more directly for your shipmates on HELENA.

SPECIAL REQUEST CHITS - I expect chits to be routed and finally acted on within three working days. I will review any chit that is recommended for disapproval.

Our reputation is "**PROUD AND FEARLESS**". Proud to be the best and fearless of the challenges that confront us.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS BIRMINGHAM (SSN 695)
FPO AP 96661-2375

14 December 1995

From: Commanding Officer, USS BIRMINGHAM (SSN-695)

Subj: COMMAND POLICY DURING WESTERN PACIFIC DEPLOYMENT

1. This letter provides my goals and priorities for the men of BIRMINGHAM and expands on my general command policy. These goals must remain clear in everyone's mind and are the keys to our success during deployment.

2. WESTPAC Primary Goals/Priorities:

a. Operate BIRMINGHAM Safely. The goal is unchanged from my general command policy and remains paramount.

b. Mission Accomplishment. While deployed, our ability to complete any assigned operation and respond to any contingency directly reflects on the ship and the U.S. Navy. We must remain flexible and positive about a rapidly changing schedule. Our training program will be upgraded to use all available resources and opportunities to prepare BIRMINGHAM to accomplish all missions.

c. Material Condition. Operating at great distances from maintenance and logistic support requires us to maintain our material condition peaked. "Small" problems can require us to terminate a mission. Our ability to maintain our material condition directly affects (a) and (b) above.

d. ORSE Preparations. The June examination is our next major inspection and proper preparation is essential to superior performance.

e. Good Liberty. I expect every crew member to have safe and enjoyable WESTPAC liberty.

3. Our performance during the POM process has proven that we are capable of accomplishing great deeds on this deployment. This deployment should be memorable and professionally rewarding to every member of the crew. You will make the difference. You are the key to a successful WESTPAC.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

USS BIRMINGHAM (SSN 695)
FPO AP 96661-2375

14 Nov 94

From: Commanding Officer, USS BIRMINGHAM (SSN 695)

Subj: COMMAND POLICY

1. This letter provides my goals and priorities for the men of BIRMINGHAM. As submariners, you will likely be familiar with the topics discussed below. They must remain clear in everyone's mind and are the keys to our success.

2. Primary Goals/Priorities:

a. Operate BIRMINGHAM Safely. Safety of the ship, crew, and equipment is paramount. There is no peacetime requirement that overrides the need to be SAFE.

b. Execute Our Mission. Through thoughtful planning and professional competence we must be ready to smartly carry out missions as various as torpedo firings, ORSE, shallow water operations, or an upkeep to mention just a few.

c. Train to Fight and Win. There are many trouble spots in the Pacific that could quickly generate in hostilities. If called upon to fight, God forbid, we will execute our mission as effectively as we have trained for it. Therefore, plan on using every available opportunity to train to fight and win.

d. Provide Each Crewmember Every Opportunity to Reach His Full Potential. As a BIRMINGHAM crew member you will be provided every reasonable opportunity for personal and professional growth. I encourage you to take advantage of these opportunities as you pursue qualification, leadership assignments, and advancement/promotion.

3. The following represent the foundation of what I expect from you as crew members of BIRMINGHAM:

a. Integrity. A man's word is his bond. Mistakes will occur, be honest and forthright.

b. Responsibility. BIRMINGHAM has awesome capabilities from the nuclear power plant to missile and torpedo systems. The responsibilities involved in the operation and maintenance of the ship are immense. Face them and be accountable for your duties and responsibilities.

c. High Standards. This is the hallmark of the submarine force. Keep your standards high. Work smartly to constantly evaluate and improve the way we do business. Every man on board

Subj: COMMAND POLICY


can help make things better through constructive suggestions and actions. I expect you to be committed to continuous process improvement.

d. Teamwork. Everyone of you is vital to the success of BIRMINGHAM. We back one another up and prevent complacency from creeping into our ship.


e. Follow Procedures. Break them out and use them!

f. Do It Right the First Time. Beginning with effective training and planning, along with the proper personnel and supervision, do the task correctly the first time. We have too much to accomplish to conduct rework or recover from a botched evolution.

4. Being a submariner is demanding. Your tour on BIRMINGHAM will be rewarding and memorable by maintaining a positive outlook and adhering to the above principles. You are essential and vital to the success and safe operation of BIRMINGHAM.



114-23



*If it's worth doing...
It's worth doing right*

NAV  AIR

- Communication
 - Professionalism (*How Safety Fits*)
- Support the Fleet
 - What's expected
 - Flight Test
 - Training
 - ORM / lessons learned
- Flight Test
 - Leadership
- Be Smart
 - Talk to the Troops
- Trust your Judgment
 - Travel
- Test Plans (contract)
 - Independence
- CO/TD Relationship
 - Training
- TCT Relationship
 - Branding
- ERB
 - FitReps
- Reporting
 - Misc.
- Integrity
 - Uniform o' the Day
- DAWIA
 - Education
- SETP and Other Professional Societies.
 - Squadron Parties
- Present Papers

NAF-23

PROFESSIONALISM

P – people, planning
R – responsibility
O – ORM, optimistic
F – fun, family
E – e-mail, education, excellence
S – standards, supervision
S – safety, security
I – integrity, information
O – operational, obligation
N – NATOPS, no-vote, (k)nowledge, nurture, Naval
A – advancement, accountability, aggressive, attitude
L – leadership, loyalty
I – initiative, innovative/imaginative
S – simplicity, standardization
M – mission, motivate, maintenance

NAV  AIR



W-23

- **DUI**
- **Suicide**
- **Force Protection**
- **OPSEC**
- **Take Care of Each Other & your Family**
 - teach, lead
 - recreational safety and safety in the hangar

NAV  AIR




Command Philosophy

Overview

- State of Squadron
- Not a typical fleet squadron
- My maintenance outlook
- E/F challenges
- Our two command goals
- Personal Conduct
- Command Philosophy

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Awesome Squadron


- One of a kind, special squadron
- Mission to “fill to toolbox”
- We get to play with all the new toys (tools)
- PMA-265 “Hornet Buzz” at NAVAIR HQRs
 - majority of “accomplishments” done here
- Harriers/Cobras.... All DT work done here
- T-39.... Special Science & Technology TB



Not your typical fleet squadron!

- 26 aircraft (typically fleet squadron has 10-12)
 - Variety of aircraft
 - Different lots, series, configurations
 - Special Mods
 - Special Instrumentation
 - Many one of a kind aircraft
 - Preservation of these assets critical
- Our uniqueness adds risk of messing up
 - best course: **DO IT BY THE BOOK**
 - If in doubt, **STOP AND ASK**

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My maintenance outlook


- Compare this to professional auto racing team
 - Team hires only the best mechanics in world
 - Cars and stakes very high for team
- Our stakes are much higher
 - We should be very proud and honored that the DoD has entrusted us to maintain and operate these valuable machines
 - You all are the brightest, most professional, and best trained in the business...

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
Continued...

- In this “One Nation under God”
 - On the winning NAVAIR team,
 - In the strongest, most respected Military in the World, defending
 - The wealthiest, most advanced, most powerful country
 - Highest standard of living
- We could all probably make more money working outside of the military, but
 - We choose service to country, to
 - Preserve our freedoms and standard of living,
 - Great personal satisfaction serving an honorable, worthy cause
 - U.S. Military the most respected “business” in United States



E/F Challenges


- Many....
 - First fleet deployment (18E, full toolbox)
 - Upgrade of displays and mission computers
 - New HOL software
 - New jet (like a new car, but different)!



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Bathtub curve



Bottom Line...

Be extra vigilant to watch out for unexpected failures, and question unclear procedures

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Our two Command Goals

- You know them... what are they?

1) Preservation of Assets

- Personnel
- Equipment
- Aircraft

2) Mission accomplishment


- Fill to toolbox

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Personal Conduct

- High standard of personal and professional conduct
 - DRUGS... some “designer drugs” out there
 - You will be exposed to them
 - Need to be educated on them, and their dangers
 - NCIS will be invited to provide a brief on this THREAT
 - ZERO TOLERANCE
 - Alcohol
 - God gave us the freedom to eat and drink freely
 - **Personal responsibility to use good judgment and moderation**
 - Take care of your fellow Dust Devil shipmates
 - Obey to state & federal laws (DUI, underage drinking)




~~Captain's Mast~~

- Most cases historically involve one or both of the above
 - Ask each and everyone to help your fellow Dust Devils to use GOOD JUDGEMENT AND MODERATION
 - My goal = NO Masts
 - Because sailors taking care of each other
 - Smart choices of how to use free time
 - Take advantage of the many MWR activities provided
 - Take advantage of what this area offers
 - Sierra Mountains; hiking, camping, fishing, hunting, skiing
 - gym, golf, tennis, basketball, roller hockey, mountain-biking
 - Historical sites, Death Valley, tours
 - Religious and youth programs, community involvement

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Command Philosophy



- Safety is PARAMOUNT
 - Every man/woman is critical to our mission
 - On and off duty... think safety.
- Take care of your people
 - Know your folks and equipment
 - Develop & Mentor your folks
 - Max training, professional development, advancement
 - Reward your people
- Family unit cornerstone of strength as a Nation
 - Take care of your families
 - Take the leave you have earned.... Rejuvenate, spend quality time with your loved ones, keep your family strong

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Command Philosophy (cont)


- Communication key to success
 - Honest two way communication, frequently
 - without fear of reprisal
 - not a “zero-defect” attitude, admit & learn from mistakes
- Excellence is the standard
 - Execute your roles with honor, integrity, professionalism
 - Environment of mutual respect & equal opportunity
 - Lead by example, look sharp, be a proud Dust Devil
 - Maintain excellent Physical conditioning
- “*Work Hard to Play Hard*”
 - Get the job during normal working hours
 - Enjoy your job.... “*If we are not having fun, we’re not doing it right*”

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Conclusion

- Our mission of “filling the toolbox” is vital to our National Defense and the execution of National Policy....
- Desire a fun, tight, safe, professional, and informed squadron, that gets the job done right.
 - I am committed to ensure each and everyone has
 - resources they need to do their job,
 - knows our goals and the “big picture” plan
 - minimize distractions (getting jerked around)
 - Provide a great shore tour for you and your families



Ready-room Brief

- Continuation of Command Philosophy ...
- Additional areas
 - SOP
 - Flight Schedule
 - FITREPS
 - Communications
 - CNO remarks germane
 - My weaknesses
 - Families, and spouses club
 - Hail and Farewells
 - Awards
 - Command Climate
- Things yet to come...
 - Department specific goals
 - Written Command Philosophy Statement
 - Brief of FITREPS & what boards look for

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SOP

- Don't ask me to waive SOP
- If it needs to be changed, we can pursue improvements, outside of the emotions at the time
- SOP in rewrite now... get inputs in



Flight Schedule

- I take a close, personal interest in the flight schedule
- Keep me informed (SDO, project officers)
- Plan well, then execute your plan
- Flight schedule planning system in work...


NAME	Quals	Hours	Yesterday	Today	Tomorrow
Zulu			████████	████████	
Woody			████████		████████
Doogie			████████	████████	
Lipper			████████	████████	████████
Opus			████████	████████	████████

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FITREPS

- WTS is a great place for competitive FITREPS
- #1 or #2 of X invaluable for boards
- Smart phasing is front office responsibility



- I have no averages.... Detaching O's will start
 - generally, expect starts around 4.0
- Board brief coming soon....



Communications

- Strong 2-way comms very important
 - Open and Frequent
 - AOM, Quarters, staff meetings, e-mails, etc
- What works best for me
 - e-mails
 - I read when ready to receive, digest, respond back
 - If time critical, call then back up with e-mail if needed
 - meet together

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


CNO Remarks

(from the USS Cole incident)

- Not an environment of zero defects
- His test on holding someone accountable
 - Actions in accordance with standards of perf?
 - SOP, NATOPS, OPNAV and test plans germane
- We are all leaders.... LEAD
 - Step forward and make the right & sometime hard decisions at your level
- *The fact that we can make mistakes & learn from them is one of our greatest strengths as a nation and Navy.*


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My Weaknesses


- Many.... But things important as CO
 - Risk taker by nature
 - It will be a personal struggle to say “no”
 - Project oriented... want to see project succeed
 - Must protect the health & welfare of troops
 - If distracted or pre-occupied, not receptive
 - Thinker, Introvert, judgemental (CLC survey)
 - Poor with names

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Family

- Family unit cornerstone of our strength as a nation.
 - I place very high value on our families
 - Take good care of your families
 - Fully support your subordinates to do the same
 - Your families well being comes first
 - If illness or conflict arise, your dismissed to take care of what is most important.... Squadron will wait
 - Take the leave you have earned: rejuvenate, spend quality time with your loved ones, encourage spiritual growth
 - If supported, I would like to do things as a squadron family occasionally...
 - Camping
 - Pig Parties, etc
 - Skiing



Spouses Club

- Important informal command network
 - Critical crisis management resource
 - Invaluable support group for
 - births
 - illnesses, family deaths, hardships
- Also very helpful for command social events
 - Hails and Farewells: location, food, comms

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Hail and Farewells

- For both officer and their spouses
- Positive, sincere, timely welcome
- Thoughtful, meaningful farewell
- Informal and affordable, max participation
- Sponsor programs.... Take them serious
 - really reach out to those you sponsor



Awards


- Max recognition for outstanding service
 - take every opportunity to award performance
 - go for highest reasonable award
 - capture quantitative justification when able
 - Mid-tour encouraged when warranted
- Families will be invited and encouraged to participate (officers and sailors alike)
 - There support is instrumental in your success
 - They really appreciate sharing the recognition
 - Photographer/press will be invited

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Command Climate

- Desire a fun, tight, supportive, and informed squadron
 - If your not having fun as a dust devil, were not doing it right
 - Provide a great shore tour for you and your families
 - Work hard to play hard
 - Be safe on and off duty



Initial Interview Topics – Project Officers

- **Test & Evaluation Environment**
 - ❖ Supervisor(s)
 - ❖ Military Chain of Command
- **Test Planning**
 - ❖ Test Coordination
 - Participants (DT Test Aircrew / OT Aircrew / Ground Teams / Contractors / Ranges, etc.)
 - Identify Logistics Support Requirements (A/C, ordnance, personnel, support organizations)
 - A/C Scheduling and Configuration (strive for > 4 wks)
 - Review Requirements
 - * Loading Checklist Approved prior to 1st Ground Event
 - * Mod Package Approval by the ACCB
 - * Flight Clearance Prior to 1st Flight
 - * Test Plan 1-2 weeks prior to ERB Request via CTE
 - ERB 1 week prior to 1st Flight
 - Signed Flight Clearance Prior to Test Plan Final Approval
 - Test Plan Approved prior to Flight Schedule Entry
 - ❖ Test Plan Instruction (Read this 1st)
 - ❖ Then Apply Your “Original Thought”, avoid Cut & Paste
 - ❖ Involve / Task the Contractor to develop a Single Product
 - ❖ Strive for early Tactical Application, use OA’s and DT Assists
 - ❖ Assertive yet remain Polite & Professional with Civilians / Ktrs
 - ❖ Delegation of Tasks
 - ❖ You are responsible for the Final Draft of the Test Plan
 - Capture Target Conditions of the Test
 - Allowable Deviations
 - Define Test Envelope (Needs to be inside Flt Clearance)
 - Consider Download Options for Configuration Flexibility
 - Be Explicit on Sortie Intentions, Get requests in Early to Schedules
 - Team Assessment of Hazards (Seek Corporate Experience)
 - Be clear on Who Owns What (CFE vs GFE)

□ **Importance of Flight Discipline**

❖ **Flight Leader Responsibility**

- Pre-flight
- In-flight
- Post Flight

❖ **Flight Readiness**

- Highlight concerns wrt Proficiency
- Limited NATOPS Training
(Sims / FRS Guides Available upon request)
- ORM:
 - * Is there something new or different in this mission?
 - * Do I need to accept the existing level of risk?
 - * What can go wrong?
 - * How can I prevent that?
- Do I Understand the Mission and My Role?
- Do All Team / Flight Members Understand the Mission and Their Role?
- Is Everyone Ready to Execute?

□ **Test Execution**

❖ **Training Your Fellow Aircrew**

- System Integration
- Aircraft Displays
- Cautions or Safety Hazards
- Mission Planning Requirements
- Loading / FQ Considerations
(Do this now to Prepare for OPEVAL / Fleet Introduction)

❖ **Briefs / Debriefs: Pass on Ideas for Improvement to your FTE**

- Flight Card Preparation (Directive before Descriptive)
- Room to Write
- Specifics of What to Look or Expect
- Reasonableness of Execution
- Sufficient Time to Plan / Adequate Visual Aids
- Take time to review Tapes if warranted for the Team
- Wrap-up with Deficiency Discovery Summary
and Assign Specific Individuals to enter SARs into D/B

❖ **General Flight Recommendations**

- Walk Early
- Get out of Line and Marshall
- Walk through each System Setup on Deck if Possible

- Start Range Period On-Time
- Prior to Calling 1st Pass: Visually Check Recorders / Display Setup / Review Key Steps and Timeline for the Run
- Extend your Run-In slightly, Pause an extra couple of seconds
- Don't Let the Controller compress the Setup
- Use your Sequence and Course Line Aids
- Have a Backup Area Plan in Mind prior to leaving the Brief
- Talk A lot on the Tape during the run if able
- End of Run, recap on the Tape what you saw, what you didn't see, what concerned you and tactical relevance, capture in shorthand if able
- ❖ Communicating Your Results
 - Daily Reports:
Be specific wrt Testing Conducted / Outcome of the Sortie / Problem Identification (Test Conditions & Configuration if Warranted) / Mission Impact of Problem(s) Discovered / Recommended Solutions
 - Email:
Keep discussions professional / Unemotional / Calls in Advance / Crosscheck with your IPT / PMA on critical issues
 - Keep your CO up-to-date on Safety Issues / Controversial Issues
- ❖ Written Reports:
Used during controversial or time critical programs in which you face opposition on key deficiency correction.
- ❖ Seek Outside Opinions
- **Fleet Introduction of "Your" Product into OPEVAL**
 - ❖ Mission Planning Ready
 - ❖ Training Complete
 - ❖ Support Tools / Publications (Aircrew / O, I and Depot Level)
 - ❖ System Performance Clearly Understood and Presented

□ **Time Management**

❖ Planning:

- Daily
- Weekly
- Quarterly
- Travel
- Aircraft Proficiency
- Personal Time
- Leave
- Career Support Events (FITREPS / Counseling / Boards)

❖ Assessing "Your" Time Management Success

- Can You "Say No"?
- Do you have a Quiet Place to Work?
- Can you execute your Daily Plan 3 days out of 5?

❖ If You need Help – Please Speak Up

□ **Be Cognizant of Different Perspectives**

- ❖ Your Squadron Mates
- ❖ Your Maintenance Control
- ❖ Your PMA
- ❖ Your OTD
- ❖ Your Friends in the Fleet




NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS



Why Are We Here?

- Mishap rate over the past two years has raised concerns.
- We need to learn how to manage risk to prevent future mishaps.
- Define cultural attitude towards safety within the WD workforce.
- Are we providing you with the tools and processes to do your work safely?





Naval Aviation Mishap Rate

FY50-97

776 aircraft
destroyed in
1954

33 aircraft
destroyed in
1998

Angled decks

Aviation Safety Center

Naval Aviation Maintenance Program
(NAMP), 1959

RAG concept initiated

NATOPS Program, 1961

Squadron Safety program

System Safety

Designated Aircraft

ACT

FY98

2.41

50

55


60

65

Fiscal Year


Human Error a Major Problem

**4 of every 5 Navy Service Class A
flight mishaps involve human error.**






No Steady Decrease in Human Error Mishaps



All Navy-Marine Corps Mishaps, CY 1977-92



Human Error In Mishaps, FY95-99





Accident




*The unplanned result of a behavior that
is likely part of an organization's culture.*

1005A

Barriers to Mishaps


Processes are in place to provide multiple
redundant ways to prevent mishaps





Increased Risk

Bypassing processes leaves you more
vulnerable to mishaps



Causes of Risk

- ★ **CHANGE!**
- ★ **Resource constraints**
- ★ **New technology**
- ★ **Complex evolutions**
- ★ **Stress**
- ★ **Feeling of “Invincibility”**




Causes of Risk (cont.)


- ★ **Personal work ethic**
- ★ **Environmental influences**
- ★ **Human nature**
- ★ **Speed, tempo of operation**
- ★ **High energy levels**



Operational Risk Management

- A Decision Making Tool
- Increases Ability to Make Informed Decisions
- Reduces Risks to Acceptable Levels





From CNO


"ORM applies across the entire spectrum of naval activities, from joint operations and fleet exercises to our daily routine. We must encourage top-down interest in the ORM process, from the flag level all the way to the deckplates." --

August 1998




Risk Assessment...

...The process of detecting hazards
and assessing risks.




WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE?

Risk:




Control severity and probability.

Severity:



**The worst consequence
which can occur as a result of a hazard.**



Probability:



**The likelihood that a hazard
will result in a mishap.**



Risk Assessment Matrix


Risk Assessment Code

- 1 = Critical
- 2 = Serious
- 3 = Moderate
- 4 = Minor
- 5 = Negligible

CAT I = Death, Loss of asset.
CAT II = Severe, injury / degradation of asset.
CAT III = Minor, injury degradation of asset.
CAT IV = Minimal, injury degradation of asset.


Probability of Occurrence					
	Likely	Probably	May	Unlikely	
	A	B	C	D	
S E V E R I T Y	Cat I Catastrophic	1	1	2	3
	Cat II Critical	1	2	3	4
	Cat III Marginal	2	3	4	5
	Cat IV Negligible	3	4	5	5

Risk Levels



Navy's Five-Year Goals

- Human error mishaps cut by 50%
- ORM embedded in training pipelines
- All commands have active ORM process
- ORM in foundational documents





Operational Risk Management

Goal:

To optimize operational capability and readiness by managing risk to accomplish the mission with minimal loss.






Operational Risk Management Process

1. Identify Hazards
2. Assess Hazards
3. Make Risk Decisions
4. Implement Controls
5. Supervise

Operational Risk Management



3 - Levels of Application

- Time-critical – On the run consideration of the process.
- Deliberate – Application of the complete process.
- In-depth – Complete process with detailed analysis.

4 - Principles

- Accept risk when benefits outweigh the cost.
- Accept no unnecessary risk.
- Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
- Make risk decisions at the right level.



Operational

Risk

Management

Definite approach

Proactive

Integrates all types of risk into plan; "what if"

Common process/terms

Conscious decision based on risk vs. benefit

VS.

Non-Standard

Approach

Random, hit or miss

Reactive

Safety as after-thought once plan is done


Non-standard


"Can do" regardless of risk



The Benefits of Risk Management

- ★ *Reduction in Serious Injuries and Fatalities.*
- ★ *Reduction in Material and Property Damage.*
- ★ *Effective Mission Accomplishment.*





What ORM Can Save the Navy

Cut human-error mishaps by 50% in
the next five years and we will save:


★ 250 lives

★ \$1 billion



My Personal Philosophy

- * *Everyone* has a “NO” vote.
- * Do not let the customer’s needs force you to bypass safety.
- * Hurry, but don’t rush.





Navy Safety Program

- Six Elements

- Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) (8.4E)

- Explosives Safety (8.4E)

- Aviation Safety (5.6V)

- Nuclear Safety (N/A)

- Traffic Safety (8.4I)

- Off-duty Safety (8.6)




WEAPONS DIVISION SAFETY


CAPTAIN BERT JOHNSTON

COMMANDER

SAFETY OFFICER





WD Safety Organization





WD Safety Council





“Back to Basics”

NAWCWD SAFETY REVIEW...

How do YOU perceive us?

*Have we (corporate leadership) let you down?

*Are we expecting you to perform the impossible?

*Are you still doing more with less?



GOAL

Provide the workforce with the tools and training required to safely and efficiently accomplish our mission.

Determine what the cultural attitude is towards safety.



The Review Team - Your Friends!

Team Lead CDR Scott Sasscer (NAWS OPSO)

*Core Members ... Bill Deem (Head, Safety and
Physical Security)*

Dena Christison (Head, Safety Office)

Dave Ganger (TWP Aviation Safety)

*Terri Olson (Ergonomics /
Explosives Safety)*


Phil Sodergren (ORM Training)

Nick Wiruth (Electrical / Explosives)

Larry Balin (ORM Training)




6 Month Rolling Review Cycle







Current State of 6 Month Rolling Review Cycle



Review Cycle





MID-CYCLE FEEDBACK

- Level 1 and 2 management needs to take a more active role in safety, including the review process.
- There is a perceived fear of using the “no” vote.
- Personal Protective Equipment deficiencies - wrong or no equipment issued.
- Communication issues



Our Next Mishap . . . Can Be Avoided!



- ★ Hurry, Don't Rush
- ★ Plan the Flight...
Fly the Plan
- ★ If Uncomfortable,
Stop!


NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS



ON THE WEB

[Http://on-site.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~imd/all_hands_safety_briefing.htm](http://on-site.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~imd/all_hands_safety_briefing.htm)

NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS



QUESTIONS ?



September 2002



Naval Test Wing Atlantic

Safety Gram



" T.P. SENDS:"

To all Naval Test Wing Team Members- I am extremely proud and at the same time humble to have been selected as the Commanding Officer of this outstanding organization. I want to ensure every one of you that my commitment to safety is absolute. "Gator" has left behind a visible safety program that works. The safety program must be robust; we cannot afford to rest or take a day off when it comes to providing a safe environment to work and operate. I will soon issue a safety policy that will reflect my personal beliefs and philosophy on safety. I can tell you that it will stress personal accountability, professionalism, superb leadership at all levels and an openness to report hazards and exercise the "no vote." I will continue to use the Safety Gram as a way to address each of you on my safety philosophy. Following are my remarks on safety made at the Change of Command Ceremony.

" WE ARE HERE TO DO FLIGHT TEST, SAFE FLIGHT TEST, BUT MORE THAN THAT WE ARE HERE TO DO SAFE FLYING EACH AND EVERY DAY, REGARDLESS OF THE MISSION. OUR JOB IS TO MINIMIZE RISK AT ALL LEVELS FROM THE PLANE CAPTAIN ON THE LINE TO THE SHOP SUPERVISOR, DIVISION CPO, MAINT CPO, AND AIRCREW. MILITARY, GOVERNMENT SERVICE AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WE FORM A TEAM.

DO THE JOB RIGHT, IF YOU ARE NOT SURE, STOP AND ASK QUESTIONS. I'LL PARAPHRASE SOME COMMANDING OFFICER COMMENTS FROM A RECENT MISHAP REPORT I READ:

KNOW YOUR JOB, START WITH THE BASICS AND FIGURE OUT HOW TO MAKE A VERY DANGEROUS BUSINESS SAFER. NO MISSION, BE IT TEST OR PROFICIENCY IS SO IMPORTANT TO BE FLOWN AT THE EXPENSE OF SAFE AND SOUND OPERATING PROCEDURES.

OUR FOLKS ARE OUR GREATEST ASSET. TAKE CARE OF YOURSELVES AND EACH OTHER."

This is our start point - The question is; Where will our journey take us? Just like you, I am unwilling to accept any accident as a cost of doing business. In the coming months I will do my best to listen, investigate and correct safety issues before they become accident statistics. Join me in this endeavor to safeguard our most precious resource - the men and women of this outstanding organization.

" Taking Care of Business "

Thomas P. Phelan
Captain, U.S. Navy
Commander, Naval Test Wing Atlantic

Comments or Questions: Contact Tom Roberts at 342-3425 or robertste@navair.navy.mil or LCDR Bill Patton pattonwr@navair.navy.mil 342-1145.

May 2002



Naval Test Wing Atlantic

SAFETY GRAM



"GATOR SENDS":

Naval aviation is a profession that requires the utmost professionalism from maintainers to pilots. Any compromise in the performance of our duties will have a profound effect on our operations. The recent loss of life during the QF-4 accident at the Point Mugu Air Show demonstrates just how dangerous our profession is. It is too early to know what caused the accident. We must wait on the accident board's report. Like many of you, I have read the newspaper articles that describe numerous performance deficiencies and safety discrepancies in the QF-4 Maintenance Division. I cannot pass judgment on the validity of these articles nor will I cast aspersions on the maintenance program based on these articles.

The articles caused me to question the effectiveness and understanding of the Command Safety Program.

My Command Safety Policy was published 25 May 2000; it establishes the five principles that we must adhere to in order to have an effective Safety Program. The program is built on trust. I trust you to be professional in all of your actions. I trust you to be trained for the tasks that you are assigned to perform. I believe that you will take pride in all of your accomplishments. You must trust the chain of command to act on all of your safety concerns. When it comes to safety, the chain of command works for you. I believe in this policy of mutual trust, all who work with me must share that same belief. Going outside the chain of command has never been a productive method of solving safety-of-flight issues. Safety issues must be brought to the attention of those charged with the authority and responsibility to fix the problem.

This is my philosophy of how the Wing Safety Policy works:

1. Anyone in the chain can use the no-vote without prejudice.

**** This includes military, civilian, and contractor. All are treated the same. It is your duty to exercise the no-vote whenever you believe that an unsafe evolution is about to occur. The no-vote stops the evolution. The Operational Risk Management process will then be used to resolve the issue. There are only two possible outcomes – One is that the appropriate commander accepts the risk or that the risk is mitigated or eliminated. False alarms – All no-votes will be recognized as a good faith no-vote. There will be no reservation or recrimination.**

2. All NTWL personnel are responsible for their safety and for the safety of those they work with.

**** Share lessons learned no matter how embarrassing. Set the example. Think before you act. Don't do anything dumb. Enough said.**

3. All NTWL personnel must be assertive in challenging the actions of others if unsafe practices become apparent.

****Tell it like it is.** This can be one of the most difficult policies to comply with. *You feel that you can't go to your chain of command, so you tell those that you are comfortable with. You go to your competency, union representative, family or friends.* While all of these contacts are important they can do little to fix the problem. If you feel that you cannot use your chain of command use the "Anymouse" policy. Talk to your unit Safety Officer. If you are still uncomfortable, call the Wing Safety or the NAVAIR Safety Office. If you still feel uncomfortable contact the Commander of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division. I can promise you that they will respect your concerns and treat them confidentially.

4. Published standards shall be strictly adhered to and when specific guidelines are absent, conscious use of mature, professional judgment is expected.

****I expect you to do your job. You expect me to do my job.** Implied in this policy is that the publication is correct. If it is not correct, raise the red flag and get it fixed.

5. All flights shall be conducted with all established safety procedures strictly adhered to and conformed with.

****Do not invent or improvise. Do learn and implement.** These rules are here to protect you. If you feel that you must violate a safety rule or procedure – reconsider quickly. There is no room in this organization for those who violate the rules and put people and aircraft at risk.

These comments are annotated in GATOR-VISION.

If we have folks in the wing who have safety-of-flight issues they must be heard by the chain of command. It is the chain of command that has the RESPONSIBILITY and AUTHORITY to initiate corrective actions. All personnel who voice a safety issue will be treated with respect and they will receive a timely response concerning the issue.

"Standing By For Signals"

Colonel Gene Fraser, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander, Naval Test Wing Atlantic

Attached is the Wing Safety Policy. All personnel shall review and comply with the policy.

Comments or Questions: Contact Tom Roberts at 342-3425 or robertste@navair.navy.mil
LCDR Bill Patton at 342-1145 or pattonwr@navair.navy.mil

3700
Ser 55TW01A/138
MAY 25 2000

From: Commander, Naval Test Wing Atlantic
To: Distribution

Subj: NAVAL TEST WING ATLANTIC COMMAND SAFETY POLICY

1. Naval Test Wing Atlantic's (NTWL) primary mission is to be the Navy's principal Atlantic flight and ground test support activity for all naval aviation systems. TEAM-controlled aircraft and aircraft functions engaged in research, development, test, and evaluation of aircraft and aircraft systems; and, to perform such other functions as may be directed by higher authority. I am the head Safety Officer and my office is the safety office. I expect all personnel to act as safety officers to ensure their duties are carried out in the proper manner. We will NOT allow safety to be compromised.
2. Each squadron CO will act as my adjutant safety officer in their respective command. Pride and professionalism in our standards and testing are examples of a command ready and adequately trained to perform their duties. I charge you with ensuring all directives and standards are met and adhered to.
3. Other specific policies are:
 - a. Anyone in the chain can use the no vote without prejudice.
 - b. All NTWL personnel are responsible for their safety and those they work with.
 - c. All NTWL personnel must be assertive in challenging the actions of others if unsafe practices become apparent.
 - d. Published standards shall be strictly adhered to and when specific guidelines are absent, conscious use of the mature, professional judgement is expected.
 - e. All flights shall be conducted with all established safety procedures strictly adhered to and conformed with.
4. The primary responsibility of my safety department is to ensure all safety directives are properly followed and to assist assigned commands when and where needed in safety related matters. You are encouraged to make use of all NTWL assets for the enhancement of safety.

Original signed
E. J. FRASER
COL USMC



SAFETYLINE



THE NAVAL FORCE AIRCRAFT TEST SQUADRON'S SAFETY NEWSLETTER

APRIL 2002

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

- **Safety Pro.**
Orion Test Team Person Named as the Force Safety Pro for the Month of February.
- **Cell Phone Use While Fueling.**
There has been some growing safety concerns regarding cellular telephone usage while fueling your vehicle at the gas station. Certain precautions should be exercised.
- **Reporting of Injuries On and Off the Job.**
When should you report injuries to the Command Safety department?
- **Spring Sports Safety.**
Experts say that many sports injuries can be prevented by systematically addressing the factors that contribute to them by following some basic fitness rules.

AT1(AW/NAC) Christopher M. Harrison Named Force Safety Pro for February

On 15 February 2002, while troubleshooting the internal communication system (ICS) on P-3C aircraft BUNO 158912, you noticed that the chassis on the pilot's side master ICS control box was energized and sparking. You immediately advised the technicians to secure power, eliminating the potential for electrical shock or fire due to the ICS control box's proximity to the aircraft oxygen system. These actions reflected your good judgment and reinforced sound Navy maintenance procedures. Upon further inspection, several broken wires were discovered on the cannon plugs that apply power to the master ICS control box. Your timely reaction, attention to detail, and situational awareness identified this hazardous situation and ensured that the proper safety measures were taken, preventing a serious hazard.

Please accept my sincere appreciation for your outstanding performance. Your dedication to duty and mission accomplishment reflects great credit upon yourself, the Naval Force Aircraft Test Squadron, and the United States Navy. Congratulations on a job "well done."

S. R. Eastburg



Cellular Phone Usage While Fueling



There has been some growing safety concerns regarding cellular telephone usage while fueling your vehicle at the gas station. While there is some speculation and controversy with reports circulating in various publications and email regarding this issue causing this concern, there remains some prudence for safety – ‘better safe than sorry’.

Most of the reports of actual injuries and damage from flash fires caused by a ringing cellular phone during fueling at a gas station come from Asia and Australia with little to none reported from the United States. The explosions are a result of a spark or static electricity created when the phone is in use, rings, or vibrates in the presence of fuel vapors with similar being possible with one and two way pagers. Such similar potential of explosion does exist from static electricity being developed when refueling portable gas cans mandating that the cans be placed on the ground when refilled. Not discounting the potential, the severities of hazards caused from cellular phones in different environments remain inconclusive until additional testing and research can be done. The petroleum and mobile phone industry give cautions in owner’s manuals and pamphlets, but does not make an outright warning regarding this issue. Labeling on most mobile phones and pagers state that the device may have varying degrees of safety in different classes of ‘hazardous’ locations IE: (oxygen, methane, flammable vapor, and dust environments), but is not wholly intrinsically safe ... best not to take a chance.



Most gas stations post signs regarding no cellular phone use during fueling, but enforcement is difficult as no particular laws or regulations are in place regarding this issue. Nevertheless, your not using a cellular phone while fueling a vehicle is a matter of prudence. In general:

- Keep your cell phone and pager switched off at gas stations.
- If expecting an urgent call and the phone or pager cannot be switched off - KEEP IT IN THE VEHICLE - Do not answer a cell phone or use a pager (one or two way) when fueling.



Heed the warnings ... some lessons are best learned without the experience!

Reporting of Injuries On and Off the Job

I had an injury on the job – what should I do???



I had an injury off the job – what should I do???

I had an accident – what should I do???



DON'T delay in obtaining proper medical attention.

When you receive an injury that requires medical attention; keeps you from flying aircrew duties; or were involved in any accident on or off duty (whether or not there were injuries or lost time from work) involving a motor vehicle, motorcycle, boat, or recreational craft, you or your supervisor are required to:

1. Give an initial verbal report of the incident to NAS Safety at 342-4247 within one hour or as soon as practical following the incident day or night - weekend or holiday.
2. Following the verbal report, the injury or accident needs to be reported on the local 'Mishap Investigation' form in Force Safety.

Supervisors in all offices and work centers are **REQUIRED** to report the above if it involves military or civil service personnel. In incidents involving contractors, they are handled and reported locally per their internal company procedures although a courtesy copy of the incident to Force Safety is desired.

Note:

- ♦ Timely reporting of injuries is important. Depending on the cause of the injury, an investigation may be required per OPNAVINST 5100.23 to report the details and events of the incident on the OPNAV Safety Report (SR).
- ♦ Supervisors shall complete the 'Mishap Investigation' form and the SR with information obtained from the injured person or a witness as soon as practical following the incident.

All reports will be submitted to NAS Safety who will investigate and compile information for the formal reports (as necessary) to the Naval Safety Center for Department of the Navy and Department of Defense statistical database.

The information is not to place blame or admit guilt other than record the information to be later analyzed for trends and solutions to prevent or minimize the incident from happening to others and improve equipment or procedures.

If you need any forms and/or assistance to report an injury or accident, please contact the Force Safety Office and we will be happy to assist you. There are local Mishap Investigation forms in the safety magazine rack by the Mid Bay Café.

Spring Sports Safety

Spring is in the air and the flowering pear trees have already bloomed. With spring comes spring sports which often results in injuries. Injuries commonly involve the knees, ankles, lower legs, and hands. The average time lost from work is 22 days.

Three of the most common injuries are ankle sprains, lower back strain, and patellar tendonitis. Ankle injuries are among the most frequent suffered by NBA players and account for 25 percent of all athletic injuries.



BACKGROUND

A review of sports mishaps shows most injuries are caused by lack of conditioning, improper sliding techniques, and collisions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Experts say that many sports injuries can be prevented by systematically addressing the factors that contribute to them. Just follow these basic fitness rules:

- *Get into condition before the season begins.* If you were once in shape but have slacked off for some time, it's important to exercise yourself back into shape before baseball/softball season—and watch that diet! Extra weight can mean extra wear and tear on your muscles and joints.
- *Prepare before each game or practice.* Warm-up stretches are essential. Cool-down stretches after the game also help to prevent injuries.
- *Bone up on basic skills.* Practicing the proper techniques for base running, sliding, throwing, pitching, and other activities can dramatically reduce the likelihood of an injury.
- *Be moderate.* Avoid overuse injuries and other sports-related problems by easing into activities. You can pick up the pace as your body becomes accustomed to the demands of the game, but be careful not to do too much too quickly.



INJURY EXAMPLES

The following are typical of mishap reports submitted to the Naval Safety Center:

- A player made a diving leap at a ball hit to shallow right field. His head impacted the right fielder's leg at full speed causing compression and crushing of three vertebrae. Permanent paralysis of both legs and his right arm cost the Navy a young sailor whose only mistake was to be a little too aggressive chasing down a fly ball.
- While running to the outfield to catch a fly ball, a player and his teammate collided. He fell to the ground and the other player stepped on his leg. He sustained a compound fracture. He lost 48 days from work.
- A player was going after a fly ball and stepped into a hole. He hyperextended his knee, and fractured his leg. He lost 90 days from work.



OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Inspect the playing field before the game for potholes, slippery areas, and obstructions.

- Wear rubber cleats or good quality athletic shoes. Do not wear metal cleats.
- Don't drink alcoholic beverages before or during play.
- Do stretching exercises and warm-ups for 10 to 15 minutes preceding play, as well as between innings.

- Enforce a no-sliding rule during command-sponsored picnics and all pickup games when stationary bases are used.
- Use breakaway or safety bases, which allow the base to absorb the shock from an improper slide to vice the leg, ankle, or foot. Always use proper sliding techniques. Coaches should provide guidance on sliding safely.
- Designate the center fielder to call players off outfield fly balls. In the infield, the shortstop should be assigned this job. These precautions will help collisions.
- Spectators should stay away from sidelines unless fencing material is at least eight feet high. Some people have been seriously injured when struck by overthrown balls while seated in this area.
- Don't tolerate unnecessary horseplay and un-sportsmanlike contact.



On The Air

Accounts of actual exchanges between airline and control towers from around the world:

Taxi for Departure in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida:

During taxi, the crew of a US Air departure flight to Ft. Lauderdale made a wrong turn and came nose to nose with a United 727.

The irate ground controller (a female) lashed out at the US Aircrew screaming "US Air 2771, where are you going? I told you to turn right on Charlie taxiway; you turned right on Delta. Stop right there. I know it's difficult to tell the difference between C's and D's but get it right.

"Continuing her lashing to the embarrassed crew, she was now shouting hysterically, "God, you've screwed everything up; it'll take forever to sort this out. You stay right there and don't move until I tell you to. You can expect progressive taxi instructions in about a half-hour and I want you to go exactly where I tell you, when I tell you, and how I tell you. You got that, US Air 2771???"

The humbled crew responded: "Yes Ma'am."

Naturally, the ground control frequency went terribly silent after the verbal bashing of US Air Flight 2771. No one wanted to engage the irate ground controller in her current state. Tension in every cockpit at LGA was running high.

However, shortly after the controller had finished her admonishment of the U.S. Air crew, an unknown male pilot broke the silence to ask: "Wasn't I married to you once?"

Landing into San Jose, California:

A DC-10 had a exceedingly long roll out after landing with his approach speed just a little too high.

San Jose Tower: "American 751 heavy, turn right at the end, if able. If not able, take the Guadeloupe exit off of Highway 101 and make a right at the light to return to the airport."

Landing into Kansas City, Missouri:

It was a really nice day, right about dusk, and a Piper Malibu was being vectored into a long line of airliners in order to land at Kansas City.

KC Approach: "Malibu three-two-Charlie, you're following a 727, one o'clock and three miles."

Three-two-Charlie: "We've got him. We'll follow him."


KC Approach: "Delta 105, your traffic to follow is a Malibu, eleven o'clock and three miles. Do you have that traffic?"

Delta 105 (long pause and then in a thick southern drawl): "Well...I've got something down there. Can't quite tell if it's a Malibu or a Chevelle, though."



Got an idea to improve Squadron Safety?

If so, then we want to hear from you!

Please call the Safety Officer, LT Jason Harris at 757-3324; the Command Safety Specialist, Mr. John Paust at 757-3325; or the Command Safety Petty Officer, AT1(AW/NAC) Santa Maria at 757-3325. You can email us too. 

We have an open door policy, come visit us!







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General Safety POD Notes

POD Note #1: POSTED SAFETY PRECAUTIONS: All industrial plant equipment, (drills, grinders, etc.), will have operating instructions and safety precautions posted in full view at each piece of equipment.

POD Note #2: All hands are reminded that Safety Hazard Report Forms are available on the _____. These forms are used to report hazardous conditions and practices that could lead to a future mishap. Forms can be submitted anonymously. The Safety Officer will reply on the action taken within three days for all serious or moderate hazards.

POD Note #3: All hands are encouraged to report unsafe conditions to their immediate supervisor. Supervisors should take prompt action to correct those situations, and crew members should be informed of these actions to make _____ a safer place to work and live.

POD Note #4: All hands are reminded of the following precautions around operating machinery: 1. Do not wear jewelry or loose fitting clothing. 2. Wear proper protective clothing and equipment. 3. Do not wear polyester, or synthetic clothing around hot or spark-producing equipment. 4. Observe posted safety precautions and warning labels.

POD Note #5: A complete safety survey of all work areas, processes and operations must be conducted at least annually. This survey is used to identify hazards. If you see a safety hazard, don't wait for the survey - report it now to the Safety Officer at _____.

POD Note #6: When passing stores in a working party, hand the boxes from person to person - NEVER throw boxes! Many injuries result from missing a thrown box, or catching a box and pulling a back muscle. Always wear safety shoes on working parties.

POD Note #7: All hands are reminded, as they move up and down ladders, the following safety rules apply: - Always keep one hand on the railing - Rings, watches, key rings, etc. may become entangled - Walk, don't run or slide - Avoid loose fitting clothing

POD Note #8: SLIP SLIDING AWAY! Sliding down a ladder, a railing or into home base can all be hazardous activities. A slide is movement out of control, usually fast, and with various outcomes. Sliding may seem fun, but cleaning blood off the deck where you fell is not fun! Let's be careful out there!

POD Note #9: When handling sharp materials, such as sheet metal or glass, leather gloves shall be worn. Leather gloves shall be worn over electrical safety rubber

gloves when working around sharp objects. These leather gloves are available at Tool Issue and from your Safety Petty Officer.

POD Note #10: Do you know of an unsafe situation? It is your duty to yourself and your shipmates to report it! Use the Safety Hazard Report (OPNAV 3120/5) form located at _____ and submit it to the Safety Officer. You may submit these hazard reports anonymously, if desired, just as long as you report it!

POD Note #11: Back Injury Prevention - If you have ever had a back injury, you know it can be one of the most painful of all injuries. Back injury can be prevented in the following ways: - Lift with your legs, not your back - Do exercises to strengthen your back - Avoid twisting when lifting - Get help for heavy loads

POD Note #12: Tried to report a safety hazard and not satisfied with the response. You have a right to report hazards and appeal the action if you are not satisfied with the corrective action. See the Safety Officer if you have any question about correcting a hazard.

POD Note #13: Non-skid strips are to be placed at the top and bottom of each ladder and on either side of doors with high coamings (greater than 6"). Non-skid strips are available from _____. Place the non-skid strips parallel to the door or ladder, with no space between strips.

POD Note #14: As all personnel know, Safety is everyone's concern. All hands are encouraged to report any unsafe or unhealthful work procedures or conditions to their immediate supervisor, the division Safety Petty Officer, or the Safety Office. Cooperation from all hands is essential to ensure a safe and healthy working environment.

POD Note #15: If you think something is an unsafe, unhealthy, dangerous practice or condition or violation of a safety or health regulation you may be right! Bring it to the attention of the work center supervisor, the Safety Officer. Or you can fill out a Safety Hazard Report form available in the work center and drop it off at the _____.

POD Note #16: HORSEPLAY HAZARDS: We all enjoy a good joke, but horsing around on the job is no laughing matter. In fact, horseplay is one of our most serious industrial "hazards" because it creates accidents through inattention, carelessness, and in many cases recklessness - which lead to "freak" or senseless accidents.

POD Note #17: The most dangerous evolution of a deployment may well be liberation. Prior to departing the ship have a plan, use the buddy system, stay alert. Avoid over indulgence in alcohol, don't be a victim. For specifics see OPNAVINST 5100.25A.

POD Note #18: Since many areas on the exterior of the ship are inaccessible to the crew from decks or built-in work platforms, it often becomes necessary to go "over the side" or "aloft" to reach these areas. Be sure to use the appropriate check sheet.

routed to the OOD and CDO before working aloft or over the side. Sample checksheets and safety precautions are in OPNAVINST 5100.19D Vol II, Chapte C-8.

POD Note #19: A few reminders when divers are working on our ship: - OOD's ensure "Code Alpha" is being displayed. - Ensure small boats not involved in the diving operation are kept at least 50 yards from the ship. - Do not throw anything over the side. - Follow all applicable tagout procedures.

POD Note #20: Safety: Safe and Healthful working conditions are the responsibility of everyone in the chain of command!

POD Note #21: Working Over The Side - Safety Tips - A completed check sheet must be routed to the OOD and CDO before going over the side. - Wear a safety harness with a Dyna-Brake safety lanyard and tending line. - Attach safety lanyards to all tools, if practical. - Wear an inherently buoyant lifejacket and hard hat with chin strap. (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D, Articles C0802 and C0803)

POD Note #22: Safety Note: According to OPNAVINST 5100.19D CH A2, all divisional safety petty officers need to be an E-5 or above and is appointed by the Division Officer.

POD Note #23: Detection of unsafe or unhealthful working conditions at the earliest possible time and prompt control of hazards identified as a result is essential to a successful NAVOSH program. All hands are encouraged to orally report unsafe or unhealthful working conditions to their immediate supervisor or the safety officer at _____. (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D Art A0203)

POD Note #24: AFLOAT SAFETY MANAGER. The Afloat Safety Manager NEC is available to E-5 through E-9 personnel meeting the eligibility requirements. Designated personnel will assist the Safety Officer in his many duties, including: coordinating the implementation of the Navy Safety Program, maintaining a complete safety library, monitoring and evaluating the ship's ability to identify hazards and prevent mishaps, assisting and advising in investigations and reporting of mishaps. If you are up to the challenge of becoming a true safety professional, contact the safety officer for further eligibility requirements. (IAW NAVPERS 18068F)

POD Note #25: Scott Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD). EEBD's are devices that provide 15 minutes of oxygen used for escape from life threatening atmospheres. A quick visual inspection is easily conducted by verifying the humidity indicator is blue and ensuring two one half inch black marks can be seen through the humidity indicator spot. For more information, refer to NSTM Chapt 077 and your DCPO.

POD Note #26: Shattered Light Bulb. In accordance with NSTM 330, if a light bulb shatters in its socket, deenergize and tag-out the circuit at the lighting power distribution panel before removing the light bulb. This is essential since the local switch controlling the fixture may open one side of the line while the other side remains energized at the fixture. Be safe, not sorry.

POD Note #27: Safety PMS: Does your workcenter have an eyewash station, deluge shower, acid/chemical locker or spill clean up kit? If so then your workcenter should carry the safety petty officer PMS MIP 6600. Inspect your workcenter spaces and ensure required eyewash stations are in place and being properly maintained. Know the requirements and ensure they are followed. When an accident happens, it's too late to make sure you're ready. (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D CH B0508 and OPNAVINST 4790.4C)

POD Note #28: All hands are reminded that the shipyard industrial environment produces continuous health hazards to be aware of. Welding, cutting and brazing operations are hazardous to the eyes from ultraviolet and infrared radiation in addition to skin burns and toxic fumes. Do not look directly at or observe welding or brazing operations and ensure spaces are well ventilated. Wear eye protection, head and ear protection at all times! (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D C1101)

POD Note #29: All hands are reminded to inspect before operating portable industrial equipment to ensure that the equipment is in good working condition and that all safety features are in place and in good working order. (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D C1304)

POD Note #30: The following are the proper ways to use hand tools. - Use tools only for the purpose for which they were designated. - Keep cutting edges sharp. Dull tools can slip. - Store tools so they cannot fall and be damaged or can cause injury. - Carry pointed or sharp edged tools in pouches or holsters. - Repair or replace tools when they are damaged. - Replace or refit loose or split handles. Keep handles secure and smooth. - Lubricate adjustable and other moving parts of tools to prevent wear and misalignment.

POD Note #31: All hands are reminded that, unless assigned to mooring detail, they are to remain clear of bow, stern and tug stations. Personnel on mooring details are to remain clear of danger zones when lines are under tension. (OPNAVINST 5100.19D, C0504 and film "Synthetic Line Snap Back")

POD Note #32: Safety Over the Side. When working over the side the following minimum personal protective equipment shall be worn: Safety harness with DYNA-BRAKE lanyard and working lanyard, an inherently buoyant life jacket (with buttonhole for safety harness), and a hard hat with chin strap. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.19D

POD Note #33: Safety Question: Who must approve a Men Working Aloft chit? Answer: The OOD/CDO (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D, C0802, Par a)

POD Note #34: Safety Question: Who is responsible for reporting any observed safety hazards or unsafe practices. Answer: All hands (IAW OPNAVINST 5100.19D, A0203, Par j)

POD Note #35: FIRE WATCHES NOTE: Don't get pushed around by civilian contractors. If they don't listen to you when point out an unsafe condition inform the OOD or EOOW. They will contact the Safety Officer. Safety is paramount. Taking shortcuts isn't worth the risk.

POD Note #36: Every crew member is a part of the ship's safety organization. If you see a hazardous situation - REPORT IT! Don't wait for the Safety Petty Officer or Master At Arms to find it.

POD Note #37: When working aloft, all hands are reminded to post a safety observer in the vicinity of, but not directly below the men working aloft. This safety observer shall be outfitted with harness, climber assembly and safety lanyard to provide immediate emergency assistance. (OPNAVINST 5100.19D, C0804)

POD Note #38: Have a safe time on liberty and practice safe sex. Remember the only true safe sex is abstinence. If you must partake use a condom. Condoms are available in sickbay. Pick some up before you leave on liberty.

POD Note #39: All Hands - Do you know where your escape trunk is located? Can you find it in the dark? Is it clear and uncluttered? Take the time to find the answers to these questions now. Don't wait until there's an emergency.

POD Note #40: Pumping Iron. Two MM3s were overhauling a pump during an IMA availability. They decided to move the pump rotor, which weighed 200 pounds, to a pump shop on another ship. Instead of getting rigging services, they manhandled the rotor up ladders, off the ship, up more ladders and through the galley to the pump shop. The next day, one of the men reported to sick bay with back pain. He was given three days bed rest and put on limited duty for two weeks. The moral of the story is: "When it's bigger than both of you, get some (rigging) help!"

POD Note #41: Hot Foot. Since the water heater in a shipboard galley wasn't working, the mess attendants drew hot water from the steam kettles to clean the deck. As they were throwing a bucket of the scalding hot water on the deck, another sailor came around the corner and received third degree burns to the leg. If it's hot enough to cook food, it's hot enough to cook you. Be careful!

POD Note #42: Safety? Sez Who? "No operational tasking is so expedient, real or perceived, as to compromise the safety of our personnel. No in-port period or liberty port should lull us into forgetting that safety is an all hands, all the time responsibility, for our shipmates and ourselves." – VADM Bennett, COMNAVSURFPAC.

POD Note #43: WESTPAC Treasures. After a liberty port, a SURFPAC ship had fire in a boiler uptake space. Turns out the port was famous for textile products. The fire resulted from recently purchased personal goods, clothing and blankets being placed against a hot boiler exhaust stack. Make sure your presents are stowed properly so you have them to give away!

POD Note #44: "Wait For Meeeee!" A sailor trying to make the departing shuttle boat ignored the coxswain and tried to jump. Since he wasn't an Olympic-grade broad jumper, he was unable to clear the six feet of water which lay between him and the boat and landed in the water. The coxswain tossed him a life ring and pulled him in. He didn't miss any work, but he is missing a stripe for disobeying

the coxswain's order.

POD Note #45: "What's Wrong With This Picture?" The configuration on one SURFPAC ship required a trapeze act to get into and out of the motor whale boat for routine maintenance. A petty officer was seriously injured when he fell on the trip back to the ship. If there's not a safe way to do something, let your supervisor know.

POD Note #46: "But I WASN'T Aloft!" When is "working aloft" not "working aloft"? How about when you're working near ANY vertical drop, like an elevator shaft or an access/escape trunk. Two sailors, under different circumstances, would have been spared the "sudden stop" if they'd been wearing "man aloft" gear. One of them died, the other got away with just a broken wrist. Don't let this happen to you!

POD Note #47: Stern Gate Safety. A BMSR was trying to undog a bolt on a stern gate. The bolt was tight, so he tried to break it free with his foot on a wrench. His foot slipped and he fell 25 feet to the deck below. He wasn't wearing a safety harness. He may be permanently partially disabled from his broken leg. This accident didn't happen as a result of procedural violation, no safety harness was required at the time. Good safety sense might have prevented this mishap.

POD Note #48: "Just Some Water Hammer." No, it's not a special tool, it's a shock wave travelling down a steam pipe. One ship found out how much impact it can create when a low pressure steam line ruptured, scalding three sailors. If something doesn't sound quite right, it probably isn't!

POD Note #49: Quality Assurance. Or 'QA' for short. It's a means of ensuring the repairs to a system meet acceptance standards. Each of us needs to apply QA in our maintenance actions. Do the materials you use, such as nuts and bolts, meet the requirements of the technical manual, ship's drawing or technical repair standard? If you don't know, you need to find out. What's more, if the individual repairing your equipment doesn't know, BOTH of you need to find out before the equipment (or system) is tested or operated. Failure to do so can be, and often is, fatal.

POD Note #50: A sailor was using a grinding wheel on a major component. The grinding wheel apparently bound up in the cutting slot, and came apart. The wheel hit him in the mouth. He lost half his front teeth, six of his lower teeth (three required root canals) and had 26 stitches in his lower lip. He was wearing all his protective gear, except for the face shield.

POD Note #51: A sailor was opening cans of jelly for the mess decks. Instead of completely removing the top, he opened the cans part way and bent the top back. He cut a tendon on a finger (surprise). Can lids are razor sharp. Treat them that way.

POD Note #52: A young sailor was moving a file cabinet off a pallet onto a truck. Instead of putting the cabinet on the truck bed, he put it on his foot and lost 14 days while he hobbled around on crutches. If it's bulky, heavy or just plain awkward, GET SOME HELP.

POD Note #53: While guarding aircraft on the flight line, a Marine was playing with his weapon and shot himself in the head. He was rushed to a hospital and put on life-support, but he died from the massive trauma. Guns are built to kill; they aren't toys.

POD Note #54: "The chances are a million to one I won't get hurt." Possibly. But random chance is exactly that: random. You might get away with it the first (pick number) of times, or you might get nailed the first time. Don't take chances, even the odds are with you.

POD Note #55: When a sailor was frocked to PO3, his 'buddies' enthusiastically "tacked on" his crow. His arm was so bruised the tissue became inflamed and he spent five days in the hospital. Advancement is a time of celebration and congratulations, not an excuse for venting frustration.

POD Note #56: A sailor was sitting on top of a locker. He decided to jump down, lost his balance and hit his head on the bulkhead. He died. Bones give before walls do. Be careful!

POD Note #57: A sailor was assigned to prime the overhead of a berthing compartment. Rather than get a ladder, he used a chair and a wall heater. The chair slipped; he fell and dumped the primer on his head and most of his body. The bruises he got and the primer stain will fade at about the same time.

POD Note #58: Cutbacks in spending and fewer operational days, means we need to intensify our training in port to maintain a razor edge on our operational capabilities. A lot can be learned at the deck-plate level.

POD Note #59: Two Marines were killed and two others injured in four separate on-duty mishaps involving horseplay with weapons. All believed the weapons were empty or on safe. Weapons are for killing intended targets, not for skylarking.

POD Note #60: Two Marines lost their lives when the driver lost control of an M60A1 tank. The driver was speeding, one Marine was allowed to ride on the outside of the vehicle, and the vehicle crew members were permitted to ride without their CVC helmets. All contributed to the fatalities. Standard Operating Procedures are meant to be followed.

POD Note #61: A LCPL died when he was swept under a river he was attempting to cross during training preparations. The investigation revealed the river was 75 feet across, the LCPL had no specific direction with respect to wet crossings, the wet crossing was attempted without ropes or flotation devices, the LCPL held a third class swimmer QUAL, and he was carrying 31 pounds of equipment when he entered the water. Training is only good for those who live through it. Be one of them.

POD Note #62: The Commandant of the Marine Corps said it, but it applies to everyone: "There is no place in our Corps [or Navy] for those who, on or off duty display a willful disregard for their own safety or the safety of their subordinates."

contemporaries... You are never off duty when safety is involved, and I expect everyone to understand that whenever two or more Marines [or sailors] gather - one is in charge. Whether you are taking a hill, playing volleyball or on liberty, real warriors take care of themselves, and they take care of each other."

POD Note # 63: A sailor used a belt sander to grind down a shim, even though he sensed it was the wrong thing to do. He didn't consult the operating manual or check the clearance between the belt and the tool rest. The rotating belt grabbed the shim and dragged it and his hand into the gap. After seven hours of surgery to reconnect severed nerves, arteries and tendons in all four fingers, he still faces permanent partial disability.

POD Note #64: During OBA training, a new sailor passed out after using a trainin canister. His shipmates noticed his face was blue, and immediately removed his mask. He had deep indentations on his forehead and behind his jawbone. Apparently, the facepiece was so tight it pinched the arteries in his neck, restrictir blood flow to his brain. New people need supervision during training evolutions.

POD Note #65: An individual opened a hatch to lower supplies. The automatic latch caught, but the locking pin was missing. After dropping off the supplies, the individual climbed up the ladder and grabbed the hatch to pull himself from the trunk. The latch dislodged and the hatch fell on his chest. Caught between the hatch and the knife edge, he broke two ribs. A similar incident killed another sailor.

POD Note #66: While painting, a spray gun clogged up. A sailor tried to clear it t running paint thinner through the gun. To see if the clog was free, he sprayed it at his hand. The high pressure cleaner hit his left index finger and rebounded off the bone and liga- ments toward his palm. He spent 14 days in the hospital. He wasn't an authorized user, nor had he received any training on the gun. If you don't know how to use it, DON'T!

POD Note #67: While coolly sliding down the handrails of a ladder, a sailor uncoolly caught his foot between the ladder treads, fell and broke his ankle. WALK up and down the ladders.

POD Note #68: A sailor was leaning back against a safety net while painting a pump room trunk. He turned, slipped and fell. He grabbed the safety net and swung over the edge, hitting his knee on a bulk- head. He released his hold and fe six feet to the lower deck. He was hospitalized with a fractured knee. A safety harness would have prevented pain and lost time.

POD Note #69: While standing on the rim of a deep-fat fryer cleaning the exhaus hood, a Navy person stepped into the hot grease. Can you believe this was done o a rocking, rolling ship? Use a ladder, and ensure the danger below doesn't reach u and snag you.

POD Note #70: A sailor removed a deck grating to apply preservative, but didn't rope off the area. After completing the job, he turned, stepped into the hole and fe to the lower level, cutting his leg on the piping support. Just goes to show you,

some people are their own worst enemy.

POD Note #71: A young petty officer sat on the top of the safety chain at the top of a mezzanine deck. The chain was improperly secured to its stanchions with marlin instead of being shackled. Both ends parted under the sailor's weight, and he fell about 15 feet to the welldeck. He lost 5 days, but could have lost his life. Two failures here: form over function ("Yeah, I put the chain back up."), and disregard of safety precautions (sitting on a safety chain).

POD Note #72: A sailor was preparing to paint using an automatic airless paint sprayer. He was unfamiliar with this model of sprayer and didn't realize it automatically maintains pressure. As he investigated the apparent failure, he placed his thumb under the operating piston. When the sprayer cycled and restarted, the piston crushed his thumb, removing flesh and nail. The safety guard was missing. Know your gear and keep it in safe working condition.

POD Note #73: Skylarking, horseplay, roughhousing, goofing around. No matter what you call it, it's dangerous and has no place aboard ship. In one instance, a newly reported sailor was wrestled to the ground for a "pink belly." The ligament in his right knee were damaged in the process. He now has a permanent partial disability.

POD Note #74: A Navy person was using his fingers, instead of the wrench in his back pocket, to loosen a large securing bolt on an inside bay door. The door shifted and he lost the tip of his finger. Man is known as the tool-using primate. Make sure you follow this evolutionary pattern.

POD Note #75: Four sailors suffered minor cuts and bruises when their paint float took on water, rolled and capsized. Seven people were on board, and all were wearing kapok life jackets. This may have saved one or more lives.

POD Note #76: A sailor was opening the locker under his bunk. Since he was in a hurry, he used his shoulder to support the bunk instead of the installed support. When he turned slightly, the bunk slipped off his shoulder and landed on his hand breaking two bones. Use installed safety devices -- your hands and fingers will love you for it, and so will your command.

POD Note #77: Machines don't suffer pangs of guilt. Keep those safety guards and devices in place. Tag it out before you work on it. Never rig a cheater for two-hand or deadman controls. No loose clothing, jewelry or gloves. Use a machine only if you've been trained in the operation. Violation of any one of these safety precautions can result in serious injury.

POD Note #78: A sailor was walking around a corner when he slipped on a freshly waxed floor. He lost 21 work days because of a broken leg and torn cartilage in his knee. "Wet deck" signs weren't posted.

POD Note #79: A sailor was acting as standby in a winch room to ensure the cable retracted into the grooves without twisting. He was leaning on the winch, waiting when the winch motor started without warning and caught the cuff of his long

sleeved shirt on a clip. He broke and cut his arm when it got pulled into the winch housing. Lack of communications, failure to stand clear of rotating machinery, and wearing long sleeves cost him some agony.

POD Note #80: In the military, a "can-do" attitude is a big help, but should never be confused with 'hope for the best'. When people are exhausted, they tend to do just that. Supervisors have to be aware that the worker will not admit to fatigue. Make sure they can do so without reprisal. Workers need to swallow pride and be honest about their capabilities. There are no "acceptable losses" in peacetime, especially in a training exercise.

POD Note #81: A sailor was cleaning the anchor windlass room, using a wire rope spool as a ladder to reach the high spots. When he stepped down, he sprained his ankle. Another crafty ladder disguising itself.

POD Note: #82: A sailor attached an aluminum cutting blade to an electric grinder. He was cutting a piece of aluminum sheet metal when the saw kicked back and down, penetrating his leg. Permanent partial disability. He wore all his safety gear but he wasn't using the right tool. If he'd used a cutting wheel instead of a grinder he'd have been protected by the safety guard.

POD Note #83: While mounting a tire, a Navy person was hit in the eye with a piece of metal. He'd been issued safety goggles, but wasn't wearing them. Another case of "it won't happen to me."

POD Note #84: A sailor was walking on deck toward an open hatch, but looking in another direction. No safety chains were installed around the hatch so he fell in, hitting his head. You can't rely on someone else to be perfect (like installing safety chains), so you've got to watch where you're walking.

POD Note #85: A sailor was lagging pipes in the overhead of a fireroom. The sailor stepped out onto a pipe, slipped and fell 20 feet. Where was the safety harness?

POD Note #86: A sailor was taking black powder out of dud salute charges that had been soaking in water for a month. He cleaned 3 of the charges and took a fourth out to soak it with a hose when he found the powder was still dry. He lit a cigarette on his way out, and sat down with it in his mouth as he banged the powder out of the charge. The resulting flash caused first- and second- degree burns to his face, neck and chest. Complacency? Maybe.

POD Note #87: A sailor was using a rag to clean dust of the drum cover in the back of a ship's laundry dryer. The dryer came on and the rag got wrapped around the sprocket, pulling his hand into the sprocket. He lost part of his index finger. He didn't tag the dryer out and paid a price for the lesson.

POD Note #88: Two sailors were painting a fan room in shifts. One of them noticed the other was unconscious and called for help. He was in intensive care for 2 days. The corpsman who assisted in removing the unconscious guy suffered nausea and dizziness. A third sailor who entered the space to set up the emergency

ventilation was also hospitalized for 2 days. Respirators would have helped a lot.

POD Note #89: A broken handle on a freezer door nearly killed one sailor. He'd gone inside for breakouts when someone else noticed the door was unlocked. The second person stuck his head in and called, but heard no answer, so he locked the door. About 30 minutes later, sounding and security heard the first guy yelling for help. The unfortunate "prisoner" was treated for hypothermia. Repair your faulty equipment so we don't have to depend on chance to keep from hurting someone.

POD Note #90: A sailor was on the pier scrubbing the ship's side. He leaned out to reach a little higher. The ship surged, he lost his footing and fell into the water between the ship and pier. He was lucky. Instead of being killed, he only bruised his ribs. Wearing a safety harness and shock absorber underneath a life jacket can prevent this type of mishap.

POD Note #91: The DC Central watch was playing with a rubber band when he shot himself in the eye. He was hospitalized for his 'pains'. Watchstanders like this don't inspire a lot of confidence in that ship's ability to control damage.

POD Note #92: One office worker amputated one toe and broke two others when he dropped a typewriter on his foot. Wearing steel-toed safety shoes instead of Corfams would have saved his toes. Safety shoes are required on board ship regardless of where you work. Do you have yours? Are they in good condition, and are you taking care of them? A little polish goes a long way in extending the life of your shoes. It's not just for appearance. It's also for preservation.

POD Note #93: While lifting a 40 lb toolbox, the phone rang, so the sailor balanced it against a book case. He felt a sharp stab of pain in his back. Diagnosis muscle strain. Just goes to show you it doesn't have to be heavy to hurt you. Improper lifting techniques and haste can cost you pain and physical problems in the future.

POD Note #94: Rocket scientist of the week: A sailor was cleaning a passageway when he was told he had to stay after liberty call to help prepare the space for painting. He got angry and hit the bulkhead, breaking his hand. Guess he showed them.

POD Note #95: A petty officer was pressure cleaning a space. He was wearing goggles. Only problem was they were the wrong kind. They had vents on the side instead of being the covered vent goggles. He hit a pocket of dust and debris. That combined with the soap and water, ran down his face, through the goggles and into his eyes. He was treated at the hospital for corneal abrasions to both eyes.

POD Note #96: A sailor was inspecting keel blocks from a drydock wall. He fell over safety chains and plunged 70 feet to his death. Heights can be deadly. Be careful when you're standing on an elevated platform.

POD Note #97: After a day of painting, a sailor was climbing down the scaffolding. He caught his wedding ring on a hook and amputated the end of his finger. If your spouse complains when you don't wear your wedding ring to work, relate this

incident. Wearing jewelry around an industrial setting is dangerous.

POD Note #98: If you've not yet made any New Year's resolutions, here's a few to try for a safer year. "I hereby resolve to ..." wear my safety belt; use the required safety gear for the task I'm starting; use the buddy system in port; not take foolish chances on liberty; treat firearms as if they were loaded; give my undivided attention to my task; buckle my children in their safety seats; pay attention to the safety notes in the POD.

POD Note #99: While performing maintenance, a sailor dropped his wrench in the bilges. He removed a deckplate, retrieved the wrench and set the deckplate back in place unsecured. He started to leave the job, the deckplate shifted and he fell through bruising his ribs. Moral: leave things as they should be, not necessarily as you found them.

POD Note #100: A security guard entered the guard house for protection when strong winds came up. The guard house was not tied down nor permanently attached to the ground. The wind blew the guard house over and the guard broke his wrist. Just goes to show that any port in a storm isn't necessarily good. Make sure you enter a safe port.

POD Note #101: Three sailors were assigned to move a power washer from one space to another. After carrying the washer up one ladder, they decided to use the ramps and a piece of line to haul the washer up to the next level. As 2 of them pulled, the other pushed from below. The line broke and the washer hit the lower guy in the head. Possible compression fracture of the spine. Rotten line = rotten break.

POD Note #102: One guy was using a 25,000 rpm grinder equipped with a 15,000 rpm wheel. The wheel broke up at the higher speed, hitting this guy in neck, jaw and collarbone. Mismatching a grinder and a wheel leads to this kind of incident all too often. Make sure you match them correctly. Color coding is one idea to ensure the right wheels are used on the right grinder.

POD Note #103: A sailor was using a portable grinder in an enclosed area. He was wearing goggles with vents on the side. The dust generated got into his eyes, causing corneal abrasions. These kind of goggles are primarily for chipping. If there's going to be a lot of airborne dust, or if there's liquids involved, you need to use the kind with covered vents. See the Safety Officer for the information.

POD Note #104: While changing the pad on a steam press, with the press open, a sailor bumped into one of the buttons which operate the press. Normally, two buttons, located several feet apart, have to be pushed to close the press. One of the two was stuck in the closed position, so the sailor ironed his arm. Two important lessons here: If a safety device is faulty or defeated, the equipment isn't safe anymore. Secondly, tag it out before doing maintenance.

POD Note #105: One individual was observing flight operations when he saw a piece of paper blow by and ran to chase it down before it damaged an engine (FOD). He tripped and fell on the non-skid, breaking 2 teeth and cutting his lip,

nose and both hands. Flight decks are dangerous; that's why people get extra pay for working there. Be careful.

POD Note #106: As so often happens, this safety notice was written in blood. A sailor was using a paper shredder when it blew a fuse. He removed the protective cover, replaced the fuse and turned the shredder back on to test it. His hand, resting on the plastic cover of the motor, got caught by the chain drive and pulled into the shredder blades, amputating two of his fingers. This particular brand of shredder isn't designed with a safety interlock to keep it from operating without the protective cover, but now has a sign that reads, "Don't energize when the cover is removed."

POD Note #107: Unwritten policies are dangerous because they can be ambiguous and misinterpreted. If a procedure or job is to be done in a specific manner, give it the appropriate degree of attention. Write it down. The longer a policy is left unwritten, the greater the chance people will be confused. Be ready; be professional; be specific.

POD Note #108: A sailor was washing an airplane when cleaning solution leaked under his safety goggles and into both eyes. He was treated for mild irritation. A classic case of safety equipment not working because it wasn't used properly. The goggles were worn loosely, therefore uselessly.

POD Note #109: A young man was standing on the pier after emptying garbage. His friend called down from the ship to see if he wanted a cigarette. He said yes, his shipmate threw him a lit cigarette. It hit him in his eye and burned his pupil. He was lucky, though, it only cost him 2 work days. He might have been blinded.

POD Note #110: When mishaps occur, the command seems to become extremely attuned to mishap prevention. Why wait? If we can generate the concern after the mishap, we can generate it before the mishap, and thus avoid it. Plan ahead for a safe task instead of trying to piece the facts together after an incident. It's a lot easier, and a lot less painful.

POD Note #111: A lot of times we are tempted to overextend ourselves and say "I can save this (pick a situation)." Loyalty to the mission or equipment should only last as long as it doesn't risk injury to personnel. Sometimes it's a better call to fold the hand than try to bluff it out.

POD Note #112: MLOC is an acronym familiar to the engineers, but in this case it stands for "momentary lapse of concentration." It can rear its ugly head at anytime and is often responsible for some of the worst disasters. How to combat it? Concentrate totally on the task at hand. Leave complacency, nonchalance and distractions some where else.

POD Note #113 Comparing 1999, 2000, and 2001 safety data reveals a mixed bag of results. The number of Navy people killed in private vehicle accidents is down through the '90s as is the number killed in off-duty accidents. Fewer sailors are dying aboard ship as well. On the down side, the number of Class A mishaps is on a plateau for 1997-2001 in all Naval communities (aviation, ship, submarine and

shore), but is lower than 1993. We're doing some things right, obviously, we just need to continue to pay attention to detail in our equipment operations.

POD Note #114 Heat stress is a safety program that traditionally only draws attention during engineering plant readiness inspections, or when operating near the equator. It needs attention all the time. A class bravo fire on one ship was directly attributed to failure to take the appropriate actions for the heat stress readings logged. How's this for an obvious statement: If it doesn't meet the safety criteria, it's UNSAFE. Don't ignore the heat stress program just because the inspectors aren't aboard.

POD Note #115: During one fiscal year, the Navy lost enough sailors to man a frigate, 354 good men and women. 244 to motor vehicle accidents (1855 injured), 52 killed in recreation and home accidents (2515 injured), 36 in aviation mishaps, 11 aboard ships and submarines, 9 at shore activities, and 2 in diving accidents. Why? There are probably 354 answers, but many have common threads. Like no safety belts, no helmets, alcohol impairment, or taking chances. Believe it, it CAN happen to you.

POD Note #116: Safety and the Golden Rule. Safety in any organization is very much a matter of the Golden Rule. You know, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." If we all keep an eye out for each other and spot the hazards around the ship or in the way we're doing things, pretty soon, we'll have all the hazards identified and on the way to being corrected. What's more, it will build camaraderie between all of us. And that's good for everybody.

POD Note #117: Planning and preparation goes a long way to making any evolution safer. Plenty of lead time allows you to pre-brief, including safety aspects. This will get you thinking about safe work practices, lessons learned, and short and long term goals. Then you can work slowly back up to speed, concentrating on basics, doing the job right the first time, and review everybody's progress as you go. Trouble spots are identified early on, and there's no last minute crunch to 'fix' the problems.

POD Note #118: With the continuing draw down in both funding and manpower, we need to pay close attention to how we distribute our assets, from the command level on down to the deckplates. We can stretch ourselves pretty thin trying to do the same job with fewer resources. In the end, we have to sober up and face the reality of reducing commitments. One way to help is to prioritize our tasking, and do what we can on the "high pri" jobs. Then, we have to let our supervisors know what just can't get done, and the reason why.

POD Notes#119: Did you know that one of the most stressful times of the year for many people occurs just prior to and right after the Christmas and New Year's holidays? These times bring many happy emotions, but they can also cause anxiety, anger and even depression. It's especially important right now to ensure you're focused on the task at hand. Stop and think before you take actions which might be compulsive in nature. Proper safety rules and common sense are especially important at this time of year.

POD Note #120: Sometimes, in a hurry to get a job done, people bypass safety procedures. This happened in a metal forming plant. The end result was the employee operating a particular machine with two safety devices bypassed crushed his wrist. You're inviting disaster when you bypass either safety procedures or safety devices. Don't let this happen on .

POD Note #121: Navy studies indicate the back is the most injury prone part of the body. Most people will suffer back pain at some point in their life. Preventing a back injury is easier than correcting one. Injuries can be avoided by using proper lifting methods, reducing load weight, and taking care to avoid twisting when lifting or carrying a heavy load.

POD Note #122: There is an ever increasing use of aerosol containers on board Naval vessels. The contents of these containers are pressurized and extreme caution must be used to prevent punctures or overheating. Storage, handling, and use requirements are found in OPNAVINST 5100.19D, article C2310.

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Force Safety Share Folders and Web Page Links

Get to them by clicking on the web page link(s) below for the Force Safety share folders or double-click on Network Neighborhood (on the desktop), Entire Network, Pax6, and then 'Paustjm'.

Force Safety: Force Safety 'safety msgs' (on the LAN)
Force Mishap Reports: Mishap Reports 'mishap (sirs)' (on the LAN – password required)
Safety Links: Links (on the LAN)

Select from a variety of topics under 'safety msgs' shared folders which includes:

- A. Force CO Safety Policy
- B. SafetyLine
- C. Safety Council Minutes (Officers, Maint, etc.)
- D. Safety Representatives
- E. Messages for each Platform (P-3, C-130, etc.)
- F. Safety Center Messages
- G. Posture Report
- H. Safety Links
- and others

No 'password' is needed.

=====

Select from a list of platforms under 'mishap (sirs)' shared folders, which includes mishap incident reports for:

- A. C-12
- B. C-130
- C. C-2
- D. E-2
- E. E-6
- F. Misc aircraft of interest
- G. P-3
- H. S-3
- I. T-2
- J. T-34

'Password' is required. *** Privileged information – contact your Department Head or the Force Safety Office to request a password.

***THE FORCE SAFETY DEPARTMENT - OUR GOAL:
"FULL SPECTRUM FLIGHT TEST FOR THE FLEET...DONE SAFELY"***



14 May 2002

MEMORANDUM

From: Safety Officer
To: Commanding Officer
Chief Test Pilot

Subj: MONTHLY SAFETY POSTURE REPORT FOR APRIL 2002

Ref: (a) NAVAIRINST 3750.5B

1. The following Safety Posture Report is submitted for April 2002.

2. AVIATION SAFETY:

a. Flight/Flight-Related Mishaps						
Month	A	0	B	0	C	0
CY-02	A	0	B	0	C	0
Date of Last:	A	04/29/92	B	08/15/80	C	04/04/01
Mishap Free Hours	A	38,015.6	*B	38,640.6	C	4,841.5

b. Aircraft Ground Related Mishaps						
Month	A	0	B	0	C	0
CY-02	A	0	B	0	C	0
Date of Last:	A	06/11/93	B	None	C	11/22/96
Mishap Free Hours	A	35,290.6	*B	38,640.6	C	22,450.6

* Since 1 January 1992

	This Month	CY-02	CY-01
c. Hazard Reports	2	3	13
1) General Hazard Reports	1	2	5
2) Bird Strikes	1	1	8
3) Near Midair Collision	0	0	0
4) Physiological Incidents	0	0	0
d. Pre-Mishap Drills	0	0	1
e. Safety Survey	0	0	2
f. Aircraft Mishap Board Training	0	1	2
g. Fire Drill	0	2	2

3. FLIGHT DATA:

Category	Apr 02	Apr 01	CY-02	CY-01
a. Total Flight Hours	415.7	411.9	1,262.0	4,746.0
1) Day	392.0	404.2	1,183.1	4,190.2
2) Night	23.6	7.7	78.8	555.8
b. Total Sorties	178	193	584	2,063
c. Total Test Flight Hours *1	94.7	150.5	386.7	1,898.2
d. Total Test Flight Sorties *1	22	80	129	641
e. FCF Hours *2	16.5	16.0	53.7	175.2

3. FLIGHT DATA: (con't)

Category	Apr 02	Apr 01	CY-02	CY-01
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f. FCF Sorties *2	10	14	38	154
g. Average Pilot Hours	17.7	16.1	13.6	16.7
1) Day	17.1	15.8	12.9	14.7
2) Night	0.6	0.3	0.8	2.1
h. Average NFO Hours	15.1	7.5	12.0	11.3
i. Total Landings	678	543	2,213	5,575
1) Day	577	541	1,859	5,125
2) Night	101	2	265	450
3) Carrier	0	0	89	10

*1. Test Hours and Sorties comprised of 'Flight Purpose Codes' 2K7, 2K9, 2L0, 2L7, and 2L9.

*2. FCF Hours and Sorties comprised of 'Flight Purpose Codes' 2K1 and 2K2.

4. AIRCREW DATA:

Category	Hours in April FY-02	Hours in March FY-02	Hours in February FY-02	FY-02 Average Hours/Month
j. Low Time Pilots (Averaging less than 10 hours per month for - Fiscal Year in Squadron)				
BLACK	8.1	6.5	12.3	8.7
BRENNAN	9.9	14.3	12.5	5.5
DEBOLD	10.3	2.9	4.4	9.2
FERREIRA	5.1	17.3	14.6	9.5
GUFFEY	2.7	1.7	9.6	4.8
GUIDRY	2.1	3.9	12.5	2.6
HARRIS	9.7	2.3	11.0	9.9
JACKSON	14.1	4.0	3.6	4.3
LOY	13.2	3.4	2.3	4.3
PARK	11.2	15.9	0.0	4.4
PHILLIPS	9.8	0.0	0.0	6.5
STRAHM	5.1	6.5	10.3	7.1
k. Low Time NFO's (Averaging less than 5 hours per month for - Fiscal Year in Squadron)				
PHILLIPS	11.4	3.3	0.0	3.0
VIVONA	0.0	3.8	0.0	2.0
l. Low Time Enlisted Aircrew (Averaging less than 5 hours per month for - Fiscal Year in Squadron)				
BRACKETT	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5
CORNELL	5.7	0.0	0.0	0.8
CORNOYER	0.5	4.5	7.6	3.0
DAWN	0.0	4.8	5.8	3.9
DIRKIN	1.8	5.0	6.8	3.7
ESTES	0.0	6.5	0.0	3.9
FERRY (New)	0.0	0.0	xxx	0.0
HOFFMAN	0.0	6.0	18.1	3.4
HUSE	0.0	4.3	1.8	3.6
KARSA	3.1	6.5	10.3	2.8
LINDSAY	4.2	0.0	0.0	2.3
MYERS	4.7	0.0	0.0	4.4
PALMER	0.0	2.2	7.6	1.4
PAYNE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Category	Hours in April FY-02	Hours in March FY-02	Hours in February FY-02	FY-02 Average Hours/Month
1. Low Time Enlisted Aircrew (con't) (Averaging less than 5 hours per month for - Fiscal Year in Squadron)				

PENNINGTON	4.2	0.0	1.4	4.6
POAG	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
REDFIELD	6.7	10.3	2.8	4.2
ROCKEY	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6
SALCIDO	11.3	0.0	0.0	2.8
SALTZMAN	5.5	0.0	11.4	4.4
SANKOVIC	5.1	0.0	0.0	3.5
SANTAMARIA	3.0	6.0	4.3	3.7
SCANLON	15.0	1.1	2.1	4.8
SMITH, R	0.0	0.0	8.0	3.3
SMITH, S	0.0	8.8	5.5	3.6
VEIT	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7
WATKINS	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6

5. GROUND SAFETY:

a. Personal Injuries	This Month	CY-02	CY-01	Type Codes	
1. Total	1	6	15	(Y)es	
a. On-Duty	1	3	8	(N)o	
b. Off-Duty	0	3	7	(O)ther	
2. Motor Vehicle	0	0	6	(M)otor Vehicle	
3. Recreational	0	4	3	(R)ecreational	
b. Fatalities/Total Disability	0	0	0	(F)atality/(D)isablilty	
c. DWI	0	0	2		
d. Anymouse Submissions	0	0	1		
e. E-mail Submissions	1	4	4		
f. Injury Summary				Injury Received (Y/N)	
Date (CY-02)	Rank	Summary	On Duty	Off Duty	Type Code
04/29/02	AT1	Sprained right ankle - basketball (PT)	Y		R
03/08/02	Ssgt	Tear/pull right shoulder - bicycle		Y	R
03/06/02	Lcpl	Twisted/rolled ankle - basketball		Y	R
01/28/02	AD1	Injured nose – bolt cutters	Y		O
01/14/02	AME1	Sprained Ankle – 4 wheeling truck		Y	R
01/07/02	AZ1	Cut thumb - moving office furniture	Y		O
Date (CY-01)	Rank	Summary	On Duty	Off Duty	Type Code
12/15/01	AO1	Cut nose and below eye - P-3 Flap	Y		O
12/04/01	ATC	Lump/cut above eye - Bungie cord	Y		O
11/14/01	AM1	Cut Above Eye - Exiting P-3 HSC	Y		O
10/26/01	AT2	Bruised Hand - Buoy Load Inflight	Y		O
07/20/01	AME1	Cut Fingers - Wood Joiner		Y	O
07/20/01	AD3	Motorcycle Accident		Y	M
07/18/01	AD2	Auto Accident - Duty Van	Y		M
07/03/01	AT2	Auto Accident - Duty Truck	Y		M
06/05/01	AE1	Auto Accident – Rear Ended		Y	M
05/23/01	Lcpl	Strained Elbow – Gym		Y	O
05/20/01	LCDR	Auto Accident – Roll over		N	M
05/03/01	LT	Sprained Ankle – PRT run	Y		O
05/03/01	AD1	Auto Accident – T-bone	N		M
04/30/01	AD2	Cut Finger – Acft Maint	Y		O
04/07/01	Sgt	Cut Eye Brow – Rugby		Y	R
04/05/01	AE1	Broke Wrist – Softball		Y	R
03/14/01	AMH1	Sprained Knee – Racquetball		Y	R

6. MISCELLANEOUS:

EVENT	NEXT EVENT	LAST EVENT
a. Safety Standdown	05/16/02	01/10/02
b. Stan Board Meeting	TBA	01/30/02
c. Force Officer Safety Council Meeting (FOSC)	05/21/02	04/16/02
d. Force Safety Council Meeting (FSC/FMSC)	05/28/02	04/30/02
e. Human Factor Council (Aircrew)	07/23/02	04/30/02
f. Human Factor Council (Maintenance)	07/23/02	04/30/02

	This Month	CY-02	CY-01
h. NATOPS Change Recommendations:	0	0	0
i. Periodical Articles Submitted:	2	2	0
j. Periodical Articles Published:	0	0	0
k. FORCE Safety Pro Submitted:	3	5	14

l. NATOPS Unit Evaluations:	Platform	Next	Last
	T-34	10/02	10/01
	P-3	12/02	06/01
	S-3	07/02	03/01
	T-2	06/02	06/01
	E-2/C-2	06/02	06/01
	E-6	03/03	03/02
	C-130	10/02	04/01

Very respectfully,

//signed//

J. A. Harris

LT USN

Copy to: XO, MO, OPS, All PC'S, CSPO, Share Folder, FOSC Folder, FSC Folder

